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ABSTRACT 
 
Matter and Form: Towards an Animalist Conception of Personal Identity 
 
by 
 
Keith A. Hess 
 
In this dissertation, I defend an answer to the following question in the diachronic 
personal identity debate: what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for our 
persistence over time? Two popular approaches to answering this question are the 
psychological and the somatic approach. On the former approach, we persist in virtue of 
some sort of psychological continuity. So, some proponents of the psychological 
approach think that we cease to exist if we lose certain features of our psychology such as 
our memories, beliefs, and rationality. On the latter approach, we persist in virtue of some 
sort of physical continuity. Eric Olson defends a version of the somatic approach called 
animalism. On his view, we are numerically identical to biological organisms and we 
persist if and only if the organisms we are persist. Although Olson’s animalism has some 
benefits, it also faces some challenges. For example, many people would say that we go 
wherever our brains go (if we go anywhere at all) because our brains (more specifically, 
our cerebra) realize the aspects of our psychology traditionally associated with persons, 
such as memories, beliefs, rationality, and self-awareness. But on Olson’s animalism, our 
psychology has nothing to do with our persistence and we go wherever our bodies go 
rather than our cerebra. Following Aristotle and Aquinas, I lay out an animalist view of 
vi 
 
our persistence called hylomorphic animalism. On this view, we are numerically identical 
to rational animals, which are living bodies composed of prime matter and a rational soul. 
Furthermore, we persist if and only if the composite of matter and rational soul persists. I 
claim that hylomorphic animalism makes better sense of certain contemporary personal 
identity thought experiments than Olson’s animalism. For example, contra Olson, I argue 
that our psychology does have something to do with our persistence and that we go 
wherever our brains go.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The diachronic personal identity debate in philosophy centers on finding 
necessary and sufficient conditions for our persistence over time. The notion of identity 
involved is numerical identity rather than qualitative identity. The latter notion concerns 
similarity between objects. Object X and Object Y can be more or less similar and they 
are exactly similar if and only if every property that one object possesses the other 
possesses. Numerical identity concerns numerical sameness. Object X and Object Y are 
numerically identical if and only if they are one and the same object. Applied to persons, 
person1 is numerically identical to person2 if and only if person1 and person2 are one and 
the same person.1 If the personal identity debate centers around our persistence 
conditions, what is meant by our persistence? Simply put, the debate concerns human 
persons like you and me and Donald Trump.2 In specifying the debate in this way, I do 
not intend to say that it only concerns our persistence qua persons. That is, the central 
question of the diachronic personal identity debate is not the following:  
(1) If a [human] person x exists at one time and a [human] person y exists at 
another time, under what possible circumstances is it the case that x is y?3  
                                                            
1 Throughout this dissertation, unless specified otherwise, when I speak of identity, I mean 
numerical identity.  
  
2 Eric Olson, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
8. But what is a human person? See Jens Johansson, “What Is Animalism?,” Ratio 20, no. 2 (2007), 202 – 
204 for discussion. In addition, some philosophers distinguish between animals and organisms. See Mark 
Johnston, “‘Human Beings’ Revisited: My Body Is Not an Animal,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, ed. 
Dean Zimmerman, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pgs 55-56 and Sydney Shoemaker, “On 
What We Are,” in The Oxford Handbook to the Self, ed. S. Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 352–71, pg. 353. 
 
3 Eric Olson, “Personal Identity,” ed. Edward Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Winter 2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-personal/. 
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While (1) is a legitimate question and worthy of investigation, it is not the persistence 
question of the personal identity debate if the debate concerns our persistence. After all, it 
rules out any view of our persistence that denies person essentialism, the view that 
persons are persons essentially. For example, on Eric Olson’s version of animalism – a 
view much discussed in this dissertation – we start out as nonpersons, become persons in 
the process of normal development, and might one day cease to be persons while 
continuing to exist. We should not exclude Olson’s view of our persistence from the 
debate simply in virtue of the way we formulate the debate’s main question. Given this, 
we should formulate the question so that it is neutral on whether or not we could cease to 
be persons. A better formulation of the central question of the personal identity debate is 
this:  
(2) If a [human] person x exists at one time and something y exists at another time, 
under what possible circumstances is it the case that x is y?4  
 
 Other questions of personal identity are related to but distinct from (2).5 For 
example, one might wonder how we can know whether person1 is identical to person2.6 
Being able to tell that one person is numerically identical to another or that they are 
distinct is different from what makes them identical or distinct. Though the evidential 
question will arise in this dissertation, the focus will be on what numerical identity over 
time consists in.  
                                                            
4 Ibid.   
 
5 Ibid.  
 
6 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 203.   
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The question of our persistence is not the same as the question of what we are.7 
Thomson calls this a distinction between personal identity and personal ontology: the 
former concerns our persistence while the latter concerns our metaphysical makeup.8 A 
central question regarding our personal ontology is this: are we solely material beings, 
solely immaterial, or some composite of the two? An incomplete but informative way of 
answering this question is to identify our actual metaphysical makeup. This does not 
identify what we essentially are, but what we actually are (whether this is makeup is 
contingent or not). An answer to the question of what we actually are does not entail an 
answer to what we essentially are. For example, perhaps we are identical to organisms 
and organisms are essentially organic but it is possible for us to survive the replacement, 
over time, of all of our organic parts with inorganic ones. This view of what we are does 
not entail that identity is contingent (where contingent identity is as follows: it is not the 
case that if x is identical to y, then necessarily, x is identical to y). Rather, this view 
entails that being an organism is a phase in our existence much like being a teenager is. 
At one time we are identical to teenagers (or organisms), but we can exist without being 
teenagers (or organisms). To give a full answer to the question of what we are, one must 
say what we are essentially. If we are essentially organisms, then we cannot exist without 
being organisms. Therefore, an answer to the question of what we are essentially will 
entail an answer to the question of our persistence. That is, the claim that we are 
essentially organisms entails the claim that we persist if and only if the organisms we are 
                                                            
7 Eric Olson, What Are We? 17. 
8 J. J. Thomson, “People and Their Bodies,” in Reading Parfit, ed. J. Dancy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997), 204-205. 
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persist. Given this, Olson and Thomson recommend approaching the personal identity 
debate by first giving an account of what we are essentially and then using that to 
determine our persistence conditions.  
Nevertheless, note that an answer to the persistence question does not entail an 
answer to the question of what we are essentially. Suppose one answers the persistence 
question by claiming that we persist if and only if certain aspects of our psychology such 
as our memories, beliefs, desires, etc. persist. (This answer to the persistence question 
qualifies as a psychological approach to the diachronic personal identity debate, an 
approach which is discussed below in more detail.) This says nothing of whether these 
aspects of our psychology are realized in a material substance, an immaterial substance, 
or no substance at all. That is, it says nothing about our metaphysical makeup (essential 
or otherwise). John Locke held to a psychological approach to personal identity, but 
remained neutral on whether the psychology was in a material substance, an immaterial 
substance, or different substances at different times:  
It is plain consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to ages past, 
unites existences and actions, very remote in time, into the same person, as well as it 
does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment; so that 
whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to 
whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah's 
flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now; I 
could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last 
winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self, place that 
self in what substance you please, than that I who write this am the same myself now 
whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance, material or immaterial, or 
no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not 
whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances; I being as much 
concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years 
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since, appropriated to me now by this self-awareness, as I am for what I did the last 
moment.9 
 
The question of what we are and the question of our persistence are both distinct 
from another traditional question in the personal identity literature – the personhood 
question, that of “what it is to be a person, as opposed to a nonperson.”10 Answering the 
personhood question does not tell us whether we are essentially persons or whether we 
can cease to be persons and continue to exist.11 Thus, without knowing beforehand 
whether we are essentially persons, it will not inform us of our nature or persistence. 
However, if we are essentially persons, then answering the personhood question will 
inform us of our nature and will help us determine what sorts of scenarios we can 
survive. For example, John Locke defined a person as “a thinking intelligent being, that 
has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in 
different times and places.”12 If this is right and if we are essentially persons defined as 
thinking, intelligent and reflective beings, then we cannot survive without thinking 
possessing intelligence and capacities for reflection.13  
                                                            
9 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Alexander Fraser Campbell (New 
York: Dover, 1959), chapter 27.  
 
10 Olson, What Are We? 16.   
 
11 Note, though, that an answer to the personhood question entails an answer to (1). 
 
12 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, chapter 27. Note that he 
distinguished between a person and a man. Men do not have the same nature as persons and have 
different persistence conditions.  
 
13 Note that some are skeptical about attempts to define “person” and claim that “our 
conception of persons is indeterminate.” For example, see Matti Eklund, “Personal Identity and 
Conceptual Incoherence,” Noûs 36, no. 3 (2002): 465–85; Matti Eklund, “Personal Identity, Concerns, and 
Indeterminacy,” The Monist 87, no. 4 (2004): 489–511; Mark Johnston, “Relativism and the Self,” in 
Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation, ed. M. Krausz (Notre Dame University Press, 1989); Nicholas 
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The psychological approach and the somatic approach are two prominent 
approaches to the diachronic personal identity debate.14 On the psychological approach, 
“some psychological relation is necessary or sufficient (or both) for one to persist.”15 For 
example, John Locke believed that persons persist in virtue of the persistence of the same 
consciousness:  
In this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: And as far 
as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far 
reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the 
same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. 
Further: 
It is plain consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to ages past, 
unites existences and actions, very remote in time, into the same person, as well as it 
does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment; so that 
whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to 
whom they both belong.16 
                                                            
Measor, “Persons, Indeterminacy and Responsibility,” The Philosophical Review 87, no. 3 (1978): 414–22; 
Ingmar Persson, “The Indeterminacy and Insignificance of Personal Identity,” Inquiry 35, no. 2 (June 1, 
1992): 271–83; Theodore Sider, “Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001): 189–209. Quotation from Eklund, “Personal Identity, Concerns, and 
Indeterminacy,” 491.  
 
14 Other approaches include the soul approach (where sameness of person consists in sameness 
of soul), the bodily approach (where sameness of person consists in sameness of body) (discussed below), 
and the anticriterial approach (also called the simple view). Regarding anticriterialism, it says that “No sort 
of continuity is absolutely necessary or absolutely sufficient for you to survive. The only correct answer to 
the Persistence Question is that a person here now is identical with a past or future being if and only if 
they are identical. There are no informative, non-trivial persistence conditions for people.;” Eric Olson, 
“Personal Identity,” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, ed. Stephen Stich and Ted Warfield 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing LTD, 2003), 358-59. 
 
15 Olson, “Personal Identity,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Proponents include John 
Locke; Lynne Rudder Baker, Harold Noonan, Derek Parfit, and Sydney Shoemaker: Lynne Rudder Baker, 
Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge University Press, 2000); John Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding; Harold Noonan, “Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current 
Controversy,” Philosophical Quarterly 48, no. 192 (1998): 302–18; Parfit, Reasons and Persons; Sydney 
Shoemaker, “Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account,” in Personal Identity, by Richard Swinburne and 
Sydney Shoemaker (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 67–132; 139–152.  
 
16 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, chapter 27.   
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Memory played an important role in his account of consciousness and some even say that 
Locke believed that “a person, x, existing at one time, t1, and a person, y, existing at a 
later time, t2, y is identical with x if and only if y remembers experiences had by x.”17 
Call this account of personal identity (whether or not Locke actually subscribed to it) the 
Lockean account.  
The Lockean account has a certain benefit. To see this, consider a case of brain 
transplant involving Brown and Johnson.18 Brown and Johnson are identical twins who 
have their brains removed and Brown’s brain is placed into Johnson’s body. The person 
who results from the transplant—that is, the person who results from the combination of 
Brown’s brain and Johnson’s body—possesses the same memories as pre-operation 
Brown. Since humans go wherever their memory goes, the Lockean account says that the 
person who results from the transplant is numerically identical to the pre-operation 
Brown. This goes for all brain transplants—the person who “donates” his brain will go 
along with his brain during the transplant and will find himself in a new body post-
operation. This result of the Lockean account concerning brain transplants seems to fit 
our intuitions about what happens in such cases. That is, many people would say that we 
go wherever our brains go (if we go anywhere at all) because our brains (more 
specifically, our cerebra) realize the aspects of our psychology traditionally associated 
with persons, such as memories, beliefs, rationality, and self-awareness. In the personal 
                                                            
 
17 Stephan Blatti, “Animalism,” ed. Edward Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Summer 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/animalism/>. 
 
18 This case is made famous by Sydney Shoemaker, Self-knowledge and self-identity (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1963), 23-24. Carter, Johnston, and Olson also discuss it; Carter, “How to Change 
Your Mind,” 11; Johnston, “Human Beings.” 
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identity literature, this intuition is called the transplant intuition.19 Here is a simple way 
to put it: you go wherever your psychology goes (that is, the aspects of your psychology 
mentioned above).  
But there are certain classic difficulties for the Lockean account. To avoid these 
difficulties, contemporary proponents of the psychological approach revise the Lockean 
account in certain typical ways.20 In laying out these revisions, I rely on Parfit’s 
explication of the psychological approach in Reasons and Persons.21 First, Bishop Butler 
pointed out that the memory criterion for personal identity is circular.22 This is because it 
is arguably a feature of the meaning of “remembers” that a person cannot remember 
doing or perceiving or imagining something she did not do, perceive or imagine. So, 
some have argued that our common concept of memory presupposes personal identity, 
and thus, that we cannot use our concept of memory to analyze personal identity in a 
fully non-circular way.23it. In response, certain proponents of the psychological approach 
invoke the concept of quasi-memory, where, according to Sydney Shoemaker, a “person 
quasi-remembers a past experience or action if he has a memory experience that is caused 
                                                            
19 Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 42. An empirical study by Bruno and Nichols found that the transplant intuition is 
commonly held. M. Bruno and S. Nichols, “Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical Study,” 
Philosophical Psychology 23 (2010): 293–312. Furthermore, neuroscience seems to show that the 
cerebrum does realize these aspects of our psychology: “Brain Anatomy, Anatomy of the Human Brain;” 
“Brain Basics: Know Your Brain,” National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, accessed May 
18, 2017, https://www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/Patient-Caregiver-Education/Know-Your-Brain; Rogers, 
The Brain and the Nervous System, 12-13, 20, 23. 
 
20 Olson, “Personal Identity,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   
 
21 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chapters 10-11. See also, Sydney Shoemaker, “Personal Identity: A 
Materialist’s Account,” 80-88.   
 
22 Shoemaker, “Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account,” 88. 
   
23 I owe my formulation of the circularity objection to Aaron Zimmerman.   
9 
 
in some appropriate way by that past action or experience.”24 He further comments that it 
“may be theoretically possible for a person to quasi-remember past experiences or 
actions—i.e., to have the experience of remembering them as his own—even though they 
are not in fact his own.”25. Invoking quasi-memory avoids Butler’s circularity objection 
because my quasi-remembering an experience does not presuppose (or analytically entail) 
that I had that experience. 
Second, since the Lockean account makes memory a necessary condition of 
personal identity, it follows that a person cannot lose her memory yet continue to exist. 
However, it seems intuitively that losing your memory isn’t fatal. To avoid this absurd 
result, some proponents of the psychological approach appeal to other types of 
psychological connections in addition to memory to ground identity over time, including 
beliefs, desires, tastes, talents, character, and the connection between an intention and the 
act that carries out the intention.26 Other proponents of the psychological approach say 
                                                            
24 Sydney Shoemaker, “Personal Identity,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed July 5, 2017, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/personal-identity. Shoemaker is the first to introduce the concept of 
quasi-memory. “Persons and Their Pasts,” American Philosophical Quarterly 7, no. 4 (1970), 271: “I shall 
say that remembering a past event involves there being a correspondence between the rememberer’s 
present cognitive state and a past cognitive and sensory state that was ‘of’ the event. In actual memory 
this past cognitive and sensory state is always a past state of the rememberer himself. What we need to 
consider is whether there could be a kind of knowledge of past events such that someone’s having this 
sort of knowledge of an event does involve there being a correspondence between his present cognitive 
state and a past cognitive and sensory state that was of the event, but such that this correspondence, 
although otherwise just like that which exists in memory, does not necessarily involve that past state’s 
having been a state of the very same person who subsequently has the knowledge. Let us speak of such 
knowledge, supposing for the moment that it is possible, as ‘quasi-memory knowledge,” and let us say 
that a person who has this sort of knowledge of a past event ‘quasi-remembers’ that past event.”  
  
25 Sydney Shoemaker, “Personal Identity,” Encyclopedia Britannica.  
  
26 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 205; Shoemaker holds to such a view. He identifies us with 
persons and thinks that we cannot persist unless we retain certain aspects of our psychology such as 
“interests, tastes, talents, and traits of personality and character; “Personal Identity,” 89-91. Shoemaker 
also suggests a couple of other ways to avoid the implication of the Lockean account that one cannot lose 
one’s memories and continue to exist. First, he suggests that even if one cannot retrieve a memory on 
10 
 
that it is not continuity of mental content such as memories, beliefs, etc. that matter, but 
continuity of mental capacities such as self-consciousness and reasoning (but not 
necessarily the exercise of those capacities).27 The reason Lockeans appeal to these other 
psychological connections in grounding identity over time is this: even if a person loses 
her memory, if she retains certain other aspects of her psychology, she will continue to 
exist. Thus, we can identify two versions of the psychological approach based on this 
distinction: a version that claims that continuity of mental content such as memories, 
beliefs, etc. matters for our identity and another that claims that continuity of mental 
capacities such as self-consciousness and reasoning matter for our identity.  
Third, the Lockean account grounds identity over time in direct psychological 
connections. So, for example, if person1 remembers doing something that person2 did, 
then person1 is directly psychologically connected to person2. But grounding personal 
identity in such connections is problematic. As Reid pointed out, the personal identity 
                                                            
one’s own, one might still retain the memory in latent form (where memories in such a form cannot be 
retrieved except through some special process such as hypnosis) and latent memories might ground 
personal identity (81). Second, he is skeptical that one could lose one’s memory beyond all possibility of 
retrieval and yet retain other aspects of one’s psychology such as personality, character, tastes, interests, 
etc. (86-88).   
 
27 Olson identifies Unger and Nagel as proponents of this view; The Human Animal, 75. For 
Unger, the capacities relevant to the persistence of a person over time are the capacities for conscious 
experience, reasoning, and the forming of simple intentions; Peter Unger, Identity, Consciousness, and 
Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 68, 109. For Nagel, it is the person’s capacity for 
experiences and “the capacity to identify and reidentify himself and his mental states, in memory, 
experience, and thought, without relying on the sort of observational evidence that others must use to 
understand him;” Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 41. Baker also holds to the capacities view and 
requires, for our persistence, “the capacity for a first-person perspective.” She addresses the fetus 
problem specifically and claims: “I did not exist before having the capacity for a first-person perspective. 
The fetus that came to constitute me existed before it had the capacity for a first-person perspective (and 
thus before it came to constitute me). Therefore, I was never (identical to) that fetus”; Persons and 
Bodies, 204-205. See also, “When Does a Person Begin?” Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 2 (2005), 35-
36.  
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relation is transitive and the direct psychological connectedness relation is not: if person1 
is directly psychologically connected to person2 and person2 is directly psychologically 
connected to person3, it does not follow that person1 is directly psychologically connected 
to person3.28 After all, if person1 remembers something person2 did and person2 
remembers something person3 did, it does not follow that person1 remembers something 
that person3 did. In response to this, Parfit recommends that the psychological theorist 
rely on psychological continuity instead of direct psychological connections. Person1 and 
person2 are psychologically continuous if and only if overlapping chains of strong 
connectedness hold between them (and person1 and person2 are strongly connected “if the 
number of direct connections, over any day, is at least half the number that hold, over 
every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.”)29 Psychological connectedness is 
transitive: if person1 is psychologically continuous with person2 and person2 is 
psychologically continuous with person3, it follows that person1 is psychologically 
continuous with person3.  
Fourth, versions of the updated Lockean account vary according to the sort of 
cause of psychological continuity that is necessary for personal identity: the narrow 
version, the wide version, and the widest version.30 On the narrow approach, the cause of 
psychological continuity must be the continued existence of the brain, what Parfit calls 
                                                            
28 Thomas Reid, “On Mr. Locke’s Account of Personal Identity,” in Essays on the Intellectual 
Powers of Man, ed. Knud Haakonssen, vol. 6, The Edinburgh Edition of Thomas Reid (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 275-279.  
 
29 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 205-206.    
 
30 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 207-208.    
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the normal cause. The wide version requires a reliable cause and the widest version 
simply requires a cause (any cause whatsoever).  
Finally, even given the above revisions to the Lockean account, it is possible for 
one person to be psychologically continuous with two people. Consider three different 
cases: Parfit’s My Division, teletransportation, and Shoemaker’s brain-state transfer:31 
First, consider My Division:   
My body is fatally injured, as are the brains of my two [twin] brothers. My brain is 
divided, and each half is successfully transplanted into the body of one of my brothers. 
Each of the resulting people believes that he is me, seems to remember living my life, 
has my character, and is in every other way psychologically continuous with me. And 
he has a body that is very like mine. 
 
Presumably, the people resulting from the surgery – call them person2 and person3, the 
two individuals who each have one of my (call me person1) cerebral hemispheres – will 
be psychologically continuous with person1. This is a problem on the psychological 
approach since the identity relation is transitive, but transitivity fails in our example: 
person3 is identical to person1, person1 is identical to person2, but person3 is not identical 
to person2. The same goes for certain cases of teletransportation. In teletransportation, a 
person’s brain and body is scanned and copied, his brain and body are destroyed, and the 
teletransporter builds a physical duplicate of his brain and body in another location. The 
copy has the memories, beliefs, character, capacities, etc. as the original person. Is the 
copy the original? On the normal cause, no (supposing that, for the continued existence of 
the brain, physical continuity is required). On the wide and widest version of the updated 
                                                            
31 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 199-201, 254; Shoemaker, “Personal Identity: A Materialist’s 
Account,” section 10. My Division is first described in David Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal 
Continuity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 53. 
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Lockean account, yes (since the cause of the continuity between the original person and 
the copy is reliable). Now consider a revised teletransportation scenario on which the 
teletransporter is programmed to make two copies of the original person. Which copy is 
identical to the original? Both are, according to these views. But, again, identity is 
transitive yet transitivity fails in our example: copy1 is identical to the original person, the 
original person is identical to copy2, but copy1 is not identical to copy2. Finally, the same 
goes for Shoemaker’s brain-state transfer. On such a scenario, a machine scans and 
copies person1’s brain state, wipes clear person2’s brain of all mental content, configures 
person2’s brain so that it matches the brain state of person1, then destroys person1. Now 
consider a revised brain-state-transfer scenario on which the machine configures the 
brains of person2 and a third person, person3, so that their brain states each match the 
brain state of person1. Which copy is identical to the original? Again, on the wide and 
widest versions of the updated Lockean account, both copies are. But transitivity fails in 
this example as well. Note further that My Division, the revised teletransportation case, 
and the revised brain-state transfer case each show that the transplant intuition is not a 
failsafe guide for what happens to us in the various personal identity thought 
experiments. For example, in My Division, the transplant intuition tells us that I am 
identical with each of the persons that result from the surgery. And this contradicts a 
perhaps more deep-seated intuition that I cannot exist at two distinct locations at the same 
time having the experiences generated by two distinctly embedded nervous systems.  
The possible responses to My Division, the revised teletransportation case, and 
the revised brain-state-transfer case by the proponent of the psychological approach are 
14 
 
various. Olson identifies two prominent responses.32 On one response, the proponent of 
the psychological approach adds a non-branching condition to their account of personal 
identity.33 That is, they say that person1 is numerically identical to some past or future 
being only if there is no other being that is psychologically continuous with person1. 
Thus, My Division causes person1 to cease to exist. On another response, the proponent 
of the psychological approach claims that if a person branches into two persons, the 
original person prior to the split was actually two people occupying the same space.34  
So much for the psychological approach. On the somatic approach, our 
persistence consists in “some sort of brute physical continuity.”35 On one version of the 
somatic approach – call it the bodily continuity view, – we persist if and only if our body 
persists. Thomson holds this view.36 Animalism is another view of our identity. It says 
that we are numerically identical to human organisms. As for our persistence conditions, 
animalism is silent on whether or not we are organisms essentially, that is, on whether or 
not we could one day cease to be organisms. However, most animalists accept that we 
persist in virtue of the persistence of our organisms: we persist if and only if our 
                                                            
32 Olson, “Personal Identity,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
  
33 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 207; Shoemaker, “Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account,” 85.  
 
34 David Lewis held this view. David Lewis, “Survival and Identity,” in The Identities of Persons, ed. 
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 17-40. 
 
35 Olson, “Personal Identity,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
 
36 “People and Their Bodies.” Thomson also says that we are identical to our bodies.  
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organisms persist. If organisms persist in virtue of some sort of physical continuity, then 
animalism qualifies as a somatic approach.37  
Animalism is distinct from the bodily continuity view. This is because animalism 
does not entail that organisms are identical to bodies and that the persistence conditions 
of organisms are equivalent to the persistence conditions of bodies. For example, it is 
open to the animalist to hold that organisms cease to exist when they die and open to the 
bodily continuity theorist to say that bodies continue to exist after the death of the 
organism. Both viewpoints are consistent with their respective theories.38 But if such 
viewpoints are consistent with their respective theories, then the theories cannot be 
equivalent. As another example, it is open to the animalist to hold that organisms are 
essentially organic and it is open to the bodily continuity theorist to hold that bodies can 
survive the replacement, over time, of all of their organic parts with inorganic ones. If so, 
then animalism and the bodily continuity theory cannot be equivalent.  
                                                            
37 Certain self-described animalists deny that organisms persist in virtue of some sort of physical 
continuity because they think that organisms can exist in a disembodied state. See Christopher Brown, 
Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus: Solving Puzzles about Material Objects (London: Continuum, 2005); 
Jason Eberl, “Do Human Beings Persist Between Death and Resurrection?” in Metaphysics and God: 
Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, ed. K. Timpe, Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 7 (New 
York: Routledge, 2009); Eleonore Stump, “Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution,” in Die 
Menschliche Seele: Brauchen Wir Den Dualismus, by B. Niederberger and E. Runggaldier (Frankfurt: Ontos 
Verlag, 2006), 151–72. 
 
38 Eric Olson and Peter van Inwagen think that organisms persist if and only if the vital functions 
of organisms persist (such as metabolism, respiration, circulation, etc.): Eric Olson, The Human Animal, 
135-140; Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). Others 
animalists, including David Mackie, think that organisms persist only if “(enough of) the organisation of 
parts that is the product of their natural biological development, and that makes them apt for life” 
persists.  Given that (typically) the organization that makes an organism apt for life continues even after 
the vital functions cease, organisms continue to exist after they die (and thus, so do we). “Personal 
Identity and Dead People,” Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 236. Thomson (a bodily theorist) thinks that 
we (typically) persist after death because our bodies persist after death: Thomson, “People and Their 
Bodies,” 202. I will say more on the different views of organism persistence later. 
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Eric Olson holds to a version of animalism on which aspects of our psychology – 
metal content such as memories, beliefs, etc. and capacities such as reasoning and 
consciousness – have nothing to do with our persistence and on which we are 
contingently persons. Our psychology is not necessary for our persistence because we 
organisms (according to Olson) start out as fetuses lacking the mental capacities and 
content abovementioned and we organisms can survive in a persistent vegetative state 
(PVS). Our psychology is not sufficient for our persistence because it is possible for our 
organism and our psychology to part ways. For example, suppose (as it is presumed in 
the personal identity literature and seems to be confirmed by neuroscience), that these 
aspects of our psychologies – our various mental capacities such as rationality and self-
awareness and content such as personality, character, memories, beliefs, and desires – are 
realized in our cerebra. If a person’s cerebrum is removed from his skull, these aspects of 
his psychology will still be realized in his cerebrum, but the organism he was (if it 
survives) will stay behind as a cerebrum-less entity. Olson thinks that we are contingently 
persons because he thinks it is necessary for being a person that one has the capacity for 
“conscious experience, self-awareness, and rationality.”39 
Finally, what is at stake in the diachronic personal identity debate? Why is it 
important to seek to discover our persistence conditions? Though the debate has wider 
implications than what I mention here, I will point out an implication that the debate has 
for abortion. If we do not begin until, say, mid-gestation, then any abortion that occurs 
before mid-gestation does not kill one of us. (Even so, whether or not such an abortion is 
                                                            
39 Eric Olson, “Was I Ever a Fetus?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, no. 1 (1997), 
97; Olson, The Human Animal, 17, 77.  
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permissible is another issue.) But if we begin at conception or shortly thereafter, this 
means that a higher percentage of abortions kill one of us than if we begin at mid-
gestation.40 (Whether or not an abortion that kills one of us is permissible is another 
issue.) Further, the question of whether or not we can exist as non-persons is relevant to 
the morality of abortion. Suppose that person essentialism is false and that we can exist as 
non-persons. If so, then perhaps the point at (or period of time during) which we begin is 
earlier than the point at (or period of time during) which we become persons. If persons 
have more moral worth than non-persons, then perhaps there are more types of cases in 
which it is permissible to abort one of us before we become persons than types of cases in 
which it is permissible to abort one of us once we become persons. But if person 
essentialism is true and we are persons, then we begin when human persons begin. When 
do human persons begin? If, as Olson thinks, it is necessary for being a person that one 
has the capacity for rationality or self-awareness, then perhaps we do not begin to exist 
until late in fetal development or even after birth. If we do not begin to exist until after 
birth, then no abortion kills one of us. Or perhaps we are essentially persons and 
Thomson is right in identifying people with their bodies.41 If this is so, then we begin 
much earlier than on Olson’s view of persons and some abortions kill one of us. Again, 
whether an abortion that kills one of us is permissible is another issue 
                                                            
40 Most abortions, at least in the United States, occur during the first trimester: “Abortion after 
the First Trimester in the United States,” Parenthood, accessed August 10, 2016, 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/5113/9611/5527/Abortion_After_first_trimester.pdf.    
 
41 Thomson, “People and Their Bodies,” 202-203.   
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 In this dissertation, I follow Thomson’s and Olson’s approach to the personal 
identity debate in that I first give an account of what we are essentially and then I apply 
that account to the diachronic personal identity debate. I defend a version of hylomorphic 
animalism (which is itself a version of animalism) by comparing and contrasting it with 
Olson’s animalism – the most prominent version of animalism defended today. I claim 
that hylomorphic animalism retains the advantages and avoids the disadvantages of 
Olson’s animalism. On the view I lay out, all human persons are composed of prime 
matter and a rational soul (notions defined below). Further, I build into hylomorphic 
animalism the claim that all human persons are numerically identical to organisms of a 
specific type: rational animals. Rational animals are by nature living substances that have 
the capacity for sensation and rationality. Thus, hylomorphic animalism (as I lay it out) is 
the view that we are numerically identical to rational animals which are living substances 
composed of prime matter and a rational soul. As for our persistence, I claim that we 
persist so long as the substance that we are persists.  
In Chapter 1, I describe animalism in general as well as Olson’s version of 
animalism in particular. I then lay out three advantages for animalism and discuss certain 
objections to it. One advantage lies in its claim that human persons are identical to 
organisms. Proponents of the psychological approach such as Sydney Shoemaker and 
Lynne Rudder Baker claim that the organism and the person – though they are co-located 
–   have different persistence conditions and so are not identical.42 They say that the 
relationship of constitution holds between the organism and the person. But this gives rise 
                                                            
42 Baker, Persons and Bodies; Sydney Shoemaker, “Persons, Animals, and Identity,” Synthese 162 
(2008): 313–24; Shoemaker, “Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account.”  
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to various too-many-thinkers problems that are discussed throughout the dissertation. For 
example, if human organisms are co-located but not identical to human persons, and 
human persons can think, why cannot human organisms think as well? But if human 
organisms can think, then there are two thinkers where we thought there was only one – 
the person and the organism. Animalism avoids these problems by identifying the person 
and the organism. Second, animalism has the advantage of saying that we were once 
early fetuses without much of a psychology, for example, before we had the capacity for 
consciousness. This is an advantage because it fits the common intuition that we started 
out as early fetuses (“See the little baby in the ultrasound photo? That’s you!”). Finally, it 
carries the advantage of being able to say that we can persist in a persistent vegetative 
state. But animalism seems to carry some disadvantages with it. For one thing, it seems to 
fall prey to certain transfer problems – scenarios in which you seem to diverge from and 
exist independently of your organism. For example, suppose your cerebrum is removed 
from your skull. If your psychological capacities such as the capacity for rationality and 
consciousness and your mental content such as your memories, beliefs, desires, etc. are 
realized in your cerebrum, then these capacities and content go with your cerebrum.43 
Suppose further that there is a living, breathing, cerebrum-less entity that qualifies as an 
organism left behind on the operating table. If this entity is you, then you stay behind as a 
                                                            
 
43 Proponents of embodied cognition would deny that the cerebrum can think without the rest of 
the body. The article on embodied cognition identifies the “working hypothesis of embodied cognitive 
science” as the Embodiment Thesis: “Many features of cognition are embodied in that they are deeply 
dependent upon characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that the agent's beyond-the-brain 
body plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that agent's cognitive processing.” 
For more information on embodied cognition, see Alva Noë, Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your 
Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness, 1st edition (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010); 
Robert A. Wilson and Lucia Foglia, “Embodied Cognition,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, Spring 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/embodied-cognition/. 
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cerebrum-less entity devoid of the capacities and content just mentioned. But many 
people have the intuition that we go wherever our mental capacities and content go. 
Animalism also seems to fall prey to certain multiplication objections – objections on 
which (i) there is more than one entity thinking your thoughts or (ii) the number of 
human organisms and the number of human persons that exist in certain cases does not 
correspond to the number of human organisms and the number of human persons that 
animalism says there should be. As an example of (i), on Olson’s animalism, organisms 
are not numerically identical to their brains. But if brains exist, they seem to be just as 
good a candidate for thought as the organism. But if brains can think and organisms can 
think, then there are two thinkers when we thought there was only one. As an example of 
(ii), I consider actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning in which there seem to 
be two different people that are proper parts of one organism, or one person who is a 
proper part of two different organisms. But if animalism says that we are identical to 
organisms, then these cases serve as counterexamples to animalism.   
In Chapter 2, I lay out my hylomorphic view of human persons following 
Aristotle and Aquinas and then lay out the conceptual tools needed for later chapters. In 
Chapters 3 through 5, I claim that hylomorphic animalism has the same advantages as 
Olson’s animalism, but can avoid the disadvantages. In Chapter 3, I argue that 
hylomorphic animalism retains the advantages of Olson’s animalism. First, I claim that 
the thinking-organism argument applies just as well to hylomorphic animalism as it does 
to hylomorphic animalism. Second, I consider the hylomorphic view of when we begin 
and claim that it is open to the hylomorphic animalist to claim that we were once early 
fetuses devoid of (immediately operable) capacities for rationality and consciousness and 
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devoid of mental content such as memory, beliefs, and desires. In Chapter 4, I consider 
transfer objections as they relate to hylomorphic animalism. I claim, for example, that the 
hylomorphic animalist can satisfy the transplant intuition by contending that the organism 
“goes with” its cerebrum in cerebrum-transplant scenarios.44 Finally, in Chapter 5, I 
consider various multiplication objections as they apply to hylomorphic animalism. I 
claim that hylomorphic animalism has the conceptual resources to respond to these 
objections or at least to mitigate their counterintuitive consequences.  
Even if one agrees with me about the advantages that hylomorphic animalism 
brings to the diachronic personal identity debate, one might think that these advantages 
are outweighed by the costs of accepting the view. In particular, one might think that 
hylomorphism is an antiquated metaphysics that we rightly gave up long ago and that it 
does not matter what other advantages it has. That is fine. I do not presume to defend the 
claim that hylomorphic animalism is true. Although it is important to consider whether or 
not hylomorphic animalism is true, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, I 
simply wish to show that hylomorphic animalism fits many of the intuitions we have 
about what we can survive and avoids certain complications that plague the psychological 
approach and other versions of animalism.  It is unclear what a view of persons would 
have to do beyond this to establish its truth. Hylomorphic animalism is coherent and 
intuitive and on these grounds an attractive account of our persistence over time.  
 
                                                            
44 I spell out the exact relationship between the organism and the cerebrum later.   
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CHAPTER 1: ANIMALISM 
In this chapter, I identify the core elements of animalism, the view that we are 
identical to organisms of a certain species (homo sapiens), the main current proponent of 
which is Eric Olson.45 Then, I discuss three benefits of animalism – that it is supported by 
the thinking-organism argument as well as the fetus argument, and it allows us to say that 
we can continue to exist in a persistent vegetative state. Finally, I discuss various 
objections to animalism.  
What Is Animalism? 
 Animalism is the view that we are numerically identical to biological organisms of 
a certain kind. Let me give some qualifications of this view. First, Animalism says that 
we are numerically identical to organisms, so it is distinct from any view that says that 
we are “intimately related,” but not identical to, organisms.46 For example, substance 
                                                            
45 Eric Olson, The Human Animal, 16-21. Other animalists (as identified by Blatti, “Animalism”) 
include M. R. Ayers, Locke, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1991); Stephan Blatti, “A New Argument for 
Animalism,” Analysis 72 (2012): 685–90; W. R. Carter, “Why Personal Identity Is Animal Identity,” Logos 11 
(1990): 71–81; D. DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); 
P. M. S. Hacker, Human Nature: The Categorical Framework (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); David Hershenov, 
“Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity,” Mind 114 (2005): 31–59; 
J. Hoffman and G. Rosenkrantz, Substance: Its Nature and Existence (London: Routledge, 1997); David 
Mackie, “Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy”; John McDowell, “Reductionism and the 
First Person,” in Reading Parfit, ed. Jonathan Dancy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 230-50; Trenton Merricks, 
Objects and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); P. F. Snowdon, “Persons, Animals, and 
Ourselves,” in The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed. C. Gill 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 83–107; Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings; D. Wiggins, Sameness and 
Substance (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980); R. Wolheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984). Critics of animalism (as identified by Stephan Blatti, “Animalism”) include Lynne 
Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies; Mark Johnston, “‘Human Beings’ Revisited”; Jeff McMahan, The Ethics 
of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Harold W. Noonan, 
“Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy”; Derek Parfit, “We Are Not Human Beings,” 
Philosophy 87 (2012): 5–28; Sydney Shoemaker, “Persons, Animals, and Identity.” 
 
46 Olson, What Are We? 24; Olson, The Human Animal, 96-97.  
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dualists believe that the soul (or mind) and the body are two different substances, and that 
either we are the soul and are somehow related to the body or we are a combination of 
soul and body.47 Either way, this view is distinct from animalism since animalism posits 
the existence of a single substance – the organism – with which we are identical. 
Animalism is also distinct from the constitution view of human persons that is held by 
Shoemaker and Baker. On this view, persons are co-located with and constituted by, but 
not identical to organisms, much like (on the same view) statues are co-located with but 
not identical to the clay which constitutes them. On the Cartesian and constitution views, 
persons are not identical to organisms since persons and organisms have different 
persistence conditions.  
 Second, Stephan Blatti in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy treats the 
phrase ‘we are organisms’ in animalism as a universal statement:  
                                                            
47 Proponents of substance dualism include Plato, Phaedo (“The lovers of knowledge are 
conscious that their souls, when philosophy receives them, are simply fastened and glued to their bodies: 
the soul is only able to view existence through the bars of a prison, and not in her own nature”); Rene 
Descartes, Meditation VI (“on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am 
simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as 
this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from 
my body, and can exist without it.”); Alvin Plantinga, “Against Materialism,” Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 1 
(January 2006): 3-32, 3; Howard M. Robinson, “A Dualist Account of Embodiment,” in The Case for 
Dualism, ed. J. R. Smythies and J. Beloff (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989), 43–57; Richard 
Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Dean Zimmerman, “From 
Property Dualism to Substance Dorualism,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84, no. 1 (2010): 
119–50. Regarding the relationship between body and soul, Plato, Plantinga, and perhaps Descartes think 
that we are identical to souls. Swinburne thinks that we are a combination of body and soul (which are 
both substances in their own right): Evolution of the Soul, 10. The latter view is sometimes called 
compound dualism. It is unclear whether Descartes himself thinks that we are our souls or whether he 
thinks that we are a combination of body and soul. In Meditation VI, he says “Also, the fact that some of 
the perceptions are agreeable to me while others are disagreeable makes it quite certain that my body, or 
rather my whole self, in so far as I am a combination of body and mind, can be affected by the various 
beneficial or harmful bodies which surround it” (italics mine). For more on Descartes’ view, see Gert-Jan 
Lokhorst, “Descartes and the Pineal Gland,” ed. Edward Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Summer 2016, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/pineal-gland/>. 
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Necessarily, for all x, if x is a human person, then there is some y such that x=y and y 
is an organism. 48 
Olson seems to agree with this.49 But as Andrew Bailey points out, a view that treats ‘we 
are organisms’ as a generic still seems to qualify as a version of animalism.50 Generics 
are statements that make no claim to universality, so an exception to such statements does 
not make them false. Bailey gives the following examples of generics: ‘Buddhists are 
way into meditation,’ ‘mosquitos carry dengue fever,’ and ‘ducks lay eggs.’ Finding a 
Buddhist who is not “way into meditation” does not falsify the generic statement about 
Buddhists. In the same way, if the ‘we are organisms’ of animalism is taken as a generic, 
animalism would still be true even if we find a human person who is not an organism. In 
order to include generic animalism within the family of views called animalism, I do not 
define animalism in the universal sense.   
Third, even given Blatti’s definition, animalism does not include the claim that we 
are organisms essentially. Thus, it is open to the animalist to hold that we are only 
organisms contingently.51 At least two different considerations might serve as a 
                                                            
 
48 Jens Johansson, “What Is Animalism?”; Stephan Blatti, “Animalism.” 
 
49 Eric Olson, What Are We? 24;  
 
50  Andrew Bailey, “Animalism,” Philosophy Compass 10, no. 12 (2015): 867–93. 
 
51 This is not to say that identity is contingent, but that being an organism is a phase in our 
existence (or alternatively, that being an organism is a property we possess contingently), much like being 
a teenager or a professor is a phase in our existence. Proponents of the view that we are organisms 
contingently include John McDowell, “Reductionism and the First Person”; Trenton Merricks, Objects and 
Persons; David Wiggins, “Reply to Paul Snowdon,” in Essays for David Wiggins, ed. Sabina Lovibond and S. 
G. Williams (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 244 – 248. David Hershenov also presents this view and gives 
reasons why someone might hold this view, but he does not himself hold to it: “A Hylomorphic Account of 
Personal Identity Thought Experiments,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82, no. 3 (June 2008): 
481–502. 
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motivation for such a position.52 First, suppose that being an organism is a contingent 
property, that nothing inorganic can possess this property, and that it is possible for us to 
survive the replacement, over time, of all of our organic parts with inorganic ones. When 
our organic parts are replaced with inorganic parts, perhaps we cease to be organisms 
(that is, we lose the contingent property being an organism) but continue to exist. 
Second, certain Christian thinkers might follow Aristotle and Aquinas in holding to a sort 
of animalism.53  However, such thinkers will also want to say that we can survive our 
deaths in a bodiless state. On such a view, we continue to exist in the afterlife while, 
perhaps, ceasing to be organisms. Of course, if all human persons are organisms, in cases 
where we survive without being organisms, we will cease to be human or cease to be 
persons. Admittedly, cases in which we cease to be both humans and persons do not bear 
on the question of personal identity.  Each person might be numerically identical with a 
human animal even if there are conditions under which we cease to be the person/animal 
we once were.  For this reason, the question of our identity, nature and persistence is not 
correctly described as the question of personal identity. The question of our identity can 
only be correctly labeled the question of personal identity if, contra Olson, we are 
essentially people.  Moreover, there is at least one problem with saying that we are 
organisms, but not essentially: in doing so, one has not given a full answer to the “what 
are we” question. It does not specify what we are fundamentally, so long as we 
                                                            
 
52 Such considerations come from Hershenov’s “A Hylomorphic Account of Personal Identity 
Thought Experiments.”  
 
53 For example, Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, 
Hylomorphism, and Material Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Brown, Aquinas and the Ship 
of Theseus; David Oderberg, “Hylemorphic Dualism,” Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 2 (2005): 70–99, 
and Patrick Toner, “Hylemorphic Animalism,” Philosophical Studies 155 (2011), 65-81.  
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understand “fundamental” to denote a thing’s essential properties: i.e. the properties it 
cannot lose without ceasing to exist.   
A fourth qualification is that animalism does not entail that all persons are 
organisms.54 It says that human persons are organisms, but it leaves open the possibility 
that there are other types of persons that are not organisms, such as gods, angels, 
androids, or extra-terrestrials should any of these exist. This is important to note because 
animalism is not an attempt to answer the personhood question, that of “what it is to be a 
person, as opposed to a nonperson.”55 Rather, it is an attempt to identify the metaphysical 
nature and persistence conditions of human beings.   
Fifth, animalism does not entail that all human organisms are persons. While, 
according to Blatti’s definition, all human persons are organisms, it does not say that all 
human organisms are persons. More to the point, it does not claim that we are persons 
essentially. As I indicated above, Eric Olson, in his article, “Was I Ever a Fetus?” holds 
that we all start out as organisms lacking personhood. On his view of what it is to be a 
person – that persons must possess certain psychological capacities like rationality and 
self-awareness – since the early fetus lacks these capacities, it fails to be a person. 
Additionally, suppose that a human organism survives in a persistent vegetative state. On 
a similar view of personhood, since the organism in that state lacks the requisite 
psychological capacities, it fails to be a person. So if human fetuses or humans in a 
                                                            
 
54 Olson, What Are We? 24.  
 
55 Olson, What Are We? 16. 
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persistent vegetative state are organisms but not persons, there can be human organisms 
that are not persons, something animalism allows.  
 Sixth, although animalists say that we are identical to organisms, they disagree 
over the persistence conditions of organisms.56 Some, like Eric Olson, say that organisms 
persist if and only if their vital processes continue (such as metabolism, respiration, 
circulation, etc.).57 This view – organicism – entails that none of us ever becomes a 
corpse. That is, on this view, we die when our organism ceases to function (whenever that 
is). On another view – somaticism – life is not necessary for the persistence of an 
organism. Instead, the persistence conditions of organisms are as follows:  
Given a human animal, x, existing at one time, t1, and something, y, existing at a later 
time, t2, y is identical with x if and only if y retains a sufficient degree of the life-apt 
structure of constituent parts previously exhibited by x.58  
 
Given that (typically) the organization that makes an organism apt for life continues even 
after the vital functions (such as metabolism, respiration, circulation, etc.) cease, 
organisms continue to exist after they die (and thus, so do we).59 So, on this view, we 
continue to exist even as a corpse. On each of these views, some sort of brute physical 
continuity is necessary for our persistence.   
                                                            
56 Blatti, “Animalism.”  
 
57 Eric Olson, The Human Animal, 135-140; Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings.  
 
58 Blatti, “Animalism.“ Somaticists include David Mackie, “Personal Identity and Dead People,” M. 
R. Ayers, Locke, vol. 2, 224 and W. R. Carter, “Will I Be A Dead Person?” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 59 (1999): 167–72. 
 
59 Death by explosion is a case in which the organization that makes an organism apt for life does 
not continue after the vital functions of the organism cease.   
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 Seventh, the definition given above does not rule out the sort of animalist who 
holds that animalism is compatible with the psychological approach.60 Perhaps we are 
identical to organisms and the persistence conditions for the kind of organism we turn out 
to be are in fact psychological in nature. This depends on the trajectory of psychology, 
biology and the attempt to unite these sciences by elaborating a cognitive neuroscience.61  
Olson’s Animalism  
 Since I am comparing and contrasting hylomorphic animalism with Olson’s 
version of animalism in this dissertation, it will be helpful to note some key features of 
the latter view. First, Olson thinks (along with all other animalists) that we are identical 
to organisms. Second, he thinks we are organisms essentially.62 Third, he thinks (along 
with most other animalists) that we persist if and only if the organisms we are persist.63 
Fourth, Olson is an organicist since he thinks that organisms are essentially alive and that 
they continue to be alive if and only if their vital functions (such as metabolism, 
respiration, circulation, etc.) continue.64 Or as Olson puts it:  
                                                            
60 Thomas Nagel and David Wiggins hold that the psychological approach is compatible with the 
claim that we are identical to organisms. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 40 – 42; D. Wiggins, Sameness and Substance. See also, Andrew Bailey, 
“Animalism.” 
 
61 Jens Johansson, “What is Animalism?” 194.  
 
62 Olson, The Human Animal, 17, 136.  
  
63 Ibid, 16; An exception to the animalist who thinks we have the persistence conditions of 
organisms are those animalists who think that we are only organisms contingently.  
  
64 Ibid, 16, 134-136.  
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If x is an organism at t and y exists at t*, x = y if and only if the vital functions that y 
has at t* are causally continuous in the appropriate way with those that x has at t.  
Fifth, Olson thinks that we are only contingently persons.65 That is, he thinks that being a 
person is a phase in our existence much like being a teenager is a phase in our existence. 
This is because – as mentioned above – it is necessary for being a person, according to 
Olson, that one possess certain special psychological capacities such as rationality and 
self-awareness.66 Sixth, he thinks that our psychology (specified in terms of metal content 
such as memories, beliefs, etc. and capacities such as reasoning and consciousness) is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for our persistence.67 
Olson on Organisms, Animals, and Persons  
Eric Olson tends to conflate the distinction between animals and organisms and 
use the terms ‘animal’ and ‘organism’ interchangeably.68 He does this knowingly. 
Consider his statement on the matter:   
I mean by ‘animal’ what biologists mean by it: animals are biological organisms, along 
with plants, bacteria, protists, and fungi. Animals are what zoologists study. Someone 
might say that ‘animal’ in the ordinary sense of the word means nothing more than 
‘animate being’—a thing that can move and perceive—and that whether animals in this 
sense must be biological organisms is an open question. If that is the case, then my use 
of the word ‘animal’ is not the ordinary one, and I ought to have used the term 
‘organisms’ or ‘animal in the biological sense’ instead.69 
  
                                                            
65 Olson, “Was I Ever a Fetus,” 106.  
 
66Eric Olson, “Was I Ever a Fetus?” 97; Olson, The Human Animal, 17, 77.  
 
67 Olson, The Human Animal, 16.   
 
68 There are certainly animalsts who do not conflate this distinction. For example, Patrick Toner 
defines organisms as living things and animals as sensing things: “Hylemorphic Animalism,” 60. 
  
69 Olson, What Are We? 27.   
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Furthermore, he defines our persistence conditions in terms characteristic of organisms 
rather than animals. It is characteristic of animals that they have the capacity for 
sensation, voluntary movement (such as the flapping of a wing) and locomotion (moving 
from one place to another) and of organisms that they are living. But Olson does not 
think that motion and sensation have anything to do with our persistence. Instead, living 
is the crucial condition for our persistence. In this dissertation, I distinguish between 
organisms and animals according to their respective functions, which functions are 
determined by the sort of soul they possess – organic (what I call vegetative) or animal 
(what I call sensitive).70 Organisms are characterized by possessing vital (or vegetative) 
functions such as metabolism, circulation and respiration. Animals are a type of 
organism, so possess the vital functions of organisms, but are distinct from mere 
organisms in possessing the ability to move through the world and gain information about 
it through sensation. In this dissertation, I refer to us as organisms except for contexts in 
which I am discussing our nature as animals.   
 What are persons? First, for Olson, human persons are those that are numerically 
identical to human organisms. And it is necessary for being a person (in general – 
whether an angel or Martian or primate) that one has the capacity for rationality and self-
awareness. He is not alone in his view on the conditions for personhood. For one, as has 
already been discussed, John Locke thinks that being a person involves a certain type of 
mental life given his definition of a person as “a thinking intelligent being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different 
times and places.” As for a contemporary example, Michael Tooley takes this position. 
                                                            
70 See chapter 2.   
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He distinguishes two different uses for the term ‘person.’ The first refers to members of 
the species homo sapiens, so that one qualifies as a person in this sense simply by being a 
human being.71 On the second sense, one qualifies as a person only if one possesses “the 
type of mental life that characterizes normal adult human beings.” Tooley prefers this 
latter sense of the term. He thinks that something is a person “only if it possesses the 
concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and 
believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.”72 For Tooley, being a person is 
necessary for your persistence over time so that the destruction of your mental life brings 
about your destruction.73 While Olson and Tooley disagree about our nature and 
persistence, they agree that being a person requires a special sort of mental life.  
An exception to this definition of personhood is Thomson’s view.74 She recognizes that 
some philosophers use the term ‘person’ in Olson’s and Tooley’s sense, but she still 
identifies people with their bodies and claims that people persist just in case their bodies 
persist. On her view, mental content such as beliefs and desires and mental capacities 
such as rationality and self-awareness do not matter for our survival.  
I follow Boethius in defining a person as an individual substance of a rational 
nature.75 On this view, if an individual is a person, she is a person essentially. This is 
                                                            
71 Michael Tooley, “A Companion to Bioethics,” in A Companion to Bioethics, ed. Helga Kuhse and 
Peter Singer, 2nd ed. (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 129-133.  
 
72 Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, no. 1 (1972), 44. 
Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 202, seems to hold this view. Or, at least he says that this is the simplest 
answer to the question “What is the nature of a person?”: “to be a person, a being must be self-
conscious, aware of its identity and continued existence over time.”   
 
73 Tooley, “Personhood,” 130.   
 
74 Thomson, “People and Their Bodies,” 202-203.   
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distinct from Olson’s conception of persons as phases of individuals. It is also distinct 
from Locke’s, Olson’s, and Tooley’s view that something is a person only if it possesses 
a certain sort of mental life. Rather, on my view, something is a person if it possesses the 
natural potential for rationality (a notion discussed in detail in Chapter 2) even if it lacks 
the sort of mental life that Locke, etc. require. Thus, the early fetus who lacks the 
capacity for rationality and self-awareness is a person if it possesses the natural potential 
for rationality.   
Benefits of Animalism 
 There are some benefits to animalism. Here I discuss three benefits that Olson 
identifies. The first benefit involves the thinking-organism argument. This argument 
begins by noting that there is a thinking organism located where each thinking human 
person is. Then it claims that since the human person is a thinking thing and there is not 
more than one thinking thing located where each person is, human persons are organisms. 
Second, on one version of the psychological approach, continuity of mental states such as 
                                                            
75 Boethius, Patrologia Latina 64.1342. On form determining the nature of the thing (because 
matter is not specific), see: Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.17, 1041b7-8: Since we must know the existence of 
the thing and it must be given, clearly the question is why the matter is some individual thing, e.g. why are 
these materials a house? Because that which was the essence of a house is present. And why is this 
individual thing, or this body in this state, a man? Therefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form, by 
reason of which the matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing.”; Aquinas, 
Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. J. P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962), 
8.17.1668: “Hence in such questions it is evident that we are asking about "the cause of the matter," i.e., 
why it is made to be of this nature. Now the thing under investigation which is the cause of the matter is 
"the specifying principle," namely, the form by which something is”; “As Aquinas understand Aristotle, 
then, the question What is a human being? Should be analyzed as the question of what makes this 
material stuff be human. The general line of reply that Aristotle proposes (and Aquinas accepts) is that it 
is form, in the ultimate analysis, that makes the matter be what it is. Form is “the cause of the matter”; it 
is “on account of” form that the matter “realizes the nature” of what it is”: Robert Pasnau, Thomas 
Aquinas on Human Nature, 34-35.  
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memories, beliefs, personality and character traits, etc. must obtain between you and x for 
you to be identical to x.76 On another version, it is not continuity of mental content that is 
required, but continuity of mental capacities such as self-consciousness and reasoning 
(but not necessarily the exercise of those capacities).77 But if either of these views are 
correct, none of us were ever early fetuses devoid of mental content or capacities. On 
animalism, though, we did exist as early fetuses. Thus, animalism can, and its main rival 
cannot, accommodate the intuition that we were once early fetuses.78 I will consider the 
thinking-organism argument first.  
 
 
                                                            
76 Olson, The Human Animal, 13. Shoemaker holds to such a view. He identifies us with persons 
and thinks that we cannot persist unless we retain certain aspects of our psychology such as “interests, 
tastes, talents, and traits of personality and character; “Personal Identity,” 89-91.  
 
77 Olson identifies Unger and Nagel as proponents of this view; The Human Animal, 75. For 
Unger, the capacities relevant to the persistence of a person over time are the capacities for conscious 
experience, reasoning, and the forming of simple intentions; Peter Unger, Identity, Consciousness, and 
Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 68, 109. For Nagel, it is the person’s capacity for 
experiences and “the capacity to identify and reidentify himself and his mental states, in memory, 
experience, and thought, without relying on the sort of observational evidence that others must use to 
understand him;” Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 41. Baker also holds to the capacities view and 
requires, for our persistence, “the capacity for a first-person perspective.” She addresses the fetus 
problem specifically and claims: “I did not exist before having the capacity for a first-person perspective. 
The fetus that came to constitute me existed before it had the capacity for a first-person perspective (and 
thus before it came to constitute me). Therefore, I was never (identical to) that fetus”; Persons and 
Bodies, 204-205. See also, “When Does a Person Begin?” Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 2 (2005), 35-
36.  
 
78 There are other views of personal identity, like Cartesian Dualism and the hylomorphism of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, which can accommodate the view that we were once early fetuses. Proponents of 
either view might say that our persistence is grounded in the persistence of our souls rather than in some 
sort of psychological relation. Though Cartesian Dualism is not a form of animalism, I argue in this 
dissertation that the hylomorphic view is. Given that it is consistent with Cartesian Dualism that we were 
once early fetuses, this argument for animalism would be better termed as an argument against its most 
popular rival – the Psychological approach.  
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The Thinking-Organism Argument 
This argument first appears in the contemporary literature in W. R. Carter’s “How to 
Change Your Mind”: 
If X and Y have the same brain, whose physiological functions are psychological 
functions, then X and Y are equally psychological beings - individuals with 
minds. Since Fats [the human organism that coexists with Carter] and I have the 
same brain, we ‘both' have minds. Since it is false that two psychological beings 
presently are located where I am located, Fats and I are one.79 
The argument has since been popularized by Eric Olson. Olson’s version goes as follows: 
    (1) There is a human organism sitting in your chair; 
    (2) The human organism sitting in your chair is thinking;  
    (3) The one and only thinking being sitting in your chair is none other than you; 
    (4) You are the thinking organism sitting in your chair. 
Formally, Olson presents the argument is as follows:80  
    (1) ∃x(x is a human organism & x is sitting in your chair);  
    (2) ∀x((x is a human organism & x is sitting in your chair) → x is thinking) 
    (3) ∀x((x is thinking & x is sitting in your chair) → x = you) 
    (4) ∃x(x is a human organism & x = you) 
 
The first premise is straightforward. Intuitively, there is a human organism, that goes 
wherever you go, that is currently sitting in your chair (assuming you are sitting in your 
chair) and reading this dissertation. As for premise two, the organism located where you 
are has the same brain as you. On Carter’s argument, all psychological functions are 
                                                            
79 Carter, W. R. “How to Change Your Mind.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1989): 1–14, 10. 
Other early developers (per Stephan Blatti, “Animalism”) of the argument include M. R. Ayers, Locke, vol. 
2, 283; John McDowell, “Reductionism and the First Person,” 237; P. F. Snowdon, “Persons, Animals, and 
Ourselves,” 91. 
 
80 Eric Olson, “An Argument for Animalism,” in Personal Identity, ed. R. Martin and J. Barresi  
(Blackwell, 2003).  
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physiological – for Carter, minds are brains. So it follows from the fact that the organism 
has a brain that the organism has a mind and is a psychological being. But a weaker claim 
will work as well, that psychological properties supervene on physiological properties 
(where supervenience is the principle that, according to Donald Davidson, “there cannot 
be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that 
an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical 
respect”).81 Since the organism and the person share the same brain, if the person 
possesses psychological properties, so does the organism. If you are currently thinking, 
the organism you are (or the organism on which you supervene) should currently be 
thinking. As for the third premise, intuitively it seems that there are not two thinking 
things but only one located where every human person is. If this is so, then the organism 
is identical to you.82 The same argument could be made for any human person, not just 
you. It follows from these arguments that every human person is identical to a human 
organism.  
What options does one have for avoiding the conclusion of this argument? First, 
one might contend that there are no human organisms, which would be a denial of 
premise (1). It follows from this that there is no human organism located where you are 
(or where I am or where any other human being is). One could reject the existence of 
organisms if one held to three-dimensionalism (that objects are “wholly present at a 
time”) and to mereological essentialism (that “if a compound thing W has a certain part 
                                                            
81 Donald Davidson, “Mental Events,” in Experience and Theory, ed. L. Foster and J. W. Swanson 
(London: Duckworth Publishers, 1970), 214. 
 
82 Eric Olson, What Are We? 29.  
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P, then W cannot exist without having P as a part”).83 . Instead of changing, the object in 
question would cease to exist and a similar one would take its place in the temporal 
sequence. But organisms are things that are supposed to continue to exist even though 
they undergo changes of parts over time. If three-dimensionalism and mereological 
essentialism are true, then there are no organisms and premise (1) of the thinking-
organism argument is false.  
Second, one might contend that organisms cannot think.84 This would be to deny 
premise (2), that the thinking organism sitting in your chair is thinking. Olson identifies 
three options for saying that organisms cannot think.85 First, if one embraces eliminative 
materialism—the view that mental states such as beliefs, thoughts, desires, etc. do not 
exist—then there is no thinking going on.86 If there is no such thing as thinking, 
organisms do not think. Thus, premise (2) is false—there might be an organism sitting in 
your chair but it does not think. However, this response also entails that we do not think 
                                                            
83 Richard Feldman and Fred Feldman, “Roderick Chisholm,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2016 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/chisholm/; Katherine Hawley, “Temporal Parts,” in 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2015 (Metaphysics Research Lab, 
Stanford University, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entriesemporal-parts/. The 
definition of three-dimensionalism comes from the article on temporal parts while the definition for 
mereological essentialism comes from the article on Roderick Chisholm. The idea for this response to the 
thinking-organism argument comes from Eric Olson, “An Argument for Animalism.”  
  
84 Instead of denying that organisms can think, one might only deny that human organisms can 
think or are psychological beings at all. But this would be an odd view. As Carter points out, it would be 
strange if cats and dogs are psychological beings but human organisms are not; “How to Change Your 
Mind,” 9.  
 
85 Eric Olson, What Are We? 31-35.  
 
86 William Ramsey, “Eliminative Materialism,” ed. Edward Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Summer 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/materialism-eliminative/. 
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so it will not appeal to those of us who wish to retain the idea the states referred to by 
such commonsense notions as thoughts and beliefs actually do exist.87  
Alternatively, one might deny premise (2) by claiming that no material entities 
can think. One might do so by claiming that human persons can think but are not material 
entities and organisms cannot think because they are material entities and no material 
entities can think. Substance dualists might make this claim, since they typically think 
that no material object can think (though this claim is not entailed by Cartesian dualism).  
Materialist Sydney Shoemaker gives another approach for denying that organisms can 
think. Though he thinks that there are material objects that can think, he argues that 
organisms cannot think; that is, that they “cannot have the mental states distinctive of 
persons.”88 On Shoemaker’s view, only things with psychological persistence conditions 
                                                            
87 One does not even need to suppose that they are immaterial to retain them. Rather than 
eliminate such notions as thoughts and beliefs, one might retain them, but claim that they are somehow 
material. 
 
88 Shoemaker, “Persons, Animals, and Identity”; Shoemaker denies that organisms think precisely 
to avoid the too-many-thinkers problem. He contends that persons and organisms are coincident but not 
identical and that only persons have mental properties. This allows him to say that the only thinker is the 
person: “What is important here is that it is only thick physical properties that realize mental properties, 
and that the thick physical properties that do this belong only to entities that have the persistence 
conditions of persons. The instantiation of the thin physical properties shared by a person and the 
coincident human organism and body do determine that there exists something having certain mental 
properties. But what makes the person and not the organism or body the subject of those mental 
properties is what makes it possible for it to instantiate the relevant thick physical properties, namely its 
having the persistence conditions that go with being a mental subject;” Sydney Shoemaker, “Self, Body, 
and Coincidence,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 73 (1999): 303. See 
also, Sydney Shoemaker, “Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account”; Sydney Shoemaker, “Functionalism 
and Personal Identity?,” Nous 38 (2004): 525–33; Sydney Shoemaker, “On What We Are.” For responses, 
see S. T. Arnadottir, “Functionalism and Thinking Animals,” Philosophical Studies 147 (2010): 347–54; 
David Hershenov, “Shoemaker’s Problem of Too Many Thinkers,” Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association 80 (2006): 225–36; Eric Olson, “What Does Functionalism Tell Us about Personal 
Identity?,” Nous 36 (2002): 682–98. 
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can think; since organisms do not have psychological persistence conditions, organisms 
cannot think.89 
Finally, one might reject premise (3) by contending that there are two thinkers 
located where you are both thinking your thoughts: you (the person) and the organism.90 
Lynne Rudder Baker, for example, holds to a constitution view of human persons, 
according to which human persons are constituted by, but not identical to, human 
organisms. On this view, human persons think in a nonderivative way and human 
organisms think in a derivative way: both do the thinking, but the thinking is sourced in 
the person.91    
Olson identifies three problems for Baker’s response: the overcrowding problem, 
the epistemic problem, and the personhood problem.92 First, he claims that it posits one-
too-many thinkers: common sense tells us that where each human person is, there is only 
                                                            
 
89 Stephan Blatti, “Animalism.”  
 
90 Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies; Mark Johnston, “Human Beings,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 84, no. 2 (1987); David Lewis, “Survival and Identity.” Those who think that there are two 
thinkers for every human person might say either that the thoughts of the two thinkers are numerically 
identical or they might say that they are numerically distinct but qualitatively identical.  
91 Lynne Rudder Baker, “Animalism vs. Constitutionalism,” in Essays on Animalism: Persons, 
Animals, and Identity, ed. Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming), 51–63. As Baker says (52), “If x constitutes y at t, then some of x’s properties at t have their 
source (so to speak) in y, and some of y’s properties at t have their source in x.” Harold Noonan also 
contends that the person and the organism are not identical and that they both think: “The Thinking 
Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism,” Analysis 70, no. 1 (January 1, 2010), 93.  
 
92 Eric Olson, What Are We? 37-39. Carter discusses the overcrowding problem in “How to 
Change Your Mind,” 9: If we deny that Fats [the organism that constitutes Carter] and I are one individual 
(that is, identical), then we appear to be committed to saying that two psychological beings (Fats and I) 
presently are located in one place. This leaves us with one psychological being too many. If ever Occam's 
razor is called for, it is called for here.”  
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one thinker, not two. This is the overcrowding problem. Second, since the organism 
associated with a given person is physically indiscernible from the person, by the 
supervenience of the mental on the physical, the organism is psychologically 
indistinguishable from the person. Since you and the organism in question are 
psychologically indistinguishable, it follows that you have no more evidence to think that 
you are a person than the organism in question does. Given this, your justification for 
thinking that you are a person and that the organism in question is not a person is 
undermined. This is the epistemic problem. Finally, the proponent of the view that the 
person and the organism are both thinkers needs to give an account of whether or not the 
organism qualifies as a person. Since it is psychologically indistinguishable from a 
person (namely, you), should it not count as a person? If it does count as a person, then 
there are two people, not just two thinkers, where there seemed to be only one. This is the 
personhood problem.93  
One might respond to the personhood problem by claiming that even though the 
organism is psychologically indistinguishable from the person, the organism does not 
qualify as a person. But this response is inadequate. The organism would have all the 
psychological characteristics of a person without qualifying as a person. What is it that 
the person has but the organism lacks that makes the former a person and the latter a 
nonperson? It will not be something psychological since the person and the organism in 
question are indistinguishable. But the thing that separates persons from nonpersons is 
supposed to be something psychological. Furthermore, Olson points out that if the 
                                                            
93 This, in itself, is problematic, but it gives rise to other troubling consequences, as Eric Olson 
points out; What Are We? 37.  
 
40 
 
organism is not a person, even though it is psychologically indistinguishable from the 
person, it has every reason to think it is a person that the person does and the person has 
no additional reason to think it is a person rather than an organism that is not itself a 
person.94  
The Fetus Argument 
 Olson identifies another reason for thinking that animalism is true. Regarding our 
origins, Olson says that “[b]oth folk wisdom and biological science tell us that each of us 
spent several months inside our mother's womb before we were born.”95 That is, we all 
started out as fetuses and developed into mature human adults. (Whether or not we were 
persons when we were fetuses is another matter.) On some versions of the psychological 
approach to personal identity, continuity of mental content such as memory, beliefs, 
personality, character, etc. between you and some object x is necessary for you to be 
identical to x. If this is right, then a person cannot be identical to something without 
entering mental states of this kind. But the early fetus has none of these mental states 
(since the fetus does not even have a brain during the early stages of its development), so 
there is no way for anyone to be psychologically continuous (in the abovementioned 
respect) with the early fetus with which they are biologically continuous. Since a person 
and his early fetus lack this psychological continuity, they are not identical, according to 
                                                            
94 Olson, What Are We? 37.  
 
95 Eric Olson, “Was I Ever A Fetus?” 95.  
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this version of the psychological approach. Thus, this version implies that no human 
person was ever an early fetus.  
On another version of the psychological approach, it is not continuity of mental 
content that is required, but continuity of mental capacities such as self-consciousness 
and reasoning (rather than the exercise of those capacities). The capacity for reasoning 
does not develop until after birth and the capacity for consciousness is not developed 
until twenty-five to thirty-two weeks after conception.96 But, again, the organism begins 
to exist before that. Thus, on this latter version of the psychological approach, no person 
was ever an early fetus. If intuition and biological science are right in their claim that we 
were all once fetuses, this is a problem for these versions of the psychological approach. 
But it is not a problem for animalism because our organism began to exist before it 
acquired states with mental content and the (immediately exercisable) capacities 
mentioned above. According to Olson, the human organism begins to exist around two 
weeks after conception, when the primitive streak is formed, “the ancestor of the spinal 
cord.”97 Olson claims: “only at this point do we have a multicellular organism and not 
merely a mass of living cells stuck together.” 98 
                                                            
96 Olson, The Human Animal, 75. At least, it lacks them in that it does not possess the capacity in 
hand for consciousness and rationality (even if it possesses the natural potential for these things). It is 
clear that Unger and Nagel are referring to the capacity in hand rather than the natural potential . A 
proponent of the psychological approach might claim that the continuity of the natural potential for (e.g.) 
rationality is necessary and sufficient for the survival of the person. I’m not sure of anyone who holds to 
this view and claims to be a psychological continuity theorist. I discuss in more detail the distinction 
between a capacity in hand and a natural potential later in this dissertation.    
 
97 The organism may not yet be an animal at this point in development.  
  
98 Olson, The Human Animal, 91.   
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  Another problem for these views that is related to the fetus problem is the 
question of what happened to the fetus once the person came into existence. Proponents 
of said views might say one of two things.99 First, they might say that the fetus ceases to 
exist and is replaced by a person once the person comes into existence. Second, they 
might say that the fetus continues to exist alongside of (that is, in the same location as) 
the person, but is not identical to the person. Neither option is attractive. Regarding the 
first option, why should a fetus cease to exist simply because it develops the 
psychological capacities necessary for personhood? This does not seem like the kind of 
thing that would bring an organism to an end. This leaves the second option, which says 
that a human organism and human person exist in the same location but are not identical. 
But this leads to the overcrowding problem, the epistemic problem, and the personhood 
problem mentioned above.  
Animalism can easily make sense of the intuitive claim that we started out as 
fetuses and it has an attractively simple account of the relationship between the fetus (the 
human organism) and the person. The fetus, on animalism, does not go away once the 
human person comes to be. Neither does the fetus exist as a being that is co-located with 
a person once the person develops. Instead, the fetus is the person. The fetus started out 
as a nonperson and developed into a person. Being a person is a phase in the existence of 
human organisms just as being a boy is a phase in the existence of a human being. The 
person does not exist as a separate entity any more than a boy or a teenager is an entity 
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capable of existing separately from the human being that he is. So the animalists can do 
justice to the claim that we were once fetuses.100 
Persistent Vegetative States 
Animalism can also say that we can survive in a persistent vegetative state. What 
is such a state? First,  
[a] vegetative state occurs when the cerebrum (the part of the brain that controls 
thought and behavior) no longer functions, but the hypothalamus and brain stem (the 
parts of the brain that control vital functions, such as sleep cycles, body temperature, 
breathing, blood pressure, heart rate, and consciousness) continue to function. Thus, 
people open their eyes and appear awake but otherwise do not respond to stimulation 
in any meaningful way. They cannot speak and have no awareness of themselves or 
their environment.101  
For a vegetative state to be persistent, it must last more than one month. For a vegetative 
state to be permanent, it must last for more than three months (for those with 
“nontraumatic etiologies”) and more than one year (for those with “traumatic 
etiologies”).102 The likelihood of recovery from a permanent vegetative state is very low. 
Since the cerebrum of someone in a persistent vegetative state no longer functions and 
since the cerebrum is responsible for such things as for intelligence, abstract thought, 
                                                            
100 Thomson makes similar claims. On her view, we are identical to our bodies, we are persons, 
and we were once fetuses. What I cannot surmise from her writings is whether she thinks we (that is, our 
bodies) are persons from the moment we come into existence or whether we begin to exist as non-
persons and subsequently develop into persons. See “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 1, no. 1 (1971): 47-48 and “People and Their Bodies,” 202-05. 
  
101 “Vegetative State - Brain, Spinal Cord, and Nerve Disorders,” Merck Manuals Consumer 
Version, accessed May 22, 2017, http://www.merckmanuals.com/home/brain,-spinal-cord,-and-nerve- 
disorders/coma-and-impaired-consciousness/vegetative-state. 
 
102 Caroline Schnakers, “What Is It Like To Be in a Disorder of Consciousness?,” in Finding 
Consciousness: The Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law of Severe Brain Damage, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 
(Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016), 86.  
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language, reasoning, self-awareness, planning, imagining, memory, and personality, it 
appears that someone in a vegetative state has lost her ability to exercise these functions. 
Since the brainstem and hypothalamus of someone in a persistent vegetative state still 
function and since they are largely responsible for the vital functions of human organisms 
such as breathing, heartbeat, blood pressure, body temperature, digestion, and circulation, 
these functions still carry on.103 On Olson’s animalism, one’s mental content and 
psychological capacities such as rationality and self-awareness are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for one to persist. Instead, the continuation of one’s vital functions are 
necessary and sufficient for one to survive. Thus, an individual in a persistent vegetative 
state continues to exist even though it appears that she has lost her mental content such as 
her beliefs, desires, etc. and even though it appears she has lost her capacity for 
rationality and self-awareness. For, even in a persistent vegetative state, she retains the 
vital functions mentioned above. Since Olson thinks that we persist so long as the 
organism persists and since he takes the continued operation of the vital functions in the 
organic body as sufficient evidence that the organism persists, he thinks that we can 
persist in a persistent vegetative state.  
Problems for Animalism 
Several objections have been given against animalism. Stephan Blatti identifies 
two types of problems with animalism – transfer problems (like brain-transplant, 
cerebrum-transplant, brain-state transfer, and teletransportation scenarios) and 
                                                            
 
103 “Brain Anatomy, Anatomy of the Human Brain,” accessed May 18, 2017, 
http://www.mayfieldclinic.com/PE-AnatBrain.htm; Kara Rogers, ed., The Brain and the Nervous System 
(New York, NY: Rosen Education Service, 2010), 13. 
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multiplication problems (like the remnant-person problem, the thinking parts problem, 
the corpse problem, and conjoined twinning cases).104 Transfer problems rely on cases in 
which you and your organism diverge so that you exist independently of your organism. 
For example, suppose a teletransportation device dismantles your body at one location 
and assembles a duplicate at another location out of new materials. If such an event 
transports you from the first location to the second but does not transport an organism, 
then you are not identical to an organism. Multiplication problems rely on cases in which 
there is more than one entity thinking your thoughts, for example, your organism and 
your body. Or, they rely on cases in which the number of human organisms and the 
number of human persons that exist does not correspond to the number of human 
organisms and the number of human persons that animalism says there should be in such 
cases. For example, on certain types of conjoined twinning, there seem to be two human 
persons for one human organism; on animalism, though, if two numerically distinct 
human persons exist, then two numerically distinct human organisms exist. I discuss each 
of these objections. 
Transfer Problems 
I now consider the following transfer problems for animalism: brain-transplant, 
cerebrum-transplant, brain-state-transfer, and teletransportation scenarios. In each of 
these, it seems that you have diverged from your organisms, which is impossible if you 
are identical to your organism.  
                                                            
104 Stephan Blatti, “Animalism.”  
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Brain-Transfer Scenarios 
 Recall the brain-transplant scenario involving Brown and Johnson. Brown and 
Johnson are identical twins who have their brains removed and Brown’s brain is placed 
into Johnson’s body. The person who results from the transplant—that is, the person who 
results from the combination of Brown’s brain and Johnson’s body—is psychologically 
continuous in certain respect with the pre-operation Brown. That is, presumably, this 
person has Brown’s memories, beliefs, desires, etc. and there is a continuity of mental 
capacities between him and Brown such as rationality and self-awareness. For the 
psychological approach, if either continuity of memories, beliefs, desires, etc. or mental 
capacities such as rationality and self-awareness are sufficient for our survival, then the 
psychological approach says that the person who results from the transplant is 
numerically identical to the pre-operation Brown. This result of the psychological 
approach concerning brain transplants fits the transplant intuition. 
 What do animalists say about brain-transplant scenarios? Some animalists say that 
we do not go along with our transplanted brain.105 They would say that in brain-
transplant scenarios, the organism is not transplanted along with the brain. Rather, the 
brain is taken out of the organism and put into another organism. Since we are organisms, 
we are not transplanted in such scenarios. What happens to us? Since the brainstem 
controls the vital functions (“breathing, circulation, digestion, and so on”) of the 
                                                            
105 As Carter says: “I grant that a person can't be (identical with) his or her organism, if indeed it 
is in theory possible for the person first to coexist with one organism and later to coexist with still another 
organism.” Carter, “How to Change Your Mind,” 10.  
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organism, if our brain is removed from our organism (the body left on the operating 
table), the vital functions of the organism cease and the organism (and thus, we) die.106 
Such a view of what happens to us conflicts with the transplant intuition.   
 Some animalists, though, object to this description of what happens. They respond 
to the transplant scenario by contending that the original human organism goes along 
with its brain in transplant scenarios and this is precisely because the brainstem controls 
the vital functions of the organism.107 They would say that brain-transplant scenarios are 
cases of whole body amputations. Until the organism is transplanted into a new body, it 
survives as a naked brain. Such a view does not conflict with the transplant intuition.  
 
 
 
                                                            
106 Eric Olson, “Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem,” in Philosophical Perspectives on 
the Self, ed. J. Fonseca and J. Goncalves, vol. 5, Lisbon Philosophical Studies (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang 
AG, International Academic Publishers, 2015), 21–40. As another example, Carter (“How to Change Your 
Mind,”) is an animalist who denies that we go along with our brains. He takes us to be organisms and that 
minds (brains) and organisms can part ways. On this view, when a brain is transplanted, a mind is 
transplanted and an organism is left behind. He gives an argument against those who think that persons 
and minds cannot part ways. If persons go along with their minds, then either one should reject 
physicalism (type-type identity and supervenience) and hold that persons think but organisms don’t or 
one must hold that two psychological beings are co-located (the person and the organism). The former 
requires rejecting naturalism and the latter leads to an overcrowding problem. The view that he considers 
and rejects is Mark Johnston’s constitutional view of human persons (“Human Beings”).  
 
107 Eric Olson (The Human Animal, 44-46), Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons, 52), and Peter 
van Inwagen (Material Beings, 172–181) all claim that organisms go with their brains in brain transplants. 
Derek Parfit (“We Are Not Human Beings”) discusses an animalist view on which we go with our brains. 
Others argue that the brain is an organ, not an organism: P. F. Snowdon, “Persons, Animals, and 
Ourselves,” 89. 
48 
 
Cerebrum-Transfer Scenarios 
  But there is another sort of transfer scenario that seems to be a problem for any 
version of animalism. In response to the possibility that organisms go with their brains, 
Olson switches to cerebrum-transplant scenarios.108 He responds in this way because 
even if organisms go with their whole brains, he thinks it is implausible that they go with 
their cerebra. In such cases, the brainstem is left in the original organism to maintain 
control of the vital functions and to keep the organism alive.109 The cerebrum, on the 
other hand, is transplanted into a cerebrum-less organism. In such cases, it is supposed 
that certain aspects of the psychology of the person (capacities such as rationality and 
self-awareness and mental content such as memory, beliefs, and desires) who had his 
cerebrum removed and placed into another organism goes along with the transplanted 
cerebrum. Since a person goes along with his psychology, according to the transplant 
intuition, the person went along with the cerebrum. But since this person’s body is left 
intact and certain vital functions continue, the organism does not go along with the 
cerebrum but remains behind as a biologically functioning organism bereft of the 
psychological capacities and content mentioned above (assuming that enough of the brain 
stem is left behind to keep the organism alive). For example, as a result of the operation 
in the Brown and Johnson case, Brown doesn’t go along with his cerebrum and acquire a 
new body, but becomes cerebrum-less. And Johnson, at one point a cerebrum-less 
organism, acquires a new cerebrum. The cerebrum recipient and the cerebrum donor are 
                                                            
 
108 Because of this, Olson talks about cerebrum transplants and claims that no organism would go 
with his cerebrum: “Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem”; The Human Animal, 44. 
 
109 Olson, The Human Animal, 11.   
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two separate organisms, even though the donor, pre-operation, is psychologically 
continuous with the recipient, post-operation. But this goes against our intuition about 
cases of cerebrum transplant that we go where our psychology goes.  
Other Transfer Scenarios 
 Transfer scenarios are various and it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
deal with them all. Here I mention a few more and consider how the animalist might 
respond to them: Parfit’s My Division, Shoemaker’s brain-state-transfer scenario, and 
teletransportation scenarios.  
 Recall Parfit’s My Division:  
My body is fatally injured, as are the brains of my two [twin] brothers. My brain is 
divided, and each half is successfully transplanted into the body of one of my brothers. 
Each of the resulting people believes that he is me, seems to remember living my life, 
has my character, and is in every other way psychologically continuous with me. And 
he has a body that is very like mine. 
 
The animalist might respond in various ways to My Division.110 The animalist who 
thinks that transferring my brain into another organism results in my death (since I do not 
go along with my brain, but die a brainless death on the operating table) has an easy 
response. They will simply say that My Division results in my death.  
Those animalists who think that I (an organism) go along with my brain in brain-
transfer scenarios will have a harder time responding to My Division. They might say 
that while I can survive a brain transfer, I cannot survive splitting the cerebrum and 
                                                            
110 I follow Parfit’s options for responding to My Division in 254-261 of Reasons and Persons. 
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brainstem since we cannot divide brainstems without impairing their function.111 In such 
a case, they might say, we destroy the organism, and thus, destroy me. Or, they might say 
that I do not survive My Division because a given human organism is numerically 
identical to some past or future being only if there is no other being that is biologically 
continuous with that organism. That is, they might add a non-branching condition to their 
account of animalism. Instead of saying that I cannot survive My Division, they might 
say that I survive as one or the other of the resulting organisms. But as Parfit points out, 
there is nothing that would make me one of the resulting organism rather than the other if 
each of the resulting organisms are (roughly) similar. Finally, the animalist might say that 
I survive as two organisms. What exactly does this mean? The statement can be read in 
multiple ways. On one reading, for example, it means that I survive as a divided organism 
so that I am at the same time in two different places and doing two different things. But 
don’t these resulting organisms seem to be just that: two different organisms? On another 
reading, two organisms who were co-located before the procedure took place were then 
separated as a result of the procedure.112 However, this leads to the too-many-thinkers 
problems discussed later in this dissertation.  
 What about a revised version of My Division:  
My body and brain is completely healthy, as are the bodies and brains of my two 
brothers. My cerebrum is divided, and each half is successfully transplanted into the 
body of one of my brothers. Each of the resulting people believes that he is me, seems 
to remember living my life, has my character, and is in every other way 
psychologically continuous with me. And he has a body that is very like mine. My 
body and brainstem are left on the operating table with the brainstem controlling my 
vital functions. 
                                                            
111 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 256.   
 
112 Recall that David Lewis in “Survival and Identity” responds to My Division in this way, except 
he talks of two persons who were colocated before the procedure.   
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Those animalists who think that no organism is transplanted in cerebrum-transplant 
scenarios will reply to this revised version of My Division by saying that I am not 
transferred anywhere but stay behind as a cerebrum-less organism when my cerebrum is 
removed. Those animalists who think that we go along with our cerebrums in cerebrum-
transplant cases might respond in a way that is analogous to one of the responses to the 
original case of My Division.  
 Now let us consider the case of teletransportation. In such a case, a person’s brain 
and body is scanned and copied, his brain and body are destroyed, and the teletransporter 
then builds a physical duplicate of his brain and body in another location. The copy has 
the memories, beliefs, character, capacities, etc. as the original person. What should the 
animalist say about what happens to us in such a case? Well, on both the organicist and 
somaticist versions of animalism, some sort of physical continuity is required for our 
persistence. But in cases of teletransportation, there is no physical continuity between the 
person that was scanned, copied, and destroyed, and the person that the machine built in 
another location. Thus, the animalist should say that teletransportation does not preserve 
our identity; rather, it destroys us. And this seems to conflict with the transplant intuition 
that we go wherever our memories, beliefs, capacities, etc. go. However, perhaps we can 
mitigate the sting of this consequence. First, perhaps fewer people have the intuition that 
we would survive teletransportation than would say that we survive a brain or cerebrum 
transplant. Why? Because teletransportation is lacking the normal cause for our 
psychology – the brain. Furthermore, since the animalist says that teletransportation does 
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not preserve our identity, they do not fall prey to teletransportation scenarios in which 
more than one copy of a person is teletransported.  
 Finally, consider Shoemaker’s brain-state-transfer scenario. On such a scenario, a 
machine scans and copies person1’s brain state, wipes clear person2’s brain of all mental 
content, configures person2’s brain so that it matches the brain state of person1, then 
destroys person1. Again, since organicists and somaticists require physical continuity for 
our persistence, they should say that we are not transferred in such scenarios, but are 
destroyed. This also conflicts with the transplant intuition. Yet, perhaps we can mitigate 
the sting of this consequence in the same way we attempted to mitigate the sting of the 
same consequence for teletransportation scenarios in which more than one copy of a 
person is teletransported. 
  
Multiplication Problems 
 
I now consider the various multiplication problems for animalism: the remnant-
person problem, the thinking-parts problem, the corpse problem, and conjoined twinning 
cases.  
The Remnant-Person Problem113 
 This objection to animalism stems from transplant cases. According to certain 
animalists, when a cerebrum transplant occurs, the organism does not go with its 
cerebrum, but stays behind as a cerebrum-less organism. If the cerebrum is capable of 
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supporting thought and consciousness during the transplant—when it is connected neither 
to the donor nor the recipient—then it seems to qualify as a person. On animalism, this 
person is not the same person that the organism was prior to the operation. On Olson’s 
animalism, human persons are simply phases in the existence of organisms and cannot 
exist independently of organisms. But the person associated with the cerebrum is not a 
phase of the organism since the organism is still alive and breathing on the operating 
table.114 But then where did this person—call it a remnant person—come from? Either it 
existed in the same location as, but not identical to the organism prior to the operation or 
it came into existence once the cerebrum was removed from the organism. Neither option 
is attractive. The latter option goes against a plausible principle—“that you cannot bring a 
person into being merely by cutting away sustaining tissues.”115 That is, since the 
remnant person did not exist until it was removed from the organism, the removal of the 
sustaining tissues surrounding the brain brought a person into existence. But this goes 
against the aforementioned principle. And the former suffers from various too-many-
thinkers problems—prior to the operation, there were two thinkers (even persons) where 
we thought there was one (the organism and the remnant person); and how does the 
organism know she is the organism person rather than the cerebrum person?  
                                                            
 
114 Some would rather describe this situation as one in which an organism is a scattered object or 
that different parts of the organism are in different places. This is surely a plausible way of speaking about 
this situation. Olson describes the situation as above because of his view of what it takes to be part of an 
organism. He says that some object x is part of an organism only if it is caught up in the life of an 
organism. On this view, a severed hand is no longer part of the organism to which is was previously 
attached because it is no longer caught up in the life of the organism. In the same way, once the cerebrum 
is removed, if the organism remains on the operating table (which is plausible given the vital functions 
that still carry on), then the cerebrum is no longer caught up in the life of the organism. Thus, it is no 
longer part of the organism. Olson, The Human Animal, 138.  
 
115 Olson, “The Remnant-Person Problem,” 6. 
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 Furthermore, once the cerebrum is connected to the recipient’s body, what 
happens to the remnant person? It cannot exist as an organism, according to Olson, since 
organisms cannot survive as detached cerebra or start out as detached cerebra then 
become organisms. So the remnant person and the organism are distinct. If this is the 
case, either the remnant person continues to exist or it ceases to exist once it’s implanted. 
On the former option, after the transplant the cerebrum is still a person and so is the 
organism. But then the various too-many-thinkers problems arise. But the latter option 
goes against a plausible principle—“that you cannot destroy a person merely by 
surrounding him with sustaining tissues.”116 In other words, if the remnant person is 
destroyed once the brain is transplanted, then it’s possible to destroy a person merely by 
surrounding him with sustaining tissue.   
The Corpse Problem117 
 Many animalists think that organisms cease to be when they die (that organisms 
are essentially alive). But if this is so, then an organism is not identical to its body, since 
the body exists as a corpse when the organism dies (in most cases). Furthermore, if the 
body exists and is distinct from the organism, then either the body pops into existence 
when the organism dies or it exists in the same location as, but distinct from the organism 
when the organism is alive. The former option is strange, since a new object comes to be 
                                                            
116 Carter, W. R. “Will I Be A Dead Person?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 
(1999): 167–72; Olson, “The Remnant-Person Problem,” 6.  
 
117 Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies, 207ff; W. R. Carter, “Will I Be a Dead Person”; David 
Hershenov, “Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?”; William S. 
Larkin, “Persons, Animals, and Bodies,” Southwest Philosophy Review 20, no. 2 (2004): 95–116; Eric Olson, 
“Animalism and the Corpse Problem,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 2 (2004): 265–274; 
Shoemaker, “Persons, Animals, and Identity”; Sydney Shoemaker, “Self, Body, and Coincidence,” 295. 
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every time an organism dies (and because of the death of an organism). The latter option 
isn’t attractive either, since it gives rise to the various too-many-thinkers problems 
mentioned above. First, if the body is physically indiscernible from the organism, then it 
will be psychologically indiscernible from the organism when the organism is alive and 
the body will be a thinker as well. This is the overcrowding problem. Second, if the 
organism and the body are psychologically indiscernible, what reason does the organism 
have for thinking it’s the person rather than the body? This is the epistemic problem. 
Finally, if the body is psychologically indiscernible from the organism and if the 
organism is a person, shouldn’t the body count as a person as well? This is the 
personhood problem.  
 The corpse problem against animalism is analogous to the thinking-organism 
problem in that, on both problems, there are supposed to be entities that are co-located 
with and psychologically indiscernible from human persons. The corpse problem is also 
analogous to the fetus problem against the psychological approach. On the latter problem, 
the fetus exists prior to the human person and either ceases to exist once the person 
comes to be or continues to exist and is distinct from but co-located with the person. On 
the corpse problem against animalism, the body exists after the organism dies and either 
comes to be once the organism dies or exists prior to the organism’s death and is co-
located with the organism.  
Olson says that one can respond to the corpse problem in three ways. First, one 
can deny that the body exists. On this response, there was no body that was collocated but 
not identical to the organism when the organism died and no body that popped into 
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existence once the organism died.118 Second, one might deny that bodies can think. Thus, 
even though body is co-located with the organism while the organism is alive, since 
bodies cannot think, there is no problem of too many thinkers. Finally, if bodies can 
think, the animalist can point to some difference between the organism and the body 
which enable the organism to know that it is the organism and not the body.119 
The Thinking Parts Problem120 
 The thinking-parts problem against animalism is similar to the thinking-organism 
problem.121 The latter problem relies on the claim that there is an organism located where 
you are that thinks your thoughts. Further, it relies on the claim that there is only one 
person thinking your thoughts, namely, you. It follows from this that you are the thinking 
organism located where you are located. On the thinking-parts problem, your (brain 
inclusive) proper parts are candidates for thought that are located within but not identical 
to you. This problem relies on the claim that brains can think just as you can think. If 
brains think, then not only can brains and organisms think, but proper parts of organisms 
that include the brain can think as well, such as the heads and upper halves of organisms. 
But if brains and heads and upper halves of organisms can think, the various too-many-
thinkers problems mentioned above arise. First, there are two (and three and four and . . .) 
thinkers where we thought there was only one. Each of these thinkers is psychologically 
                                                            
118 Peter van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks hold to this view. Trenton Merricks, Objects and 
Persons; Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings. 
 
119 See Olson, “The Corpse Problem,” 267, for ways to respond.  
 
120 Olson, What Are We? 216-219.  
 
121 Olson, What Are We? 216.  
57 
 
indistinguishable from the organisms of which they are a part, so the organism has no 
more reason to think it’s the person than any of these (brain inclusive) organism parts. 
Further, if the organism is a person and is psychologically indistinguishable from each of 
these organism parts, shouldn’t each of these parts counts as persons? 
There are three responses that the animalist might give to avoid this multiplication 
problem. First, one might deny that any proper part of an organism thinks. Second, one 
might bite the bullet on the overcrowding problem and accept that some of the proper 
parts of an organism think, but find some way to avoid the epistemic and personhood 
problems. Third, one might deny that organisms have parts.  
The thinking-parts problem is like the corpse problem in that both are similar to 
the thinking-organism and the fetus arguments. The animalist thinks that the thinking-
organism and fetus arguments favor animalism over the psychological approach. But if 
similar problems exist on animalism, they are in the same position as proponents of the 
psychological approach. Furthermore, if the animalist has responses to the thinking parts 
and corpse problems, the psychological continuity theorist can give similar responses to 
the thinking organism and fetus arguments. Thus, it seems that the latter problems give 
the animalist no advantage.122    
 
 
                                                            
122 See Olson, “The Corpse Problem,” 268 for resolutions to the corpse problem that Olson 
alleges are not available as analogous resolutions to the thinking-organism problem for the proponent of 
the psychological approach.   
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Conjoined Twinning 
Timothy Campbell and Jeff McMahan (2010) have given a multiplication 
objection to animalism based on actual and hypothetical cases of three varieties of 
conjoined twinning.123 More specifically, the object of their criticism is animalism 
defined in the following way:124   
Necessarily, for all x, if x is a human person, then there is some y such that x=y 
and y is an organism. 
On this view, then, for each human person there is one human organism with which that 
person is identical; further, for each human organism, there is at most one human person 
with which the organism is identical. One human person cannot be numerically identical 
to two numerically distinct organisms and two numerically distinct human persons cannot 
be numerically identical to one organism since this would violate the transitivity of 
identity.  
Campbell and McMahan identify three varieties of conjoined twinning on which 
it is not clear that there is one and only one human organism for every person and at most 
one person for every organism: dicephalus, cephalopagus, and craniopagus parasiticus.125 
But if there is a case (actual or hypothetical) in which there is more than one human 
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organism for one human person or vice versa, animalism (as Blatti and Olson define it) is 
false. The problem that Campbell and McMahan point out is this: there are cases of 
conjoined twinning in which it is clear that the number of persons and the number of 
organisms do not match. There are more persons than organisms or more organisms than 
persons. In such cases, each person cannot be identical to an organism. Since the above 
definition animalism says that all human persons are identical to organisms, a single case 
in which a human person is not an organism shows that this version of animalism is false.  
 Dicephalus is a condition that results from the incomplete division of a single 
zygote during monozygotic twinning.126 Dicephalic twins have two heads, two necks, and 
one trunk. Campbell and McMahan identify a recent case in Abigail and Brittany Hensel. 
The body mass that they share (though they do not share all the parts of the body mass) 
consists of two arms, two legs, an abdomen, and a single thorax to which are connected 
two necks and two heads. Abigail and Brittany appear to be different persons because 
they have separate mental lives. Furthermore, “each feels sensations only on her own side 
of the body, and each has exclusive control over limbs on her side.”127 However, it seems 
that the body mass that they share is one organism since “there is only very limited 
duplication of organs and all the organs function together as a unit.”128 Further, as 
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monozygotic twins or the fusion of two dizygotic or monozygotic twins (after an initial complete 
separation): Rowena Spencer, Conjoined Twins, 9-12; Arif Kokcu et al., “Conjoined Twins: Historical 
Perspective and Report of a Case,” The Journal of Maternal-Fetal & Neonatal Medicine 20, no. 4 (2007): 
352. 
 
127 This suggests that although Abigail and Brittany may share parts of the body mass, they do not 
share all of the parts.  
 
128 Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” 287. 
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Campbell and McMahan point out, the degree of organ duplication in the Hensel twins is 
contingent – though the body mass contains “two hearts, two esophagi, and two 
stomachs,” it might have contained fewer duplicate organs (though in order to be a case 
of dicephalus, there need to be two heads).129 So, cases are possible in which there are 
fewer duplicate and more shared organs, further strengthening the claim that two persons 
can inhabit a single organism. If it is possible for two persons to inhabit a single human 
organism, as it appears to be in the case in dicephalus, animalism (as defined above) is 
false.  
 In cases of cephalopagus, the twins are joined “from the top of the head down to 
the umbilicus.”130 Campbell and McMahan describe this phenomenon as one in which 
there is “one head with two bodies—the antithesis of dicephalus.”131 In one particular 
case, the twins had one head, one cerebrum, two cerebella, two brainstems, and two 
spinal cords.132 If such cases involve one person and two organisms, then this is a 
problem for animalism. In the case just mentioned, since the twins died shortly after 
birth, it could not be determined whether there were one or two persons involved. But 
Campbell and McMahan contend that we can easily imagine a case of cephalopagus in 
which the twins survive and are self-conscious. If it is the cerebrum that produces 
                                                            
 
129 Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” 286.   
 
130 Arif Kokcu et al., “Conjoined Twins,” 351. 
 
131 Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” 298.  
 
132 Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” 297; 
Arif Kokcu et al., “Conjoined Twins,” 354-355. For another case that is slightly different (there are two 
cerebra that are fused together), see M Hovorakova et al., “A Case of Conjoined Twin’s 
Cephalothoracopagus Janiceps Disymmetros,” Reproductive Toxicology 26 (2008): 178–82. 
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consciousness (rather than the brainstem or cerebellum), then there is one person here. 
But there seem to be two organisms. Many of the organs are duplicated and there are two 
separate spinal cords controlling different sections of the body mass. Further, McMahan 
and Campbell claim that the fact that the twins are in principle separable and can lead 
separate lives suggests that they are two different organisms (though one of them would 
need an artificial cranium and the doctors would have to decide whether to give one twin 
the entire cerebrum or split the cerebrum between the two).133  
The final sort of conjoined twinning that Campbell and McMahan discuss is 
craniopagus parasiticus, in which one twin is fully developed and the other, in certain 
cases, has a developed head and brain but whose body ends at the neck.134 The twins are 
conjoined to each other at the head and the second twin is said to be parasitic on the first.  
In one actual case, the parasitic twin was separated from the host twin and the latter 
survived for fourteen months after the surgery.135 Actual cases in which separation does 
not occur and the twins survive are rare, so we do not know much about the capacities of 
                                                            
133 Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” 298. 
Aaron Zimmerman, in his comments on the dissertation, points out that considering what would happen 
to the twins if they were physically separated and each were given a cerebral hemisphere “seems to 
reduce the significance of the case to that of the (actual) brain bisection cases discussed by Gazaniga, 
Nagel, and others.” See Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Bisected Brain, 1st edition (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1970) and Thomas Nagel, “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,” Synthese 22, 
no. May (1971): 396–413. 
 
134 Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” 291; 
Rowena Spencer, Conjoined Twins, 311-313. 
  
135 Mohamed Lotfy, Sameh Sakr, and Basim Ayoub, “Successful Separation of Craniopagus 
Parasiticus,” Neurosurgery 59, no. 5 (November 2006): E1150; “Two-head Girl Dies of Infection,” BBC 
News, March 26, 2006, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4848164.stm (accessed July 8, 2016).  
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the parasite twin. But consider the case of craniopagus parasiticus twins from Bengal.136 
The host twin was fully developed and had a parasitic twin attached to his crown, which 
twin was composed of a head and truncated neck. The twins lived for four years before 
they died of a snakebite. The parasitic twin was observed to blink, move its eyes, and 
react when pinched: 
When the boy cried or smiled, the features of the upper-head were not always 
affected, their movements seem to have been reflex: a pinch in the cheek 
produced a grimace, and when it was given the breast, its lips attempted to suck. 
The natural head and body were perfectly normally developed, but a number of 
anomalies were noted on an examination of the parasitic head: the corneal 
reflexes were missing and the eyes’ reaction to light was weak. When the child 
slept, the eyes of the parasitic twin might be open and moving, but when it was 
first awakened, the eyes of the two heads moved in the same direction; the heads’ 
eye-movements were normally independent. The lower jaw was rather small, but 
capable of motion.137 
Actual cases aside, Campbell and McMahan suppose that it is metaphysically possible for 
the second head to develop to the point that it is capable of consciousness. In such a 
hypothetical case, they think that craniopagus parasiticus is a phenomenon in which there 
are two persons, but one organism. There are two persons, since there are two cerebra and 
brainstems which are each capable of consciousness. However, there is one organism on 
their view. The second head falls short of being an organism because it “draws life 
support from the organs below the primary head, yet it contributes nothing to their 
regulation, control, or functioning.” Further, [t]here is no duplication of organs apart from 
those in the second head.”138 
                                                            
136 Jan Bondeson and Elizabeth Allen, “Craniopagus Parasiticus,” Surgical Neurology 31, no. 6 
(June 1, 1989): 426–34. 
 
137 Ibid, 428.  
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Animalist Responses to Conjoined Twinning 
Animalists might respond by rejecting Blatti’s definition of animalism given 
above and opting for generic animalism – the view that ‘we are organisms’ is generic, 
and so, allows for exceptions while still being true. The response, then, would be that the 
cases we find in conjoined twinning that go against the universal claim that all human 
persons are organisms does not go against the generic claim that human persons are 
organisms. Just as the generic claim that ducks lay eggs is not rendered false by some 
ducks who do not lay eggs, the generic claim that we are organisms is not rendered false 
by some human persons who are not identical to organisms.  
If the animalist wants to opt for Blatti’s universalist definition of animalism – that 
all human persons are identical to organisms – how might she respond to cases of 
conjoined twinning? There are various ways to respond. Campbell and McMahan suggest 
that the animalist should respond to cases of dicephalus by admitting that there are two 
persons present since there are two minds, but then contend that there are two organisms 
that overlap. Further, they think that animalists should respond to cases of cephalopagus 
by claiming that since there is (or appears to be) one person present, there is one 
organism, even though there appear to be two overlapping organisms. 
But then they argue that even if the above solutions are satisfactory, an intractable 
problem arises for the animalist when they consider the implications the two sorts of 
phenomena have on each other. They claim that the animalist cannot consistently hold 
both that there are two organisms in cases of dicephalus and one organism in the case of 
                                                            
138 Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” 292.  
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cephalopagus. In other words, if they maintain there are two organisms in the case of 
dicephalus, they must maintain that there are two organisms in the case of cephalopagus. 
Or if they maintain that there is one organism in cephalopagus, they must maintain that 
there is one organism in the case of dicephalus. Campbell and McMahan make these 
claims because they think that the duplication of organs in conjoined twinning cases is a 
good reason for thinking that such cases involve two organisms. But both dicephalus and 
cephalopagus involve the duplication of organs. So, how can one say that there are two 
organisms in the former case, but only one in the latter? But if one claims that there are 
two organisms in cephalopagus, the animalist must claim that there are two persons. This 
isn’t feasible, though, since there is one cerebrum. Or, one might claim that there is one 
person but two organisms and one of the organisms is not a person. After all, according to 
Olson, not all human organisms are persons (consider the fetus). But since each putative 
organism in cephalopagus possesses a brainstem and they share a cerebrum, there is no 
non-arbitrary way to say that one of the organisms is a person while the other is not. But 
if it is maintained that there is one organism in cephalopagus in spite of the duplication of 
organs, then there must be one organism in dicephalus in spite of the duplication of 
organs. If this is so, then the animalist must claim that there is one person in cases of 
dicephalus. But how can one maintain that the Hensel twins – each with their own mental 
lives, interests, etc. – are one person? It seems that animalists have a problem maintaining 
animalism in light of these cases.  
So much for Campbell and McMahan’s suggestion regarding dicephalus and 
cephalopagus. What are some ways actual animalists have responded to conjoined 
twinning cases? The common response to dicephalus is to say that these are two 
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overlapping organisms.139 Liao claims that there are two organisms for several reasons, 
including the duplication of organs and the duplication of the capacity to coordinate 
organic functions.140 But the most common reason given is that such cases involve the 
duplication of the brain and/or brainstem, which is the control center of organisms.141 
Olson suggests another way of responding to dicephalus (though he himself does not take 
this response). Instead of claiming that these are two overlapping organisms, one could 
respond by claiming that such cases involve one human organism (and therefore, one 
person) who has two “mental systems” or centers of consciousness.142 As for 
cephalopagus, Olson responds by claiming that as long as there is a single cerebrum that 
the twins share there are two organisms (since there are two brainstems) and two persons, 
but one shared mind.143  
How does Olson respond to Campbell and McMahan’s claim that animalists face 
an intractable problem when the implications of both dicephalus and cephalopagus are 
considered? He responds by rejecting the response that Campbell and McMahan 
                                                            
139 R. George and P. Lee, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 44-49; Matthew Liao, “The Organism View Defended,” The Monist 89 
(2006): 334–50; Eric Olson, “The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning,” The Southern Journal 
of Philosophy 52, Spindel Supplement (2014): 24–40; Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings, 188-194. 
 
140 Matthew Liao, “The Organism View Defended.”  
 
141 R. George and P. Lee, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics, 46; Eric Olson, 
“The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning”; Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings, 188-194. 
 
142 Eric Olson, “The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning,” 30. How one person can 
have two centers of consciousness Olson discusses at length. David DeGrazia holds to a similar view: 
Human Identity and Bioethics, 59-60. So does David Hershenov, “Countering the Appeal of the 
Psychological Approach to Personal Identity,” Philosophy 79 (2004): 445–72. 
 
143 Eric Olson, “The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning,” 38-39. Again, Olson 
discusses at length how it is that two people can share a single mind.  
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recommend for the animalist for cases of cephalopagus. That is, while he claims that 
there are two organisms in dicephalus, he also claims that there are two organisms in 
cephalopagus who share a mind. His response to dicephalus seems reasonable, but 
depends on a defense of the claim that such cases involve two overlapping organisms. 
His response to cephalopagus seems a little more incredible given his claims about two 
people sharing one mind. I will not get into a discussion at this point of the plausibility of 
Olson’s response to Campbell and McMahan; instead, I will discuss this later in the 
dissertation when considering multiplication objections to my own view of human 
persons.  
How might the animalist respond to cephalopagus? Animalists like Olson and van 
Inwagen would claim that an organism can be reduced to a head, and so, that the second 
head in a case of craniopagus parasiticus is an organism. This is due to their view about 
the brain/brain stem being the control center for the vital functions of the organism and 
the essential part of the organism.144 Campbell and McMahan describe this view as 
follows: “the brain, or even just the brain stem, is the biological core of the organism, the 
internal integrator of the processes that are constitutive of the organism’s life, and thus of 
its existence.”145  
In response, Cambpell and McMahan give two reasons for thinking that the brain 
stem is not necessary for the persistence of an organism. First, they present a modified, 
hypothetical case of craniopagus parasiticus. On this case, one twin is fully developed 
                                                            
 
144 Olson, The Human Animal, 44-46; van Inwagen, Material Objects, 169-181.    
 
145 Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” 294. 
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and the other twin has a complete cerebrum, but has no body below the neck and 
possesses only the portion of the brainstem that is responsible for consciousness rather 
than the organic functions. Campbell and McMahan claim that if this parasitic head were 
removed and sustained, it would continue to be a person (supposing it retains 
consciousness). But it would fail to be an organism according to Olson and van Inwagen 
because it lacks enough of the brain stem (i.e., the internal regulatory center) that it does 
not carry on the organic functions. If they are right about this case, then since this severed 
head is a person, Olson and van Inwagen should claim it is an organism and give up their 
claim that the brain stem is necessary for the persistence of an organism. A second reason 
for doubting that the brain stem is necessary for the persistence of an organism involves a 
case studied by Dr. Alan Shewmon in which a boy’s body survives and maintains its 
bodily functions (except for consciousness) “with only mechanical ventilation, the 
provision of nutrition and hydration, and basic nursing care” in spite of lacking a brain 
and brainstem.146 The body remains an organism and retains its organic functions even 
without the brain and brainstem – components that organisms cannot persist without, 
according to Olson and van Inwagen. The upshot of all this for craniopagus parasiticus is 
that if the brain stem is not necessary for being an organism, the animalist needs to give 
an alternate reason for thinking that the underdeveloped twin in craniopagus parasiticus is 
an organism. Or, they can claim that the underdeveloped twin is not a person.  
                                                            
146 Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” 294; 
Alan Shewmon, “‘Brain-Stem Death’, ‘Brain Death’ and Death: A Critical Re-Evaluation of the Purported 
Equivalence,” Issues in Law and Medicine 14 (1998): 136. The above quotation is from Campbell and 
McMahan.  
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In response, the animalist might claim that rather than needing a brain/brain stem 
for its continued existence, an organism must “continue, with minimal external support, 
to be self-regulating and self-sustaining.”147 Second, they might claim that a severed head 
can continue to be self-regulating and self-sustaining without much external support 
while a headless body cannot. But Campbell and McMahan claim, partly because of the 
Shewmon case above, that it’s the other way around: a headless body can continue to be 
self-regulating and self-sustaining without much external support while a severed head 
cannot. So, it seems that a headless body is a better candidate for being an organism than 
a severed head. To sum up the objection to animalism based on craniopagus parasiticus: 
if the second head in some such cases is a person, but not an organism, then animalism is 
false.  
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CHAPTER 2: HYLOMORPHIC ANIMALISM 
 In this section, I identify the core elements of hylomorphic animalism148—which 
is based on Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s claim that human beings are rational animals 
composed of matter and form.149 (While I regularly speak of Aristotle’s view on an issue, 
I focus more on Aquinas’s views in this dissertation.) I compare hylomorphic animalism 
to Olson’s version of animalism, pointing out key differences. After defining 
hylomorphic animalism, I show that it retains the benefits of Olson’s animalism, in that it 
identifies human beings with human organisms (and animals). If this is right, then the 
thinking-organism argument for animalism supports hylomorphic animalism as well as it 
does Olson’s animalism. Hylomorphic animalism allows that there is an organism located 
where each person is and that this organism thinks. And hylomorphic animalism does not 
lead to a too-many-thinkers problem. I also contend that it is open to the hylomorphic 
animalist to contend that every human was once a fetus. Finally, I contend that it is also 
open to the hylomorphic animalist to say that we can survive in a persistent vegetative 
state.  
                                                            
148 The word ‘hylomorphism’ comes from the Greek words hyle, meaning “matter” and morphe, 
meaning “form”; David Oderberg, “Hylemorphic Dualism,” 72.  
 
149Contemporary proponents of hylomorphic animalism include Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s 
Ontology of the Material World; Christopher Brown, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus; Alfred Freddoso, 
“Good News, Your Soul Hasn’t Died Quite Yet,” American Catholic Philosophical Association 75 (2002): 99–
120; P. Lee and R. George, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics; David Oderberg, Real 
Essentialism (New York: Routledge, 2007), 241 – 260; David Oderberg, “Hylomorphic Dualism”; J. Ross, 
“Immaterial Aspects of Thought,” Journal of Philosophy 89 (1999): 136–50; Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New 
York: Routledge, 2003); Eleonore Stump, “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without 
Reductionism,” Faith and Philosophy, no. 12 (1995): 505–31; Patrick Toner, “Hylemorphic Animalism,” 65–
81; Patrick Toner, “On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity,” European Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 3 
(2009): 454–73.  
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 After outlining these advantages and implications I discuss whether hylomorphic 
animalism can address the problems raised against animalism in Chapter 1, namely, the 
transfer and multiplication objections. I will attempt to show that hylomorphic animalism 
can do justice to the transplant intuition without abandoning the claim that we are 
organisms. Furthermore, I will identify various theoretical resources within hylomorphic 
animalism that its proponents can use to deal with the various multiplication objections.  
Hylomorphic Animalism  
 Animalism is the thesis that human persons are identical to organisms. According 
to hylomorphic animalism, all human persons are composed of prime matter and a 
rational soul (notions defined below). Further, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, all 
human persons are identical to organisms of a specific type: rational animals. If we build 
this notion into hylomorphic animalism, then it is the view that we are numerically 
identical to rational animals which are living bodies composed of prime matter and a 
rational soul. Such a view satisfies the common view that we are organisms or animals, 
while also acknowledging that our psychology is an important part of who we are and 
that various features of our minds are implicated in our persistence over time. Before 
addressing the hylomorphic view concerning the nature and persistence of human beings, 
I address hylomorphism concerning material objects in general and the nature of their 
change over time.    
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Material Objects 
 Aristotle and Aquinas take human beings to be material substances. All material 
substances, for them, are not simple, but complex, being composites of matter and 
form.150 This view of material substances as composite is called hylomorphism, and the 
composites are called hylomorphic compounds.151   
 For Aristotle and Aquinas, matter is potentiality,152 or “that which is in 
potentiality to receiving a form—namely, a being in potentiality.”153 Form, on the other 
hand, is actuality,154 or “that which actualizes the potentiality of matter—namely, a being 
in actuality.”155 When form inheres in matter, a hylomorphic compound or substance – 
                                                            
150 Aristotle, Metaphysics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 
ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2, Bollingen Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 7.3.1029a3-6; 
Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings, trans. Timothy McDermott, The World’s 
Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 93: “Note that what composes composite substances is 
material and its form (human, for example, contain body and soul) . . .”; Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. 4 (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), 
1.75.5; Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 9. All subsequent reference to 
Aristotle’s works come from Barnes’ The Complete Works of Aristotle.  
 
151 Material substances are but one of two types of hylomorphic compound, the other being 
accidental unities, which are composed of material substances and accidental form (defined below); 
Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 9.  
 
152 Aristotle, De Anima, 412a10-11: “Now matter is potentiality, form actuality . . .”; Thomas 
Aquinas, Aristotle’s De Anima with the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2.1.215: “Matter, then, differs 
from form in this, that it is potential being; form is the ‘entelechy’ or actuality that renders matter actual; 
and the compound is the resulting actual being”; Thomas Aquinas, The Principles of Nature, trans. R. 
Kocourek (St. Paul, Minnesota: North Central, 1948), 1.35-43: “everything which is in potency can be 
called matter.” 
 
153 Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 5.  
 
154 Aristotle, De Anima 412a10-11: “Now matter is potentiality, form actuality . . .”; Aquinas, 
Aristotle’s De Anima with the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2.1.215; Thomas Aquinas, The 
Principles of Nature, 1.35-43: “. . . so also everything from which something has existence whether that 
existence be substantial or accidental, can be called form . . .”  
 
155 Thomas Aquinas, The Principles of Nature 1.35-43: “just as everything which is in potency can 
be called matter, so also everything from which something has existence whether that existence be 
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an actuality – is formed.156 Since a composite is composed of matter and form, the matter 
and form of a compound are metaphysical aspects, components or “parts” of the 
compound.157 Aquinas calls the relationship that matter bears to form subjection, the 
relationship that form bears to matter inherence, and the “relation that both matter and 
form jointly bear to the hylomorphic compounds of which they are a part” 
composition.158  
 According to Aquinas, there are two types of matter: primary matter (prime 
matter) and secondary matter.159 Corresponding to these two types of matter are two 
types of form: substantial and accidental.160 And corresponding to these two types of 
                                                            
substantial or accidental, can be called form; for example man, since he is white in potency, becomes 
actually white through whiteness, and sperm, since it is man in potency, becomes actually man through 
the soul. Also, because form causes existence in act, we say that the form is the act”; Brower, Aquinas’s 
Ontology of the Material World, 5.  
 
156 Aquinas, Aristotle’s De Anima with the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2.1.213-17. Forms 
are also spoken of as actualities, but the difference is that Aquinas speaks of forms as “beings in actuality 
in another,” whereas he speaks of compounds as “beings in actuality in or through themselves”; Jeffrey 
Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 7, 10. 
 
157 As metaphysical parts, they are not parts of the same sort as the physical parts of a substance 
(like the eyes, brains, and hands of human beings). Eleonore Stump, in this regard, distinguishes between 
integral parts (“components that add to the quantity of the material whole they compose,” e.g., the eyes, 
brains, and hands of human beings) and metaphysical parts (e.g., the matter and form of composite 
objects): Stump, Aquinas, 194, 209-210. Patrick Toner calls integral parts spatial parts. Patrick Toner, 
“Emergent Substance,” 288. 
 
158 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.75.2.2, 1.85.5.3; Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of 
the Material World, 6-7, 72.  
 
159 Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 12, 81; John F. Wippel, The 
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being, Monographs of the 
Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy 1 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2000), 298. There is some controversy regarding whether or not Aristotle accepts prime matter: 
Thomas Ainsworth, “Form vs. Matter,” ed. Edward Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 
2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/form-matter/. 
 
160 Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 12; John F. Wippel, The 
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 298.  
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matter and form are two types of hylomorphic compound: substances and accidental 
unities.161 For Aquinas, substances are composites of prime matter and substantial form 
and accidental unities are composites of substances and accidental forms.162  
 Prime matter is pure potentiality, having in itself no actuality.163 Instead, prime 
matter exists in actuality only when some form inheres in it.164 It follows from this that 
prime matter cannot exist uninformed.165 Substantial form is that which inheres in prime 
                                                            
161 Ainsworth, “Form vs. Matter.”  
  
162 Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 7. It seems that Aristotle did not 
believe that substances are composites of prime matter and substantial form: Ainsworth, “Form vs. 
Matter.” Instead, he believed that a substance is composed of proximate matter and form, where 
proximate matter is “the stuff [the substance] is most immediate made of.” The proximate matter of a 
substance is composed of its proximate matter and so on until matter is reached that is composed of 
prime matter (if there is any). 
 
163 Aristotle, De Anima, 412a10-11. Aquinas, The Principles of Nature 2.112-18: “[M]atter is never 
completely without form and privation, because it is sometimes under one form and sometimes under 
another. Moreover, it can never exist by itself; because, since it does not have any form in its definition, it 
cannot exist in act, since existence in act is only with the form. Rather it exists only in potency. Therefore, 
whatever exists in act cannot be called prime matter”; Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 
10; Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-
89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 41, 44; John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of 
Thomas Aquinas, 296. 
 
164 Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.7.1049a19-b1; Aquinas, The Principles of Nature 2.112-18: “in itself 
(per se) it can never exist, because given that by its nature it has no form, it has no actual existence, since 
actual existence comes only through form, whereas it is solely in potentiality.” On this understanding of 
the hylomorphic framework, everything that exists has form. See Robert Pasnau, “Philosophy of Mind and 
Human Nature,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 351. 
 
165 Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.7.1049a19-b1; Aquinas, The Principles of Nature 2.112-18: “Matter is 
never completely without form and privation, because it is sometimes under one form and sometimes 
under another. Moreover, it can never exist by itself; because, since it does not have any form in its 
definition, it cannot exist in act, since existence in act is only from the form. Rather it exists only in 
potency. Therefore whatever exists in act cannot be called prime matter”; As Brower says, “Insofar as 
prime matter is a being in pure potentiality, it has no form or actuality through itself, but only via 
inherence. But, given the close connection between actuality and existence, for Aquinas, this just entails 
that prime matter cannot exist without some form inhering in it. Indeed, for prime matter to exist, he 
says, just is for it to have actuality in this way, and hence to be a part of a larger compound” Aquinas’s 
Ontology of the Material World, 19. See also Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 44.  
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matter, and in so doing, actualizes the potential in prime matter.166 When prime matter 
receives substantial form, a new substance comes to be, the prime matter serving as the 
substratum for the substantial form.167 For example, at least for Aquinas, when the form 
human being informs a chunk of prime matter, a new human being comes into existence.  
 As for secondary matter, it is not matter in the strict and proper sense, the strict 
and proper sense being that which has no form in itself. Only prime matter is matter in 
this sense. Secondary matter has form in itself since it is compound, being composed of 
matter and form.168 (As such, secondary matter is not pure potentiality, being limited by 
the form that inheres in it.) But it qualifies as matter in the sense that it has the potential 
to receive a form. 
 As for accidental form, it is that which inheres in secondary matter and that which 
secondary matter has the potential to receive.169 Secondary matter serves as the 
substratum for accidental forms.170 When an accidental form inheres in secondary matter, 
no new substance comes to be (as when a substantial form inheres in prime matter); 
                                                            
166 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.76.4 and 1.76.8; Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human 
Nature, 82-83, 88, 92; John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 296.  
 
167 Aristotle, De Anima, 412a19-27; Robert Pasnau, “Philosophy of Mind and Human Nature,” 
361; R. Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 155; Stump, Aquinas, 37.  
 
168 Properly speaking, that which is in potentiality with respect to substantial being is called 
‘prime matter’, whereas that which is in potentiality with respect to accidental being is called ‘a subject’: 
Aquinas, The Principles of Nature, 1.20-24. Aquinas allows for accidental forms inhering in other 
accidental forms, but he thinks this only happens through divine intervention: Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s 
Ontology of the Material World, 239.  
 
169 Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 80. John F. Wippel, The 
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 298. 
 
170 Aristotle, De Anima, 412a19-27; R. Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima, 155. 
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instead, an already-existing substance – the subject of the accidental form – is altered.171 
When this happens, an accidental unity is formed (which is a composite of secondary 
matter and accidental form).172 For example, Socrates, a substance, is potentially pale.173 
Thus, he has the potential to receive the accidental form paleness. When this form inheres 
in Socrates (who is then the subject of the form), the accidental unity pale Socrates is 
formed.  
Change 
 
 Change174 is the corruption of one composite and the subsequent generation of 
another composite, where both composites possess the same chunk of matter as a part 
(though at different times). It occurs when some chunk of matter (M) persists through a 
transition from being informed by one form (F1) at a time (t1) (with M and F1 together 
forming a composite) to being informed by another form (F2) at a later time (t2) (with M 
and F2 together forming a different composite), with F2 being distinct from and 
incompatible with F1.175 The composite at t1 composed of M and F1 ceases to exist by t2 
                                                            
171 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.76.4; Robert Pasnau, “Philosophy of Mind and Human Nature,” 
361: “Whereas an accidental form makes a thing be thus and so, a substantial form makes a thing be 
simpliciter” and “Accidental forms are those forms that can come and go while a substance remains”; 
Stump, Aquinas, 38. 
 
172 E.g., Summa Theologica, I.76.4.  
 
173 Aquinas, The Principles of Nature . . . “. . . man, since he is white in potency, becomes actually 
white through whiteness . . .”  
 
174 Brower points out that certain instances of change do not seem to be that of the generation 
and corruption of composites, such as the change that occurs when two planets move toward each other. 
Given this, he limits the account of change given here – that of generation and corruption – to intrinsic 
change, which he thinks only applies to composites. Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 63. 
 
175 Aristotle, Physics 1 (starting at 1.7.189b30); Metaphysics M 7.7.1033a5-20; Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica 1.45.2, Aristotle’s De Anima with the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, 8.1.1688; The 
Principles of Nature, 1-2; Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 63; John F. Wippel, 
The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 297.  
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because F1 ceases to inform M. The ceasing to exist of a composite due to the separation 
of the composite’s matter and form is called corruption.176 The entity at t2 composed of 
M and F2 begins to exist when F2 begins to inform M. The coming to be of a composite 
due to the inhering of form in a chunk of matter is called generation.  Thus, with any 
change, there is some underlying matter that persists through the change, the loss of a 
form and a taking on of another form by that matter, and the corruption of one composite 
and the generation of another.177  
 The account of change just given is limited to instances of intrinsic change that 
occur when some chunk of matter persists through the loss of one form and the taking on 
of another form; in other words, when one composite ceases to exist and another 
composite begins to exist and both composites possess the same chunk of matter as a 
logical or metaphysical part (though at different times). This is one-to-one change. But 
there are other sorts of intrinsic change, namely, one-to-many change (e.g., when a statue 
is cut into two pieces) and many-to-one change (e.g., when a sperm and egg come 
together to form a new organism).178 One-to-many change is the corruption of one 
                                                            
 
176 Though substances come to be and cease to exist and though prime matter may possess 
different forms at different times, prime matter endures through changes and “is neither generated nor 
corrupted”: Aquinas, The Principles of Nature 2.90-96; see also Aristotle’s De Anima with the Commentary 
of St. Thomas Aquinas 12.3.2443.  
 
177 Aquinas gives an exception to this. He believes that the sort of change that occurs during the 
Eucharist – transubstantiation – does not involve generation and corruption. But such change is not 
natural, being brought about by divine intervention. See Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the 
Material World, chapter 11. 
   
178 Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 65. Another example of one-to-
many change that we’ll see in the section on transfer scenarios is when some of the matter in a matter-
form composite breaks off from matter-form composite and begins to be informed by a new form (since 
matter cannot exist uninformed) and the original matter-form composite is not corrupted but survives the 
loss of matter. The matter that breaks off and the new form that informs that matter compose a new 
matter-form composite. An example that is perhaps uncontroversial is when a person loses a toenail. The 
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composite and the subsequent generation of more than one composite, where the matter 
of the corrupted composite is split among the composites that are generated as a result of 
the corruption of the initial composite. Many-to-one change is the corruption of many 
composites and the subsequent generation of one composite, where the matter that made 
up the corrupted composites comes together to make up the matter of the generated 
composite. In what remains of my explanation of the hylomorphic concept of change, I 
limit my discussion to one-to-one intrinsic change.   
 There are two and only two sorts of intrinsic change: substantial change and 
accidental change.179 Substantial change is the corruption of one substance (substantial 
corruption) and the generation of another substance (substantial generation), where both 
substances possess the same chunk of prime matter as a logical part (though at different 
times). It occurs when a chunk of prime matter (M) persists through being informed by 
one substantial form (F1) at a time (t1) (with M and F1 together composing a substance) 
to being informed by another substantial form (F2) at a later time (t2) (with M and F2 
together composing a different substance), with F2 being distinct from and incompatible 
                                                            
person survives the loss of the toenail and the matter of the toenail and its new form compose a new 
matter-form composite.   
 
179 Aquinas, The Principles of Nature 1.47-50: “Because generation is a motion to form, there is a 
twofold generation corresponding to this twofold form. Generation simpliciter corresponds to the 
substantial form and generation secundum quid corresponds to the accidental form. When a substantial 
form is introduced we say that something comes into being simpliciter, for example we say that man 
comes into being or man is generated [something]. But when an accidental form is introduced, we do not 
say that something comes into being simpliciter, but that it comes into being as this; for example when 
man comes into being as white, we do not say simpliciter that man comes into being or is generated, but 
that he comes into being or is generated as white [somehow]”; See also, The Principles of Nature 1.9-19; 
Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World, 76; John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought 
of Thomas Aquinas, 297.  
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with F1.180 The substance at t1 composed of M and F1 is corrupted by t2 because F1 
ceases to inform M, while the substance at t2 composed of M and F2 is generated by t2 
because F2 begins to inform M. For example, consider what happens when Socrates dies. 
In such a case, the portion of prime matter that – together with the substantial form 
human being – composed Socrates ceased to be informed by the form human being and 
began to be informed by the form human corpse. Thus, when Socrates dies, a substantial 
change occurs: the substance Socrates ceases to exist and the substance the corpse of 
Socrates begins to exist.181   
 Accidental change is the corruption of one accidental unity (accidental 
corruption) and the generation of another (accidental generation) where both accidental 
unities possess the same subject as a part (though at different times). It occurs when some 
composite (C) (the subject of the change) persists through being informed by one 
accidental form (F1) at a time (t1) (with C and F1 together composing an accidental 
unity) to being informed by another substantial form (F2) at a later time (t2) (with C and 
F2 together composing a different accidental unity), with F2 being distinct from and 
incompatible with F1. The accidental unity at t1 composed of C and F1 is corrupted by t2 
because F1 ceases to inform C, while the accidental unity at t2 composed of C and F2 is 
generated by t2 because F2 begins to inform C. For example, consider what happens 
when Socrates is sunburned. In such a case, Socrates goes from being pale to being red. 
                                                            
180 Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.45.2 ad 2; Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material 
World, 60, 75; Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 43.  
 
181 Stump, Aquinas, 38. Alternatively, one might say that corpses do not exist as substances, but 
are aggregates of smaller substances. If this is right, there is still a substantial change, but the change is 
from one to many rather than one to one.  
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He loses the accidental form paleness and takes on the accidental form redness. When 
Socrates gets sunburned, he continues to exist, but the accidental unity pale Socrates 
ceases to exist and the accidental unity red Socrates begins to exist.182       
 
Living Substances 
 The class of material substances is divisible into the class of substances that are 
living and the class of substances that are not.183 The source of life for all and only those 
material substances that are in the class of living beings is its substantial form, or soul184 
– what Aristotle calls “the first actuality of a natural body that is potentially alive.” and 
what Aquinas calls the “first principle of life” in living beings and “the actuality of living 
bodies.”185 What is the first actuality of a natural body? Jason Eberl defines first actuality 
as “a kind of potentiality to perform some operation.”186 Which operations? Those that 
are “characteristic of living things of its natural kind,” such as self-nourishment, 
                                                            
182 Stump, Aquinas, 38.  
 
183 Aristotle, De Anima 412a18-412a26, 413a21; Aquinas, Summa Theologica I.75.I; Robert 
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 26. 
 
184 Christopher Shields, “The Aristotelian Psuche,” in A Companion to Aristotle, ed. Georgios 
Anagnostopoulos, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 42 (Massachusets: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 294. 
Though the term ‘soul,’ these days, tends to be religiously loaded, Aristotle did not take soul in that way. 
He thought of it as the source or cause of life for organisms. Although Aquinas incorporated Aristotle’s 
idea of the soul into his Christian faith, but the term ‘soul,’ for him, did not just refer to the spiritual 
aspect of humans. Instead, for him, soul is form, something every material object possesses. 
 
185 Aristotle, De Anima, 412a29-30; Aquinas, Summa Theologica I.75.I; Robert Pasnau, Thomas 
Aquinas on Human Nature, 26-29, Normann Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 129-130. By “principle of life,” Aquinas means “source” or “cause”: Robert Pasnau, Thomas 
Aquinas on Human Nature, 28. 
 
186 Jason T. Eberl, “Aquinas’s Account of Human Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations,” 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30, no. 4 (2005), 384. Eberl also distinguishes between two senses of 
first actuality: a capacity in hand and a natural potentiality to develop a capacity. This distinction will 
prove important later on in the dissertation, at which point I will explain the distinction.  
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perception, and intellect.187 Active potentiality is distinct from passive potentiality in that 
“something has a passive potentiality if it can be the subject of externally directed change 
such that it can become what it is not already.”188 Something that has a passive potential 
for life is not yet alive. Second actuality is the performance of the operations 
characteristic of living things. As Aquinas says: “the first act is said to be in potentiality 
to the second act, which is operation.” Since the operation of the capacities characteristic 
of living things is not necessary for ensoulment, it follows that a being can remain 
ensouled even when it is not exercising those operations (e.g., a sleeping person not 
exercising her rationality is first act rational but not second act rational).    
The class of living beings is divisible into the class of sentient beings and the 
class of non-sentient beings. The non-sentient beings are the merely organic and include 
such things as flowers, moss, and grass. Finally, the class of sentient beings is divisible 
into the class of beings that are rational and the class of sentient beings that are non-
rational. Sentient and non-rational living beings include slugs, frogs, and worms; sentient 
and rational beings include, at least, human beings.   
 Corresponding to the division among living things between (i) non-sentient, non-
rational, living beings, (ii) sentient and non-rational living beings, and (iii) sentient and 
rational living beings, there are different types of souls.189 Non-sentient living beings 
                                                            
 
187 Mark S. Cohen, “Aristotle on the Soul,” accessed May 26, 2017, 
https://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/psyche.htm. 
 
188 Ibid.   
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(i.e., mere organisms) possess a vegetative (or nutritive) soul. The vegetative soul is the 
source of the vegetative functions of the organism, which include self-nutrition, growth, 
and reproduction.190 Aristotle identifies self-nutrition as “the originative power the 
possession of which leads us to speak of things as living at all.” To these functions, I 
would add breathing, heartbeat, blood pressure, body temperature, digestion, and 
circulation, those functions for which the brainstem is responsible.191 Those living 
entities that are sentient but not rational (i.e., mere animals) possess a sensitive soul. The 
capacity of sensation is what distinguishes entities with a vegetative soul from those with 
a sensitive soul.192 Entities with a sensitive soul possesses not only sensitive functions but 
vegetative functions as well, as Aristotle says:  
Of the psychic powers above enumerated some kinds of living things, as we have said, 
possess all, some less than all, others one only. Those we have mentioned are the 
nutritive, the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and the power of thinking. Plants 
have none but the first, the nutritive, while another order of living things has this plus 
the sensory.193  
                                                            
189 Aristotle, De Anima, 413a21-413b13; 414a29-415a12; Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.75.3, 
76.1, and 78.1, Questions on the Soul, trans. James Robb (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984), 
1, respondeo, ad. 1.  
 
190 Aristotle, De Anima, 412a14-15, 413b4-413b13; Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.78.2; Pasnau, 
Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 122.  
 
191 “Brain Anatomy, Anatomy of the Human Brain;” Kara Rogers, ed., The Brain and the Nervous 
System, 13. 
 
192 Aristotle, De Anima, 413b1-413b3: “it is the possession of sensation that leads us for the first 
time to speak of living things as animals; for even those beings which possess no power of local 
movement but do possess the power of sensation we call animals and not merely living things.” 
 
193 Aristotle, De Anima, 414a29-415a12; Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.76.3 
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The sensitive soul is the source of these functions.194 The sensitive functions include the 
appetites (such as desire, passion, and wish195), pleasure and pain,196 the five outer senses 
(sight, touch, hearing, etc.), and internal senses like common sense (“the power that 
integrates information from the various external senses” and includes, for example, the 
ability to distinguish between the sweetness and the whiteness of an object197), phantasia 
(“a form of internal representation that underlies mental states quite generally”198), 
imagination, and memory.199 Not everything with a sensitive soul possesses all of these 
functions. But what differentiates something with a sensitive soul from something with a 
mere vegetative soul is the capacity for sensation.200 In addition, some entities with a 
sensitive soul possess locomotion.201 While all living things have the ability to move 
(those living things lacking locomotion move “in the sense of nutrition, growth, and 
                                                            
194 Aristotle, De Anima, 413b4-413b13. 
  
195 Aristotle, De Anima, 414a29-415a12. 
  
196 Ibid.  
 
197 Deboarah Modrak, “Sensation and Desire,” in A Companion to Aristotle, ed. Georgios 
Anagnostopoulos, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 42 (Massachusets: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 310, 
314-315; Stump, Aquinas, 248. Quote was taken from Stump.  
 
198 Victor Caston, “Phantasia and Thought,” in A Companion to Aristotle, ed. Georgios 
Anagnostopoulos, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 42 (Massachusets: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 325; cf. 
Stump, Aquinas 257.  
 
199 Aristotle, De Anima, 413b14-413b24; Deboarah Modrak, “Sensation and Desire,” 310; Pasnau, 
Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 420, n.14; Stump, Aquinas 248.  Not everything with a sensitive soul 
possesses all these functions (De Anima, 414a3). But what differentiates something with a sensitive soul 
from something with a mere vegetative soul is the capacity for sensation.  
 
200 Aristotle, De Anima, 414a29-415a12. Aristotle believes that all entities with a sensitive soul 
possess the power of touch (413b4-413b13: “all animals whatsoever are observed to have the power of 
touch.”)  
 
201 Aristotle, De Anima, 414a29-415a12; Aquinas Summa Theologica 1.78.1. Not everything with 
a sensitive soul possesses locomotion: “among living things that possess sense some have the power of 
locomotion, some not” (De Anima, 414a29-415a12). Aquinas labels these entities “immovable animals” 
and those entities with locomotion he labels “perfect animals.”   
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decay”202), only animals possess the capacity of locomotion – the ability to move from 
place to place by one’s own volition. I would add to this that some animals possess 
voluntary movement that is not locomotive, e.g., the flapping of wings, or the voluntary 
moving of one’s jaws. Finally, those organisms that are sentient and rational possess a 
rational soul. Organisms with a rational soul possess vegetative, sensory, and rational 
functions.203  The rational functions include understanding (which is the formation of 
concepts from mental representations of objects perceived by the outer senses), 
propositional thought, and reasoning.204 The soul of an organism determines what sort of 
thing the substance is (plant or animal, rational or non-rational),205 the soul determines 
what capacities and functions the organism has (vegetative, sensitive, or rational), the 
soul controls the various functions, is responsible for the unity of the organism, and 
organizes the parts of the body.206   
 Living entities possess exactly one soul.207 For example, a sentient (non-rational) 
animal does not possess one soul for the vegetative functions and another soul for the 
                                                            
 
202 Aristotle, De Anima, 413a21-413a31. 
  
203 Aristotle, De Anima, 413a21-413b13; 414a29-415a12; Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.76.3 
 
204 Aristotle, De Anima, 413a21-413a31; Victor Caston, “Phantasia and Thought,” 327; 
Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 142; Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, chapter 10; Stump, 
Aquinas, 270.   
  
205 Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 1.3.643a23; Aquinas, Questions on the Soul 1, respondeo, ad. 1; 
David Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 68. Normann Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 111.  
 
206 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. English Dominican Fathers (London: Burns, 
Oates, and Washbourne, 1934), 4.36, Summa Theologica I.77.6, 90.2; Mark Spencer, “A Reexamination of 
the Hylomorphic Theory of Death,” The Review of Metaphysics 63, no. 4 (June 2010): 847; Robert Pasnau, 
Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 41, 54; Stump, “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism 
Without Reductionism,” 509-510. 
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sensitive functions. Rather, the sensitive soul in an animal is the source of both the 
vegetative and sensitive functions for that animal.208 As for humans, they do not possess 
three souls, but one – a rational soul – which is the source of the vegetative, sensitive, and 
rational functions.209 Furthermore, the various physical parts of an organism – the heart, 
brain, hand, cells, molecules, etc. – do not qualify as substances in their own right. That 
is, substances (at least for Aquinas) possess no substances as parts.210 So a human hand is 
not a substance, but is part of the substance which is the human being. The fact that a 
given organism has exactly one soul and does not have substances as parts gives the 
organism a unity that would be lacking if it had three souls (a vegetative soul, a sensitive 
soul, and a rational soul) or one soul for each of its proper parts.211  
                                                            
207 Aristotle, De Anima 412b10-20, Aristotle, Meteorology 4.12, 389b31-390a19; Aquinas, 
Questions on the Soul, 11; Summa Contra Gentiles 2.8.  
 
208 For Aristotle, it seems to be the case that though these functions belong to the same soul, 
they are nevertheless different parts of that soul. Klaus Corcilius and Pavel Gregoric, “Separability Vs. 
Difference: Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 39 (2010): 
81–120. 
 
209 Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.76.3; Normann Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 131.  
 
210 Patrick Toner, “Hylemorphic Animalism,” 68. Stump gives the reasoning for why this is. She 
says that given that substantial forms inhere in prime matter, not in other matter-form composites, if a 
substance had substances as parts, those substances which are parts would inhere in the substance, not 
in prime matter. But then those parts would not be substances; Aquinas, 39.  
 
211 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.76.3: “In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely 
one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing 
has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and therefore things 
which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, "a white man." If, 
therefore, man were 'living' by one form, the vegetative soul, and 'animal' by another form, the sensitive 
soul, and "man" by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. 
Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from 
the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that 
there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), "what contains them?"—-that is, what makes 
them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because rather does the soul contain 
the body and make it one, than the reverse.” 
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 The beings in the last category of organism – those living beings that are sentient 
and rational – consist of (at least) human beings.212 Human beings are identical with213 
rational animals and are composed of primary matter and a substantial, rational soul.214 
The rational soul that partly composes human beings is what determines that human 
beings are rational and that they are living and sentient.215 The rational soul is what 
distinguishes humans from other non-rational animals.216  
 Given that human beings are rational animals, they are both persons and animals. 
I follow Boethius in his definition of a person: that of an individual substance of a 
rational nature, with the rational nature being determined by the form (since the form of a 
                                                            
212 I say ‘at least’ in order to allow for non-human rational animals such as dolphins (if they are 
rational) and Martians.  
 
213 Why say that human beings are identical with rational animals rather than, say, constituted by 
but not identical to them? The most compelling reason for thinking so is the thinking-organism argument 
given by Olson. 
 
214 Aquinas thinks that the human soul is identical to rational soul, which is the substantial form 
of the human being: Summa Theologiae 76.1: “Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is 
the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby 
we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our 
nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle 
by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of 
the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2).” Norman Kretzmann, “Philosophy 
of Mind,” 131.  
 
215 Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.76.3: “Thus the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever 
belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants”; Robert Pasnau, 
Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 145-152. 
 
216 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.75.3: “Although man is of the same "genus" as other 
animals, he is of a different ‘species.’ Specific difference is derived from the difference of form; nor does 
every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of ‘genus.’”; 1.76.1: “According to the Philosopher, 
Metaph. viii (Did. vii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which constitutes man is 
"rational," which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual 
principle is the form of man.” Normann Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 135. 
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composite determines its nature).217 This is distinct from Eric Olson’s conception of 
persons as phases of substances. On hylomorphism, a human being cannot fail to be a 
person and continue to exist, but on Olson’s animalism, human beings start out as 
nonpersons and develop into persons. I follow Aristotle and Aquinas in defining an 
animal as a sensing, corporeal thing.218 So, given that we human beings are rational 
animals, we are identical with individual substances of a sensing and rational nature.219  
Human Persistence 
Human beings are rational animals, which are material substances composed of 
prime matter and a rational soul. A particular human being is a material substance 
composed of a rational soul and a particular chunk of prime matter.220 What are the 
                                                            
217 Boethius, Patrologia Latina 64.1342. On form determining the nature of the thing (because 
matter is not specific), see Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.17, 1041b7-8: “Since we must know the existence of 
the thing and it must be given, clearly the question is why the matter is some individual thing, e.g. why are 
these materials a house? Because that which was the essence of a house is present. And why is this 
individual thing, or this body in this state, a man? Therefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form, by 
reason of which the matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing.” Aquinas, 
Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. J. P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962), 
8.17.1668: “Hence in such questions it is evident that we are asking about "the cause of the matter," i.e., 
why it is made to be of this nature. Now the thing under investigation which is the cause of the matter is 
"the specifying principle," namely, the form by which something is”; “As Aquinas understands Aristotle, 
then, the question What is a human being? Should be analyzed as the question of what makes this 
material stuff be human. The general line of reply that Aristotle proposes (and Aquinas accepts) is that it 
is form, in the ultimate analysis, that makes the matter be what it is. Form is “the cause of the matter”; it 
is “on account of” form that the matter “realizes the nature” of what it is,” Robert Pasnau, Thomas 
Aquinas on Human Nature, 34-35. 
 
218  Aristotle, De Anima, 413a21-413b13; 414a29-415a12; Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.76.3; 
Summa Theologiae Supplement 79.2.3; Norman Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 134.  
 
219 Gyula Klima, “Man = Body + Soul: Aquinas’s Arithmetic of Human Nature,” in Thomas Aquinas: 
Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. B. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 257-274. 
 
220 Souls are individuated by their inherence in a particular chunk of matter at a particular time. If 
soul1 inheres in chunk of matter1 and soul2 inheres in chunk of matter2 (and matter1 and matter2 are 
numerically distinct) then soul1 is numerically distinct from soul2. If soul1 inheres in chunk of matter1 at t1 
and soul2 inheres in chunk of matter2 at t2 (and matter1 and matter2 are numerically identical but t1 and t2 
are distinct times), then soul1 is numerically distinct from soul2. 
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persistence conditions for human beings? Here I consider two different hylormorphic 
views of the persistence conditions for human beings – the formal continuity view, and 
the composite continuity view.221 I favor the latter and say why below.  
Consider the formal continuity view first. On this view, the persistence of a 
particular human being’s form is necessary and sufficient for the persistence of that 
human being.222 That is, for any human being, x, existing at a time, t1, something, y, 
existing at a later time, t2, is identical with x if and only if the form of x is identical with 
the form of y.223  
How can the persistence of the form be necessary and sufficient for the 
persistence of the human person if the human person is identical to the composite of 
                                                            
 
221 Silas Langley, “Aquinas, Resurrection, and Material Continuity,” Proceedings of the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association, no. 75 (2001), 138. Note that Langley calls the composite continuity 
view the ‘material continuity view.’ However, this term is misleading. It suggests that what is necessary 
and sufficient for the persistence of human persons is the persistence of their matter. But, as will be seen 
below, it is the view that the persistence of the composite is necessary and sufficient for the persistence 
of the person. Furthermore, note that for the purposes of this dissertation, I will leave it open which view 
more accurately reflects the views of Aristotle and Aquinas. I am not concerned with arguing that 
Aristotle or Aquinas held one view or the other; nor am I concerned with holding to a view on human 
persistence simply because Aristotle or Aquinas held it. Langley argues that one can find textual evidence 
in Aquinas for both the material continuity view and the formal continuity view and that both are 
consistent with Aquinas’s other philosophical commitments. For further discussion of the pros and cons of 
these views see Jason Eberl, “Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings,” The Review of Metaphysics 58, 
no. 2 (2004): 333–65. For the sake of being logically complete, a third option would be the material 
continuity view, according to which you persist if and only if your matter persists. This view entails that a 
person could persist through substantial change so long as the matter persists through the change. So, 
perhaps you could become a bear or an alligator. This view would reject kind essentialism, the view that 
members of a kind are essentially members of that kind. I do not know of any hylomorphist who holds to 
this view.   
 
222 Here are some contemporary proponents of this view: Christopher Brown, Aquinas and the 
Ship of Theseus; J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae, Body and Soul (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
2000), 201; David S. Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 50-54; Stump, Aquinas.  
 
223 I took the structure of this statement from the structure of the statement of the persistence 
of organisms in Olson, “Animalism.”  
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matter and form? It cannot. If human persons are identical to the composite, the ceasing 
to be of the composite is sufficient for the ceasing to be of the human person.224 But 
formal continuity theorists like Eleonore Stump reject the claim that the human person is 
identical to the composite that constitutes her.225 Instead, Stump claims that “a human 
person is identical to a particular in the species rational animal” and is constituted by but 
not identical to a composite of matter and form. If this is right, it is open to the theorist to 
argue that the human person can lose one of its constituents (e.g., its matter) and continue 
to exist. Thus, this view is hylomorphic in the sense that it views human beings as in 
some sense composites of matter and form. But it rejects the contention by certain 
hylomorphists (including me) that human beings are identical to the composite. As Stump 
contends, human persons are identical to rational animals, but rational animals are not 
identical to composites of form and matter.  
On the formal continuity view, the continuity of one’s current mental content 
(such as memories, beliefs, desires, etc.) is arguably neither necessary nor sufficient for 
one’s survival. The continuity of her mental content is not necessary for her survival. 
Suppose that Sally is hit in the head with a brick and loses her memories, beliefs, etc. If 
her form persists, she persists. Losing one’s beliefs, for example, does not entail that one 
ceases to exist since a person’s form is distinct from her mental content. Her form gives 
her the capacity to acquire new beliefs, so, supposing her form persists, she still retains 
the capacity for acquiring beliefs. What evidence is there that Sally has retained her 
form? Her other capacities – the vegetative, sensitive, and even rational capacities (such 
                                                            
224 Unless we introduce a relative notion of identity.  
  
225 Stump, Aquinas, 51-54.    
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as the ability to add 1+1) – are still functioning and she possesses these capacities in 
virtue of her form.  In other words, if we see that many of Sally’s functions (such as 
metabolism, respiration, etc.) continue in spite of her memory loss, this is evidence that 
her form persists (and thus, that she persists). Now consider the claim that the persistence 
of one’s mental content is not sufficient for one’s survival on the formal continuity view. 
Someone might scan and copy Sally’s mental content, wipe Sally’s brain, wipe Suzie’s 
brain (an identical twin, let’s say), and then configure Suzie’s brain so that Suzie’s mental 
content matches Sally’s pre-wiped mental content. It is not clear that Sally (including her 
form) is transferred from Sally’s body to Suzie’s body. In fact, if Sally’s body retains its 
vital functions, perhaps we should take this as evidence that Sally’s body retains Sally’s 
form and that Sally was not transferred from one place to another.  
 Are psychological capacities such as rationality and self-awareness necessary 
and/or sufficient for a person’s survival on the formal continuity view? Consider first 
whether they are necessary. In a sense, one cannot lose one’s first-actuality rationality 
and self-awareness and continue to exist on the formal continuity view. To explain the 
sense in which this is true, I need now to distinguish between two senses of first 
actuality.226 The first is what Robert Pasnau calls a capacity in hand.227 He does not 
define ‘capacity in hand,’ but perhaps an example will help. A mature, properly 
functioning human being has the capacity in hand for vision whether or not she is 
                                                            
226 Recall that first actuality is equivalent to second potentiality. So, these two senses of first 
actuality are two senses of second potentiality as well.  
  
227 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 115, 118. As we will see, he ultimately 
rejects this requirement for the less stringent requirement that the brain be capable of any mental 
operations at all.  
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actually exercising that capacity (she might be in a completely dark room or sleeping). 
On another sense of first actuality, one has, as Norman Kretzmann labels it, a “‘natural 
potentiality’ to develop a capacity.”228 Each substance possesses an “essential set” of 
natural potentialities in virtue of the sort of soul it possesses.229  This sense of first 
actuality is a sort of potentiality, though it is distinct from first potentiality.230 Natural 
potentiality is active, whereas first potentiality is passive. If something has an active 
potential for x, the thing itself internally directs the realization of x. But if something has 
a passive potential for x, it will not realize x through internal direction, but must be the 
“subject of externally directed change such that it can become what it is not already.”231 
The fetus, before she develops eyes, does not possess the capacity in hand for vision. She 
does, however, possess the natural potential to develop the capacity for vision. Sperm (or 
a rock, for that matter), on the other hand, do not possess the natural potential for vision 
or rationality. The actualization of the sperm’s passive potential for vision or rationality is 
a substantial change, and thus, the sperm does not persist through the process. Given this 
distinction between a capacity in hand and a natural potential, on the formal continuity 
view, one can lose the capacity in hand for rationality and self-awareness and continue to 
exist so long as this is consistent with retaining one’s rational soul. However, one cannot 
                                                            
228 Eberl, “Aquinas’s Account of Human Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations,” 385; 
Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles Ii 
(Clarendon Press, 1999), 39. 
 
229 Jason Eberl, “Metaphysical and Moral Status of Cryopreserved Embryos,” The Linacre 
Quarterly 79, no. 3 (August 1, 2012): 304–15. 
 
230 Indeed, the capacity in hand is a sort of potentiality as well since it is a capacity that is not 
exercised.  
 
231 Jason T. Eberl, “Aquinas’s Account of Human Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations,” 384. 
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lose the natural potential for rationality and self-awareness and continue to exist since 
these are possessed essentially by the rational soul.  
 Furthermore, the retention of the natural potential for rationality and self-
awareness is sufficient for one’s survival on the formal continuity view. Since each 
person, in virtue of her soul, possesses an essential set of natural potentialities (which 
includes rationality and self-awareness), so long as she possesses these capacities, she 
retains her soul. The same goes for the retention of the capacity in hand for rationality 
and self-awareness, which is possessed in virtue of the person’s natural capacities.   
 What about biological continuity? On the formal continuity view, neither the 
persistence of the organism nor the persistence of the physical body is necessary for the 
persistence of the human being. Suppose that human beings, though essentially rational 
animals, are not essentially embodied. Suppose further, as Aquinas believed, that rational 
souls survive the death of the body and exist in a disembodied state.232 If this is so, then 
when Sally dies, since the persistence of her soul is sufficient for her persistence, she 
continues to exist in a disembodied state even though her body is in the ground.233 Is 
                                                            
232 Thomas Aquinas, Questions on the Soul 1. That there is such a state for human souls is part of 
Christian tradition. This state is temporary and will end at what is called the general resurrection when 
God will reunite all souls with their bodies.  
  
233 That organisms can exist without their bodies raises some concerns. First, if Sally can exist in a 
disembodied state, is Sally identical to her soul? No, says Stump, Aquinas, 52. She argues that constitution 
is not identity, and therefore, that human beings can lose one of their metaphysical constituents without 
ceasing to exist. However, note that unless souls have parts (as Spencer claims and Aquinas holds), the 
position that human beings can survive with their soul as their only proper part requires rejecting the 
weak supplementation principle, which, according to Toner, is the following: if x is a proper part of y, then 
there is a z such that z is a proper part of y and z is disjoint from x (where if one object is disjoint from 
another, then those objects share no part); Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.75.5.4 and 90.2.1; Mark 
Spencer, “A Reexamination of the Hylomorphic Theory of Death,” 853, n.36; Patrick Toner, “On 
Hylemorphism and Personal Identity,” 456. Second, if matter individuates souls, are disembodied souls 
not individual? No, says Stump (54): “it is possible for one separated soul to be distinguished from 
another on the basis of its past connection with matter, rather than on the basis of a present connection 
with matter.” Third, if human beings are animal by nature, does this mean that animals can exist in a 
disembodied state? Yes, according to Jason Eberl: “although without her body a human being is unable to 
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biological continuity sufficient for the persistence of human beings on this view?234 
Concerning the persistence of the organism, yes. On hylomorphism, the human soul is 
responsible for the vegetative functioning of the human being in that the inherence of the 
soul in a human being is necessary for the vegetative functions to continue. Thus, if the 
vegetative functions persist in a human body, this is sufficient evidence that the soul 
continues to inform the body.235 But in the sense of the persistence of the physical body 
(that is, physical continuity), no. The persistence of the physical body as a corpse after 
the death of the organism is not sufficient for the persistence of the human being. In fact, 
the existence of the corpse is sufficient evidence that the form of the human being has 
ceased to inform the matter of the human being.  
There is at least one problem with the formal continuity view.236 In saying that 
human persons are constituted by but not identical to the composite of matter and form, 
                                                            
actualize many of her capacities, she remains a rational animal by virtue of her soul retaining all the 
capacities—actively, in the case of the intellective and volitional capacities [because human beings can 
think in a disembodied state], or virtually, in the case of sensitive and vegetative capacities—proper to 
such a nature. It thus follows that, for Aquinas, a human being—a person—persists between death and 
resurrection by virtue of being composed of, but not identical to, a rational soul”; Jason Eberl, “Do Human 
Beings Persist Between Death and Resurrection?” 200. For further discussion of hylomorphism and 
disembodied humans, see Christopher Brown, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus; David Hershenov and 
Rose Koch-Herhenov, “Personal Identity and Purgatory,” Religious Studies 42 (2006): 439–51; Robert 
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 381; Stump, “Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution.” 
  
234 To understand why it’s important that the vegetative functions continue in an integrated 
human body, see my response to Campbell and McMahan’s objections to animalism based on cases of 
conjoined twinning. 
   
235 But suppose that God switches the souls in an integrated human body so that the vegetative 
functions continue (seemingly) uninterrupted. I would say that in this case the vegetative functions 
(grounded in the first soul) ceased and other vegetative functions (grounded in the second soul) began. If 
this is right, then souls are not individuated simply on the basis of inhering in a particular chunk of matter, 
but by inhering in a particular chunk of matter at a particular time.  
 
236 For other problems with the view that we are constituted by but not identical to composites 
of matter and form, see David Hershenov, “Soulless Organisms? Hylomorphism vs. Animalism,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85, no. 3 (2011): 465–82. 
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this view encounters the same too-many-thinkers problems that plague Shoemaker’s and 
Baker’s contention that we are constituted by but not identical to organisms. First, if the 
human person can think, why can’t the composite, which is coincident with but 
numerically distinct from the human person, also think? Second, if the composite can 
think, does it qualify as a person? If not, why not if the composite possesses the same 
psychology as the human person? Third, how can the human person know that it is the 
person rather than the composite? The formal continuity theorist needs to address these 
issues.  
 To avoid the charge of too many thinkers, my preferred hylomorphic account of 
persistence is the composite continuity view, according to which human persons are 
identical to matter-form composites and human persons persist if and only if the matter-
form composite to which they are numerically identical persists.237 This avoids the too-
many-thinkers problems, since, if the human person is identical to the composite, then the 
composite is not a rival thinker – it is the thinker. What is it for a composite to persist, on 
this view? It is for a particular chunk of prime matter to retain its form. So long as the 
rational form informs the same chunk of matter, the composite persists. Thus, a substance 
cannot survive an instantaneous and complete change in its matter. Neither can a 
substance survive an instantaneous and complete change in its form. But this does not 
mean that a substance cannot lose bits of matter and gain other bits of matter over time. If 
the composite continuity view required that a human being could not lose some of its 
matter and continue to exist, this would be inconsistent with the hylomorphic view that 
                                                            
237 Contemporary proponents of this view include Silas Langley, “Aquinas, Resurrection, and 
Material Continuity,” and Sandra Edwards, “Saint Thomas Aquinas on ‘The Same Man,’” The Southwestern 
Journal of Philosophy 10, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 89–97. 
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human beings are organisms. After all, organisms, by nature, can survive the replacement 
of their matter over time. What, then, are the persistence conditions for chunks of matter? 
Chunk of matter1 at t1 is numerically identical to chunk of matter2 at t2 if only if there is 
material continuity between matter1 and matter2, where there is material continuity if and 
only if there is some degree of material overlap from one moment to the next. What 
degree of material overlap is required? For persons, I contend that what is required is the 
continued informing of enough of the matter that composes the matter-form composite to 
be the matter-form composite of a living person.238 Why should I hold to this standard of 
material overlap? Because the form is responsible for the functions of the living person. 
If enough of the brain continues to exist that the functions of the living person do not 
cease, this is sufficient evidence that the form continues to inhere in the chunk of matter 
that partly composes the person. Regarding material continuity, then, it is sufficient for 
matter1 to be numerically identical to matter2. This means that a chunk of matter can 
persist in spite of being the subject of different substantial forms over time. Material 
continuity is also necessary for matter1 to be numerically identical to matter2. This means 
that there can be no gaps in existence for a particular chunk of matter.  
 On this view, the continuity of one’s mental content such as memory, beliefs, 
desires, etc., where the continuity has either Parfit’s wide cause (that of any reliable 
cause) or Parfit’s widest cause (that of any cause at all), is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for one’s survival. It is not necessary because one can lose one’s mental content and 
persist so long as one’s matter-from composite persists. Further, the continuation of one’s 
mental content is not sufficient for one’s persistence since it is the matter-form composite 
                                                            
238 My formulation of this was inspired by Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 202.    
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that matters to one’s survival, not one’s mental content. So, if Sally’s mental content is 
copied and transferred to a different substance and Sally’s matter-form composite is 
destroyed, that other substance may be psychologically identical to Sally, but she will not 
be numerically identical since the matter-form composite to which Sally is identical 
wasn’t transferred. Sally no longer exists, in spite of the fact that her psychology is 
instantiated in another matter-form composite. The continuity of one’s mental content 
such as memory, beliefs, desires, etc., where the continuity has Parfit’s normal cause (i.e., 
the brain) is not necessary, but is sufficient for the persistence of the human being. It is 
not necessary because (as already said) one can lose one’s mental content and persist so 
long as one’s matter-from composite persists. It is sufficient because the continuity of 
one’s mental content in a materially continuous body guarantees that the form still 
informs the body.   
The continuity of Sally’s natural potential for rationality and self-awareness is 
necessary for her survival. Since she possesses these capacities in virtue of the sort of 
soul she possesses, she cannot lose these capacities without losing her soul (that is, 
without her soul ceasing to inform her matter). The continuation of Sally’s natural 
potential for rationality, etc. is sufficient for her survival. Since she possesses these in 
virtue of her soul, if the capacities continue, she continues. However, the continuity of 
Sally’s capacity in hand for rationality and self-awareness is not necessary, but is 
sufficient for her survival. So long as her composite continues, she may lose the capacity 
to immediately exercise her rationality and self-awareness and continue to exist. If she 
retains the immediately exercisable capacity for rationality and self-awareness (so long as 
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that capacity is had in a materially continuous body), then she survives. The retention of 
the capacities guarantees that the composite continues to exist.  
What about biological continuity? On this view, the persistence of the organism is 
both necessary and sufficient for a human being’s survival over time. Recall that on the 
composite continuity view, the persistence of the composite is both necessary and 
sufficient for the persistence of the human being. Since the organism depends on the soul 
for its continued existence and functioning, if the organism continues to function, this 
guarantees that the soul of the organism continues to inform the matter of the organism, 
and thus, that the human being continues to exist. On the other hand, if the organism 
ceases to exist, this guarantees that the soul of the organism has ceased to inform the 
matter of the organism, and thus, that the human being has ceased to exist. If this is right, 
then no human being can undergo complete inorganic part replacement. Suppose that 
Sally’s organic parts are incrementally and over much time completely swapped for 
inorganic parts. At some point in the process, Sally’s vital processes – metabolism, 
digestion, etc. – cease. But once that happens, Sally – the matter-form composite – has 
ceased to exist. Bodily continuity is necessary but not sufficient for the person to survive 
on the composite continuity view. Bodily continuity is necessary because bodily 
continuity is physical continuity and the latter is required for the persistence of the human 
being on the composite continuity view. Thus, body-swapping is ruled out. Bodily 
continuity is not sufficient since bodily continuity continues after the death of the 
organism. But the death of the organism guarantees the ceasing-to-be of the matter-form 
composite. On this view, then, a human person cannot survive as a corpse.  
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The composite continuity view is similar to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s view of 
human persons, though I think there are important differences. Thomson holds that we 
are our bodies and that we persist if and only if our bodies persist. 239 This is a version of 
the somatic approach. Is it animalism? No, in that it does not claim that we are 
organisms. It claims that we are bodies. Nevertheless, some version of animalism might 
give the same persistence conditions for human beings as some version of the bodily 
continuity view. It simply depends on the persistence conditions for both organisms and 
bodies. As discussed in Chapter 1, some animalists (called somaticists) like David 
Mackie deny that life is necessary for the persistence of an organism, and claim that  
Given a human animal, x, existing at one time, t1, and something, y, existing at a later 
time, t2, y is identical with x if and only if y retains a sufficient degree of the life-apt 
structure of constituent parts previously exhibited by x.240 
It follows on this view that there can be dead organisms. Mackie might also claim this 
life-apt organization is a necessary condition for the persistence of organisms. A 
proponent of the bodily continuity view might claim that bodies in fact have these same 
persistence conditions as organisms. If so, then this version of the bodily continuity view 
and Mackie’s animalism give the same persistence conditions for human beings.  
Thomson’s bodily continuity view is different from my composite continuity view 
in the following way. I take death to be substantial change – that at the death of the 
human being, the form of the human being ceases to inform the matter of the human 
being. Life, then, is necessary for our persistence. If the human being ceases to be alive, it 
                                                            
239 Thomson, “People and Their Bodies,” 204. 
 
240 Blatti, “Animalism.“  
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ceases to be. This is because the form is responsible for the vital (vegetative) processes of 
the human being, and thus, so long as the form of the human being informs the matter of 
the human being, the vital processes will continue. Life, though, does not seem to be a 
necessary condition for the persistence of a body; rather, retaining enough of the body-
like organization seems necessary.  
Non-Human Rational Animals?  
 On the hylomorphic view of human persons that I have laid out, all human 
persons are rational animals. But I have not said anything about whether all rational 
animals are human persons. This is because I want to leave open the possibility that there 
are rational animals that are not human persons. For example, there may be rational 
animals on other planets or on our own planet (such as dolphins or chimps). So, we 
human persons belong to an ontological kind that includes members of the species homo 
sapiens but may also include individuals from other species or races from other 
planets.241  
Hylomorphic Animalism vs. Olson’s Animalism 
Since I am comparing (my version of) hylomorphic animalism to Olson’s 
animalism and claiming that (my version of) hylomorphic animalism has certain 
advantages over Olson’s animalism, it will be helpful to compare and contrast the two 
versions of animalism here. First, both Olson and I agree that we are identical to 
                                                            
241 Toner takes a different strategy. He defines ‘human person’ in terms of ontological kind rather 
than biological species. On his view, the ontological kind human person is equivalent to the ontological 
kind rational animal. So, if dolphins are rational animals, then they are human persons in spite of how 
bizarre this sounds. On my view, all human persons belong to the kind rational animal, but human 
persons are limited to those that are biologically human. “Hylemorphic Animalism,” 78-79.  
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organisms and that we are organisms essentially. Second, Olson and I agree that we 
persist if and only if our human organism persists. However, we disagree on the 
persistence of human organisms. He claims that the human organism persists just in case 
its vital functions continue. I claim that human organisms persist just in case the matter-
form composite to which they are identical persists. But, so long as the matter-form 
composite persists, it will retain its natural potential for organic functions such as 
metabolism, circulation and respiration, animal functions such as sensation and 
movement, and rational functions such as conceptualization, propositional thought and 
reasoning. Note that my view is consistent with a human person being unable to exercise 
their capacities for a time. For example, suppose that human persons could survive being 
frozen for a time. While frozen, the person would not metabolize, sense, or reason, but 
would retain the natural potential for these functions. Once the person was thawed, he 
would presumably begin to carry out his functions again. Third, Olson and I disagree 
when it comes to person essentialism. Olson thinks that persons are simply a phase in our 
existence. On the version of hylomorphism I have laid out, we are persons essentially – 
being a person is part of our nature so that we cannot exist without being persons. Fifth, 
Olson thinks that our psychology (specified in terms of metal content such as memories, 
beliefs, etc. and capacities such as reasoning and consciousness) is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for our persistence. On my view, our psychology is relevant to our survival in 
that we are identical to composites of rational soul and prime matter, so we cannot lose 
our rational soul and continue to exist. Thus, while we can lose our capacity in hand for 
rationality and self-awareness and continue to exist, we cannot lose our natural potential 
for these things and continue to exist. Sixth, Olson glosses over the distinction between 
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organisms and animals. Hylomorphists do not. Organisms possesses one kind of soul 
with functions such as metabolism, circulation, and respiration; animals possess another 
kind of soul with the functions of a vegetative soul but with the distinct functions of 
sensation as well; rational animals possess another kind of soul with vegetative and 
sensitive functions, but with the distinct functions of rationality as well. Finally, Olson 
rejects the claim that organisms are composites of matter and form, but this is central to 
hylomorphism.242  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
242 Olson, What Are We? 171-179.  
101 
 
CHAPTER 3: HYLOMORPHIC ANIMALISM  
RETAINS THE BENEFITS OF ANIMALISM 
 
 In Chapter 1, I discussed the benefits of animalism over the psychological 
approach. First, animalism avoids the too-many-thinkers problem that plagues the 
psychological approach. Second, animalism includes the benefit that we once were early 
fetuses prior to possessing the capacity for rationality, consciousness, etc. and mental 
content such as memories, beliefs, desires, etc. Third, on animalism, we can continue to 
exist in a persistent vegetative state, something the psychological continuity theorist must 
deny. In this section, I claim that hylomorphic animalism retains these features of 
animalism as it is more generally characterized: characteristics which I regard as benefits 
of adopting the animalist perspective on persons.243 
The Thinking-Organism Argument 
 Olson gives the thinking-organism argument for animalism:  
    (1) There is a human organism sitting in your chair; 
    (2) The human organism sitting in your chair is thinking;  
    (3) The one and only thinking being sitting in your chair is none other than you; 
    (4) You are the thinking organism sitting in your chair. 
 
Those who wish to avoid the conclusion that you are identical to an organism must deny 
one of the premises of this argument, but the denial of any of (1) – (3) is problematic.244 
One might deny premise (1) by claiming that there are no organisms, one might deny 
premise (2) by claiming that organisms do not think, and one might deny premise (3) by 
                                                            
243 Although it might seem obvious that hylomorphic animalism retains the benefits of animalism, 
things are complicated by the fact that hylomorphic animalists claim that we are specifically rational 
animals. More on this below. 
  
244 In chapter 1, I detail the various problems for denying the argument’s premises.  
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claiming that there is more than one thinker sitting in your chair – you (the thinking 
thing) and the organism. But these are prima facie unattractive theses, and hylomorphic 
animalism can allow us to reject them by accepting each premise in Olson’s argument. 
Regarding premise (1), hylomorphic animalism holds you are identical to an organism 
(though of a specific kind: a rational animal). So, when you are sitting in your chair, there 
is an organism sitting in your chair. As for premise (2), hylomorphic animalism claims 
that organisms think. This is not surprising, since you are an organism and you can think. 
As for premise (3), you are the only thinking being sitting in your chair because the one 
and only thinker sitting in the chair in question – the one person, i.e. organism sitting 
there – is identical to you.  
As is probably clear, the reason that hylomorphic animalism can accept each 
premise of this argument is that it equates you, the human person, with a specific human 
organism. There aren’t two entities denoted by these phrases, only one. The too-many-
thinkers problem arises for views that make a distinction between the person and the 
organism, considering them two different entities, and identifying you with one of them. 
This is true on Baker’s constitutionalism, for example. You are the human person and the 
human person is constituted by but not identical to the human organism. For the 
hylomorphist, there is a human person sitting in your chair and there is a human organism 
sitting in your chair, but there is only one thinker sitting in your chair because the human 
person in question just is the human organism in question: i.e. “they” are numerically 
identical. Furthermore, you are identical to both the human person and the human 
organism. (The personal pronouns “I” as used by the speaker and “you” as addressed to 
her, pick out the very same individual denoted by “this human,” “this organism,” “this 
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thinker” and so on.) Thus, hylomorphic animalism can avoid all the problems associated 
with denying the premises of Olson’s thinking-organism argument and it can accept the 
conclusion. Hylomorphic animalism retains the advantage of the argument, then, in that 
Olson’s argument for animalism is equally an argument for hylomorphic animalism.  
  But can hylomorphic animalism really get off so easily? Are you really the only 
thinker in your chair? For example, can the soul think? If so, and if your soul is not 
identical to you, then there are two thinkers sitting in your chair: you and your soul. What 
about your brain? Can it think? If so, and if you are not your brain, there is then an 
additional thinker in your chair. Must the hylomorphist countenance three thinkers here: 
the person, her soul and her brain?  Furthermore, hylomorphists believe in accidental 
unities. For example, while you are sitting in your chair, there is another entity sitting in 
your chair: the accidental unity seated you. Can seated you think? It has a brain, so there 
is just as much reason to believe that it thinks as that you think. But if it can think and it’s 
not identical to you, then there would again seem to be too many thinkers in your chair.  
Indeed, there would seem to be as many thinkers co-incident with you as there are 
accidental or contingent properties that you possess.  
 These worries need to be addressed as they seem to raise thorny conceptual 
issues. We will return to them in the final chapter when dealing with multiplication 
objections to hylomorphic animalism.   
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The Fetus Argument 
  On Olson’s animalism, you and I were once fetuses without the capacity in hand 
for rationality or self-awareness and without mental content such as memories, beliefs, 
desires, etc. In this section, I argue that this is true for hylomorphic animalism as well. 
Although this might seem obvious, since hylomorphic animalists claim that we are 
identical to organisms, things are complicated by the fact that hylomorphic animalists 
claim that we are organisms of a specific kind: rational animals. If we are rational 
animals, how is it that we were once fetuses without mental capacities or content? In 
giving my argument for the claim that we came into being before we developed the 
rational capacities and content mentioned above, I first summarize the fetus argument as 
it relates to Olson’s animalism. Next, I look at Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s view of when 
we begin to exist. Aristotle and Aquinas claim that human beings do not come into 
existence at conception, but at a later point in development, namely, the point at which 
the fetal matter has developed sufficiently to be capable of receiving the rational soul. 
They held this view for two reasons: (i) Aristotle and Aquinas believed that the human 
soul could not simply inform any chunk of matter whatsoever, but could only inform 
matter that was properly organized to “accept” a rational soul. (ii) Aristotle and Aquinas 
had views in embryology that inclined them to accept a post-conception date for our 
coming into being. Certain contemporary hylomorphists follow Aristotle and Aquinas in 
this view, which came to be called delayed hominization (detailed below). For proponents 
of delayed hominization, both ancient and contemporary, human beings do not come into 
existence until the fetal brain develops sufficiently for the exercise of rational capacities. 
For Pasnau, a contemporary proponent of delayed hominization, the relevant rational 
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capacity is the ability to form concepts and then in addition to have ‘thoughts’ constituted 
by these concepts.245 If this is right, then the hylomorphic animalist cannot say that we 
were once early fetuses and is in no better position in this regard than those who adopt 
the psychological approach. In opposition to delayed hominization is immediate 
hominization, according to which humans come into being at conception. In this section, 
after detailing the debate between delayed and immediate hominization, I argue that a late 
starting date for human persons (say, once the cortex begins to develop) is not required of 
hylomorphic animalism. 
  In Chapter 1, I identified a second argument for favoring animalism – the fetus 
argument. This argument relies on the intuition that each one of us was once an early 
fetus. That is, on this intuition, we all started out as fetuses without certain psychological 
capacities and without mental content and developed into mature human adults. But 
proponents of the psychological approach have trouble accounting for this. There are 
versions of the psychological approach according to which we persist if and only if 
certain mental content (e.g., memory, beliefs, etc.) persists. Since mental content is 
required for our persistence on this view; and since the early fetus lacks mental content; 
and since none of us are psychologically continuous with the early fetus from which we 
developed (in the sense of being connected via mental content); none of us is identical to 
the early fetus from which we emerged. The same goes for proponents of the 
psychological approach who require rational capacities such as consciousness and 
reasoning rather than mental content. The capacity for consciousness and rationality 
                                                            
245 Robert Pasnau, “Souls and the Beginning of Human Life,” Philosophy 78, no. 306 (October 
2003), 529. 
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develop after the fetal organism already exists. So, none of us is identical to the early 
fetus on this view. Furthermore, if none of us is identical to the early fetus from which we 
developed, what happened to that fetus once we came to be? Either it ceased to exist and 
was replaced by a person or it continues to endure throughout the space-time worm we 
occupy but is not identical to us (because it existed at earlier times than did we). Neither 
option is attractive. Regarding the first option, why should a fetus cease to exist simply 
because it develops the capacities for consciousness or reasoning or mental content such 
as memories and desires? This does not seem like the kind of thing that would bring an 
organism to an end. This leaves the second option, which says that a human organism and 
human person exist in the same location but are not identical. But this leads to the 
overcrowding problem, the epistemic problem, and the personhood problem mentioned in 
Chapter 1.  
Animalism can easily make sense of the intuitive claim that we started out as 
fetuses and it has an attractively simple account of the relationship between the fetus (the 
human organism) and the person. Given that we are organisms, we begin whenever the 
organisms with which we are identical begin. If organisms begin at conception (or close 
to it), we began at conception (or close to it).   
Now consider the animalist’s conception of the relationship between human 
persons and human organisms. The animalist view is distinct from the psychological 
approach in that the former does not consider the organism and the person to be separate 
entities. Rather, the organism is the person, though it need not hold its person-constituting 
properties essentially. On Olson’s version of animalism, human organisms start out as 
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nonperson organisms and develop into persons.246 The organism is a person in the same 
way that a human being is an adolescent or a philosophy professor. Being a person is a 
phase in the existence of a human organism just as being an adolescent is a phase in the 
existence of a human being. The person does not exist as a separate entity any more than 
a boy or a teenager is an entity capable of existing separately from the human being that 
he is. As such, the fetus does not go away once the human person comes to be. Neither 
does the fetus exist as a being that is co-located with a person once that person develops. 
Rather, the fetus becomes a person and is identical to that person. So the animalists can 
do justice to the claim that we were once fetuses. We all started out as fetuses on 
animalism because, for a given person P: P is an organism, the fetus F that P developed 
from is an organism, and the organism that F is numerically identical to at t1 is 
numerically identical to the organism that P is numerically identical to at t2.  
 Where does the hylomorphic animalist stand on this argument? Can hylomorphic 
animalism accommodate the intuition that we were once early fetuses that developed into 
mature adult human beings? Yes, one might think. After all, hylomorphic animalists say 
that we are identical to human organisms and that the fetus is a human organism. Since 
we all begin when the organism with which we are identical begins and the organism 
started out early on in the womb as a fetus, we were all once fetuses. But things are not so 
simple. Aristotle and Aquinas believed that the organized matter of the early fetus was 
incapable of receiving a rational soul, and perhaps for good reason. Since the possession 
of a rational soul is necessary for the existence of a human being, they believed that the 
                                                            
246 Olson, The Human Animal, 89.     
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early fetus was not a human being. If they are right that the early fetus is incapable of 
receiving a rational soul, then we were not early fetuses. To this issue we now turn.  
Aristotle and Aquinas on Hominization 
Aristotle and Aquinas advanced the theory of delayed hominization, according to 
which the fetus is not a human being from conception, but that human beings come into 
existence in the process of fetal development. As Aquinas says,  
the more noble a form is and the further removed it is from the elemental form, 
the more numerous must needs be the intermediate forms, through which the 
ultimate form is reached by degrees, and consequently the more numerous will be 
the intermediate generations. Wherefore in the generation of an animal or a man 
in which the form is most perfect, there are many intermediate forms and 
generations, and consequently corruptions, since the generation of one is the 
corruption of another. Therefore the vegetative soul, which comes first, when the 
embryo lives the life of a plant, is corrupted, and is succeeded by a more perfect 
soul which is both nutritive and sensitive, and then the embryo lives an animal 
life; and when this is corrupted it is succeeded by the rational soul introduced 
from without.247 
Thus, fetal development, for them, involves a series of substantial changes as “the fetus” 
comes to possess new functions.248 So, to start, the conceptus possesses a vegetative soul 
that possesses vegetative functions. When it reaches a certain level of development and 
begins to function as an animal and not merely an organism, its vegetative soul is 
                                                            
247 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles 2.89. Regarding the rational soul “being introduced 
from without,” Aquinas thought that a rational soul is not generated by natural processes, but is created 
by God and “infused into the human body”: Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 109. For 
Aristotle on delayed hominization, see On the Generation of Animals, 2.1.735a15-26 and 736a35-736b.  
 
248 I placed the phrase ‘the fetus’ in quotes because, strictly speaking, there is no single entity 
that persists through the series of substantial souls since the loss of a substantial soul by a chunk of 
matter and the subsequent gain of a different substantial soul by that same chunk of matter results is a 
substantial change and thus the coming to be of a new substance. So, the conceptus does not persist in its 
development until it becomes a human being. Rather, the human being comes into existence when the 
matter of the conceptus receives a rational soul.  
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replaced by a sensitive soul. After some further development, the sensitive soul is finally 
replaced by a rational soul when the fetus begins to live the life of a human being. Since 
human beings, by nature, possess a rational soul, they cannot exist without it.249 So, in the 
process of fetal development, when the developing entity possesses a vegetative or a 
sensitive soul, it is not a human being. It does qualify as an organism, since every living 
being qualifies as an organism. But the human being is only present once the fetal matter 
“takes on” a rational soul.  
 Why did Aristotle and Aquinas hold to delayed hominization? It is because they 
believed that the human soul could not simply inform any chunk of matter whatsoever, 
but could only inform matter that was properly organized for a rational soul.250 (And they 
believed that the matter of the conceptus was not sufficiently organized to receive a 
rational soul.) This is not peculiar to the rational soul, but is true of substantial form in 
general, that “substantial form can exist only in matter capable of receiving it.”251 Thus, 
there is a certain sort of organization required for matter to receive a vegetative soul (one 
with the organs required for vegetative functioning), a certain sort of organization 
required for a sensitive soul (one with the organs requires for sensitive functioning), and 
a certain sort of organization required for a rational soul (one with the organs required for 
rational functioning). Aquinas specified the organization required for a rational soul as 
                                                            
249 That human persons cannot persist without a rational soul is consistent with the possibility 
that a human person persists in an irreversible coma. Though such a person lacks the capacity in hand for 
exercising their rationality, they possess the natural potential for rationality, which I claim is all that is 
required for the possession of a rational soul.  
  
250 Aristotle, De Anima 412b; Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God, 3.12 and 3.9.6.  
 
251 Joseph F. Donceel, “Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization,” Theological Studies 31 
(1970), 83.  
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“that point when the fetus is sufficiently developed, in its brain and sensory systems, to 
support the soul’s intellectual operations” (which operations Aquinas identifies as the 
ability to form concepts).252  
When does the human being come into existence in the course of fetal 
development? According to Aristotle and Aquinas, hominization occurs for males around 
40 days after conception and it occurs for females around 90 days after conception.253 
Hominization cannot occur at conception, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, because 
the matter of the conceptus is not sufficiently developed to be capable of receiving the 
rational soul. On Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s view of human reproduction, the female 
provides the matter (i.e., the menstrual blood) from which the embryo is formed. The 
male is the efficient cause of the embryo via the semen as an instrument. The semen 
produces the embryo, not by becoming part of the embryo itself, but by forming the 
female’s menstrual blood into a living being via an active power which it possesses.254 
Since the material upon which the semen works does not initially possess the 
organization necessary for the reception of a rational soul (in fact, for Aristotle and 
                                                            
252 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 111, 118.  
 
253 Aristotle, A History of Animals, 583b; Thomas Aquinas, A Commentary on the Book of 
Sentences, III.3.5.2, resp. Note that Aquinas thought that once the fetus possesses a rational soul, it 
engages in conceptualization. So Aquinas thought that as early as 40 days after conception, human 
fetuses are engaged in conceptualization. See Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 118.     
 
254 Norman Ford, When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy 
and Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 25-29.; Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 
2.3.736a24-737b6; Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.118.1.4: “Living bodies . . . act so as to generate their 
like, both without and with a medium. . . with a medium—in the act of generation, because the semen of 
the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument 
derives a certain motive power from the principal agent.”  
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Aquinas, the material “was homogeneous and without any structure of its own”255) and 
since the process of organizing this material so that it can receive the rational soul is 
gradual, it takes some time for the semen to organize the matter into a body proper for a 
rational soul.256  
I have been speaking loosely about delayed hominization as if there is a single 
entity that comes into existence at conception and survives the transition from one soul to 
another until it receives a rational soul and becomes a human being. Technically, this is 
incorrect, since, whenever matter takes on a new substantial form (when it loses one form 
and gains another), a new substance comes to be. And every time this occurs, the 
previous substance ceases to exist:  
we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that 
the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does 
not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. . . . Now the substantial form gives 
being simply.257 
[M]atter cannot remain without being subjected to some form. That is why, upon the    
corruption of one thing, another is generated, and upon the generation of one thing 
another is corrupted.258 
                                                            
255 Benedict Ashley and Albert Moraczewski, “Is the Biological Subject of Human Rights Present 
from Conception?,” in The Fetal Tissue Issue: Medical and Ethical Aspects, ed. Peter Cataldo and Albert 
Moraczewski (Braintree, Massachusetts: The Pope John Center, 1994), 37. 
 
256 Benedict Ashley, “A Critique of the Theory of Delayed Hominization,” in An Ethical Evaluation 
of Fetal Experimentation: An Interdisciplinary Study, ed. Donald McCarthy and Albert Moraczewski (St. 
Louis, Missouri: Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center, 1976), 117-118; Aristotle, 
On the Generation of Animals, 2.3.736a24-737b6; Aquinas, On the Power of God, 3.9.9; Summa Contra 
Gentiles 2.89.11; Summa Theologica 1.118.1.4 and 1.119.2.20. 
 
257 Summa Theologica 1.76.4. Aristotle says as much in Physics, 190a32-190a33: “Things are said 
to come to be in different ways. In some cases we do not use the expression 'come to be', but 'come to be 
so-and-so'. Only substances are said to come to be without qualification.” 
 
258 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Generation and Corruption, trans. Father Pierre 
Conway and F. R. Larcher (unpublished but circulated in photocopied form, 1964), 25. Aristotle says as 
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Furthermore, on Aquinas’s hylomorphism, the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls are 
substantial forms:  
Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the 
intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive 
souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the 
imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute 
animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms 
with regard to the imperfect.259 
Thus, each time one substantial soul replaces another in embryonic development, a 
substantial change occurs – one substance is corrupted and another is generated. At the 
beginning of the process, an embryo with a vegetative soul exists. When the embryo 
reaches a certain level of development (i.e., when its matter is sufficiently organized to 
receive a sensitive soul), the vegetative soul of the embryo ceases to inform its matter and 
the embryo ceases to exist. At the same time, the matter begins to be informed by a 
sensitive soul, which brings a new, second embryo into existence. This second embryo 
then develops to the point that its matter is sufficiently organized to receive a rational 
soul. Once this happens, the sensitive soul of the second embryo ceases to inform its 
matter and the embryo ceases to exist. At the same time, the matter begins to be informed 
by a rational soul, which brings a final, third embryo into existence. This third embryo is 
a human being. 
                                                            
much in On Generation and Corruption, 319a17-319a28: “in substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is 
always a passing-away of another, and the passing-away of one thing is always another's coming-to-be.” 
259 Summa Theologica 1.76.4. 
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Note further that although it may be difficult to determine exactly when rational 
ensoulment takes place, this difficulty is simply epistemological. For Aristotle and 
Aquainas, rational ensoulment is not a gradual process, but is all or nothing and involves 
the coming to be of an entirely new thing.260 This result is entailed by a couple of 
different hylomorphic principles.261 First, a thing’s nature, which nature is determined by 
the sort of soul it possesses, is rigid, so that “this nature cannot be altered, cannot be 
diminished or increased”:262 
Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that one     
substance is not more a substance than another (we have said that it is), but that any 
given substance is not called more, or less, than that which it is. For example, if this 
substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than 
another man. For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more 
pale than another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another. Again, a thing is 
called more, or less, such-and-such than itself; for example, the body that is pale is 
called more pale now than before, and the one that is hot is called more, or less, hot. 
Substance, however, is not spoken of thus. For a man is not called more a man now 
than before, nor is anything else that is a substance. Thus substance does not admit of a 
more and a less.263   
When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one 
species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that one and the same 
individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another.264 
For the substantial being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every 
addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. viii 
(Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive 
"more" or "less."265 
                                                            
260 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 421, note 22.  
 
261 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 123.   
 
262 Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 123. 
  
263 Aristotle, Categories 5.3b32-4a9.  
 
264 Aquinas, Summa Theologia 1.93.3.   
 
265 Aquinas, Summa Theologia 1.76.4.  
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Second, as mentioned above, some substance cannot change its substantial form while 
continuing to exist because the transition by matter from one substantial form to another 
involves the corruption of one substance and the generation of another. (This follows on 
the composite continuity view of personal identity discussed above.) Thus, one substance 
cannot persist through a vegetative then sensitive then rational soul since these are 
substantial souls. It follows from this that the species (whether vegetative, sensitive, or 
rational) of a thing is essential to it so that it cannot transition from one species to another 
while continuing to exist.266 As Aristotle says,  
it is impossible for a thing still to remain the same if it is entirely transferred out 
of its species, just as the same animal could not at one time be, and at another not 
be, a man.267 
Thus, there are no cases, metaphysically speaking, in which it is indeterminate whether 
some substance is a mere organism, a mere animal, or a rational animal. In fetal 
development, there is a specific point at which rational ensoulment takes place even if we 
cannot tell when it takes place. Before that moment, a matter-form composite with a 
sensitive soul exists. At that moment, that matter-form composite has been replaced with 
a human being.   
Contemporary Proponents of Delayed Hominization 
Some contemporary hylomorphists follow Aristotle and Aquinas in holding to 
delayed hominization, including Henry Dorlodot, Joseph Donceel, Robert Pasnau, and 
                                                            
 
266 Pasnau makes this point about species essentiality on p. 124 of Thomas Aquinas on Human 
Nature.  
 
267 Aristotle, Topics 125b37-39.   
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Thomas Shannon and Allan Wolter.268 Each of these individuals believe in the reality of 
delayed hominization for the same reason: they accept the metaphysical principle that 
matter must be commensurate with form.269 Call this the principle of commensurability. 
To elaborate on this principle, in what follows, I lay out Donceel’s position and 
argument, which is representative of the positions and arguments held by the other 
proponents of delayed hominization. Here’s the reasoning Donceel gives for accepting 
delayed hominization:  
The soul is the substantial form of man. A substantial form can exist only in matter 
capable of receiving it. In the case of man's soul this means: the human soul can exist 
only in a highly organized body.270  
Like Aristotle and Aquinas, Donceel believes that not just any body is capable of 
“receiving” a rational soul; in order for organic bodies to be capable of receiving a 
                                                            
268 Henry de Dorlodot, “A Vindication of the Mediate Animation Theory,” in Theology and 
Evolution, ed. E. C. Messenger (London: Sands and Co., 1949), 259–83; Joseph F. Donceel, “Immediate 
Animation and Delayed Hominization”; Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, chapter 4. 
Thomas Shannon and Allan Wolter, “Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo,” Theological 
Studies 51 (1990): 603–26. Norman Ford also accepts the doctrine of delayed hominization, but not 
because he thinks the matter of the human embryo is incapable of receiving a rational soul. Rather, it is 
due to the potential of the early fetus for twinning prior to the primitive streak. Thus, he thinks that 
human beings begin after the development of the primitive streak (around two weeks); Norman Ford, 
When Did I Begin?  
 
269 Henry de Dorlodot, “A Vindication of the Mediate Animation Theory,” 259: “Since the 
‘substance of the intellectual soul is truly, essentially and per se the substantial form of the human body’, 
as the Council of Vienne defined, it is impossible for the human soul to contract that union with the body 
which, in accordance with the above definition, makes body and soul one single human nature, if this 
body does not possess a human organisation, and in particular, if it does not possess the human organs of 
the organic faculties, the operation of which are indispensable for the exercise of human reason.” Robert 
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 111: “Just as a form requires the appropriate sort of matter . . 
. so the human soul requires the appropriate sort of body” (see also, 524). Thomas Shannon and Allan 
Wolter, “Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo,” 620: “One can speak of a rational nature in a 
philosophically significant sense only when the biological structures necessary to perform rational actions 
are present, as opposed to only reflex activities.” 
 
270 Joseph F. Donceel, “Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization,” 79.  
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rational soul, they must possess a certain sort of organization.271 This is due to the 
rational soul’s role as the substantial form of the body. On Donceel’s view, the rational 
soul of a human being is akin to the shape of a statue: the rational soul could no more 
exist in a newly conceived embryo than the shape of the statue of David could exist in the 
unformed marble from which the statue was produced.272 But what sort of organization is 
required of a body for it to be capable of receiving a rational soul? For Donceel, it is a 
body that is “endowed with the organs required for the spiritual [read: rational] activities 
of man.”273 The required organs, for Donceel, are the sense organs, the nervous system, 
and the brain, especially the cortex.274 Dorlodot holds to this same requirement.275 
Shannon and Wolter hold to a similar, but less stringent requirement. They claim that the 
soul is present around the 20th week when “neural integration of the entire organism has 
been established.”276 But each of these requirements is at odds with our intuition about 
when we begin and with Olson’s claim that we begin around two weeks after conception 
with the formation of the primitive streak.  
                                                            
271 Like Aristotle and Aquinas, he believes that the same goes for vegetative souls and sensitive 
souls – that they each require a body with a certain sort of organization.  
 
272 Joseph F. Donceel, “Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization,” 83. 
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274 Joseph F. Donceel, “Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization,” 101.  
 
275 Henry de Dorlodot, “A Vindication of the Mediate Animation Theory,” 266: “. . . we can infer 
that the intellectual soul cannot animate the body before the parts of the brain which are the seat of the 
higher organic faculties are suitably organised. That does not mean that the body of man has no other 
essential organs besides the brain. In order that the brain may live, there is required the concourse of 
other organs. Every organ which is necessary for the existence and life of the brain is essential to man.” 
 
276 Thomas Shannon and Allan Wolter, “Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo,” 620. 
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Pasnau proposes a stricter standard for rational ensoulment than the presence of 
the brain: the brain must be developed to the point that the fetus (or infant, as the case 
may be) has the capacity in hand to form concepts.277 To possess this capacity, one must 
possess the immediately exercisable ability to “have full-fledged concepts, and then in 
addition to have ‘thoughts’ about those concepts.”278 If further neural development is 
required before one is able to form concepts, then one does not possess this capacity in 
hand even if one possesses the natural potential for conceptualization. But if the capacity 
in hand is required for hominization, when does this occur in fetal development? As 
mentioned above, Aquinas thinks this occurs around 40 days for males and 90 days for 
females, but Pasnau admits that this seems to push rational ensoulment beyond birth (for 
both males and females):  
It is plausible to think that the capacity for conceptualization – actually having the 
capacity in hand – does not come until some time after birth, and if that is right, 
then by Aquinas’s own lights it would follow that the organism takes on a rational 
soul and hence becomes a human being only at that late date.279 
Reflecting on the implications of this standard, Pasnau says that “it strikes us as appalling 
to claim that newborns and late-term fetuses are not genuinely human beings (or 
persons).”280 Thus, he proposes a more lenient standard for hominization: the capacity for 
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the fetus to have any mental operations at all.281 Thus, so long as the fetus is able to 
engage in mental operations, he says that it possesses a rational soul. And he believes that 
the fetus does in fact engage in thought before birth.282    
So it looks as if, by Pasnau’s own admission, requiring that a body possess the 
capacity in hand for rationality if that body is to possess a rational soul—when wedded to 
an Aristotelian definition of human beings as essentially rational animals—leads to the 
conclusion that human beings (and not merely human persons) do not begin to exist until 
after birth.283  
Pasnau calls this consequence appalling and responds by loosening his 
requirements for rational ensoulment.284 Rather than claim that the capacity in hand for 
forming concepts is required, he simply requires the capacity for any mental operations at 
all. His revised view turns out to be much closer to the views of Donceel, etc. His view, 
too, is at odds with our intuition about when we begin and Olson’s claim that human 
organisms begin around two weeks after conception.  
 
 
                                                            
281 Robert Pasnau, “Souls and the Beginning of Life,” 529.  
 
282 Ibid.   
 
283 Recall that on hylomorphism, something cannot be a human being but not a person, since 
nothing is a human being unless it possesses a rational soul, and everything that possesses a rational soul 
is a person. So, on Pasnau’s theory, it is not the case that we begin to exist before birth but do not 
become persons until after birth. Instead, we do not begin until after birth.   
 
284 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 120; Pasnau, “Souls and the Beginning of 
Human Life,” 529.  
  
119 
 
Immediate Hominization 
 If Aristotle, Aquinas, and the contemporary proponents of delayed hominization 
are correct, then we were never early fetuses because we did not begin to exist before the 
brain developed. But are they correct? Proponents of immediate hominization – a view on 
which the rational soul, and so, the human being, is present from conception – think it is 
not.285 In rejecting delayed hominization, proponents of immediate hominization do not 
deny the metaphysical principle that matter must be commensurate with form.286 On this 
they agree with the proponents of delayed hominization. Given the nature of the soul as 
the form of the body, they think that the rational soul cannot inform just any chunk of 
matter like a rock or piece of driftwood or even a dog. Thus, there is a certain sort of 
organization required for a body to possess a rational soul. The main point of contention 
for the two views lies in how they answer the following question: what sort of body is 
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required to serve as the matter for a rational soul?287 A related question that must be 
answered in addition to the first question is this: “When does the fetus come to have that 
sort of body?”288 As discussed, proponents of delayed hominization think that a body 
needs to have a brain that is capable of rational activity in order for it to serve as the 
matter for a rational soul. And the time at which the fetus develops such a body is 
nowhere near conception. How do proponents of immediate hominization answer these 
questions? They claim that the presence of the brain in the fetus is not necessary for the 
presence of the rational soul. Furthermore, they believe that the sort of organization 
possessed by the fetus at the time of conception is sufficient for the presence of the 
rational soul. This is consistent with the principle of commensurability. As Lee and 
Haldane note, the principle is not very specific, so does not, on the face of it, demand 
delayed hominization.289 On this point, they give two rival interpretations of the 
principle:    
1. What is necessary for ensoulment is the presence of the actual organs, 
sufficiently developed to support the operations proper to that species; or 
 
2. What is necessary for ensoulment is the material organization sufficient for the 
development of those organs, in other words, the epigenetic primordia of the 
organs that support the operations proper to the species.290 
                                                            
287 Robert Pasnau, “Souls and the Beginning of Human Life,” 525. To see that this is the main 
point of contention, see Ashley and Lee and Haldane: Benedict Ashley, “A Critique of the Theory of 
Delayed Hominization,” 115; John Haldane and P. Lee, “Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and the 
Value of Life,” 268.  
 
288 Robert Pasnau, “Souls and the Beginning of Human Life,” 525.  
 
289 Patrick Lee, Abortion and the Unborn Human Life, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2010), 86.  
  
290 John Haldane and P. Lee, “Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life,” 
268.  
 
121 
 
On the first reading, since rationality is the operation proper to human beings, the 
presence of the brain sufficiently developed to support the operation of rationality is 
necessary for ensoulment. This reading does not exactly correspond to the requirements 
laid out by the proponents of delayed hominization since Dorlodot, Donceel, and 
Shannon and Wolter require the mere presence of the brain (nervous system, etc.) rather 
than its operation. But it does correspond to Pasnau’s requirement that the organism must 
be capable of exercising rationality in order for the rational soul to be present. Proponents 
of immediate hominization interpret the principle in the second way, believing that it is 
not necessary for ensoulment that the body possess the organs necessary for the operation 
of the rational capacities. Instead, they interpret the principle in such a way that one must 
simply possess the natural potential to develop the capacity for rational thought, which 
they claim is present from conception.291  
Responding to the Debate 
In this section, I claim that it is open to the hylomorphist to claim that we were 
once early fetuses without much of a psychology, i.e., without mental content such as 
memories and beliefs, or without the capacity in hand for consciousness or 
conceptualization. That is, I claim that there are several accounts of when we begin – 
most of which are not immediate hominization views – that are open to the hylomorphist 
and that do not require a late “starting date” (in contrast with accounts like Pasnau’s 
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initial proposal according to which we do not begin until we have the capacity in hand for 
conceptualization). First, the hylomorphist might retain the hylomorphic claim that 
human beings are composites of matter and form while rejecting the claim that we are 
essentially rational animals. If she does this, she can claim that we begin to exist as 
organisms prior to rational ensoulment. But to make this claim she would have to hold 
that the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls are accidental, rather than substantial 
forms. That way, she can consistently hold that we persist while transitioning from 
vegetative to sensitive to rational souls. This position does not require her to give up 
person essentialism: she can reject Olson’s and Tooley’s claim that being a person 
requires a special sort of mental life and embrace a Thomson-inspired view that persons 
persist if and only if the organisms they are persist.292 When do we begin on this view? 
This position allows the hylomorphist to say that we begin to exist as early as the period 
during which the developing entity begins to function vegetatively, for example, when 
the heart begins to beat. This occurs between weeks 6 and 7 of fetal development.293 The 
early starting point for the human organism (and hence, us) on this account might do 
justice to the common intuition that we were once early fetuses. Or, if it seems that the 
organism does not yet exist at this point, perhaps she could say that the organism begins 
to exist when neural integration occurs and the fetus begins to engage in organism-level 
activities such as sucking and swallowing (which activities are made possible by neural 
integration). This occurs between 15 and 18 weeks after fertilization for sucking and 
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between 18 and 21 weeks after fertilization for swallowing.294 This is still fairly early in 
fetal development and may do justice to the intuition that we were once fetuses. 
She might further adjust the above account by claiming that it is metaphysically 
vague when the organism (and hence, the person) comes into existence. On this view, 
there are points in fetal development when it is metaphysically indeterminate whether or 
not the organism exists. Thomson holds to this view. She thinks that (i) the “newly 
fertilized ovum, the newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is 
an oak tree” and (ii) the fetus “has become a human person well before birth.”295 
Furthermore, she also thinks that (iii) “to draw a line, to choose a point in development 
and say ‘before this point the thing is not a person, after this point it is a person’ is to 
make an arbitrary choice, a choice for which in the nature of things no good reason can 
be given.”296 The transition from non-organism to organism, on this view, is incremental 
and there is no principled way to give a definitive point at which the developing entity 
transitions from non-organism to fully existing organism. In spite of this, there might be a 
point during which the organism partially exists, much in the way that there is a point in 
the construction of a building during which the building only partially exists. And, there 
will be a point at which the fetus definitively fully exists. However, it may not be a point 
for which we can say: directly prior to this point, the fetus did not fully exist and directly 
at this point the fetus does fully exist. The transition between partial existence and full 
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existence may also be vague. To hold to this position, one would have to reject 
Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s claim that it is there is a definitive moment when a substance 
comes into existence. What is the point at which we can say that the fetus definitively 
fully exists? Maybe it will be once certain vegetative functions like the heartbeat become 
active. Or, maybe the organism begins to exist when neural integration occurs and the 
fetus begins to engage in organism-level activities such as sucking and swallowing.   
The above accounts require giving up the view that we human beings are 
essentially rational animals; that is, that we essentially possess a rational soul. But what if 
the proponent of hylomorphism wants to retain this view? There are multiple ways she 
can do this. She can (and should) start by rejecting Pasnau’s initial proposal that the fetus 
must possess the capacity in hand for conceptualization in order for hominization to 
occur. This gives her the freedom to say that we begin to exist before birth. Second, she 
might go with Pasnau’s revised account and claim that the capacity for any mental 
content at all is sufficient for rational ensoulment.297 This still leaves a gap, however, 
between the time in fetal development when an organism begins to exist (at least 
according to Olson) and the beginning of human persons at rational ensoulment. To 
lessen this gap, she can reject Olson’s claim about when organisms begin and claim 
instead that the organism is only present when neural integration occurs and the fetus 
begins to engage in organism-level activities such as sucking and swallowing.298 Even 
                                                            
297 She might even accept a psychological account of diachronic personal identity according to 
which the continuity of mental content is necessary for us to persist. Psychological continuity would not 
be sufficient because of branching cases.  
 
298 “Fetal Development,” MedlinePlus, the National Institute of Health’s website for patients, 
accessed 08/17/2016, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/002398.htm. 
 
125 
 
still, the fetus is not capable of awareness until “its neurons can communicate with one 
another” which “takes place when they get connected together with synapses, roughly 
twenty-five to thirty-two weeks after fertilization.”299 But perhaps it is capable of some 
sort of mental activity prior to this point. If so, then the gap between the beginning of 
organisms and the beginning of persons (i.e., us) is not that great.  
But there is a more promising strategy for claiming that rational ensoulment takes 
place when the organism begins. First, the hylomorphist can reject the claim that rational 
ensoulment requires mental activity and adopt Shannon and Wolter’s view that rational 
ensoulment takes place “around the 20th week, when the neural integration of the entire 
organism has been established:”  
One can speak of a rational nature in a philosophically significant sense only 
when the biological structures necessary to perform rational actions are present, as 
opposed to only reflex activities. The biological data suggest that the minimal 
time of the presence of a rational nature would be around the 20th week, when 
neural integration of the entire organism has been established. The presence of 
such a structure does not argue that the fetus is positing rational actions, only that 
the biological presupposition for such actions is present.300 
Then, she can claim that the organism begins when neural integration occurs. This way, 
the hylomorphist can say that we begin when the organism begins and we are essentially 
rational animals. And she can avoid the problem of what happened to the fetus once the 
person came into existence by claiming that before the organism came to be, the fetus 
was not a substance but was a collection of parts (perhaps substances themselves) that 
were developing into the organism. Note that this requires the hylomorphist to say that it 
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is not necessary for rational ensoulment that a being possess the capacity for awareness or 
some other special mental property. Instead, she might say that the possession of a natural 
potential for rationality is sufficient for ensoulment.  
Finally, it is open to the hylomorphist to claim that rational ensoulment takes 
place at or near conception. To do this, she can claim that the organism begins very early 
on – perhaps at conception or after twinning is no longer possible (about two weeks, 
which is when the primitive streak forms).301 Furthermore, she can claim that the 
possession of the natural potential for rationality is sufficient for rational ensoulment. 
Finally, she can claim that this natural potential is possessed when the organism begins, 
since the conceptus possesses a complete genetic code. As argued before, this view does 
not reject the principle of commensurability – that matter must be commensurate with 
form. Rather, it notes that this principle can be interpreted such that the epigenetic 
primordia of the brain is all that is required for rational ensoulment. As Jason Eberl puts 
it,  
It must be noted that, from the moment that the fertilization process is complete, a 
zygote has a complete human genome and other material factors that are sufficient—
given a nutritive uterine environment—for the development of a functioning cerebral 
cortex. From this fact, one can infer that a zygote or early embryo, before it forms a 
functioning cerebral cortex, has an active potentiality for rational thought in the sense 
that it has a natural potentiality to develop a capacity in hand for such operations.302 
In summary, given the several accounts of the time of hominization detailed 
above, the hylomorphist need not accept a late starting date for hominization. Thus, it is 
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open to the hylomorphist to say that we were once early fetuses without much of a 
psychology, i.e., without mental content such as memories and beliefs, or without the 
capacity in hand for consciousness or conceptualization. It is even open to the 
hylomorphist to claim that we human beings start at conception or close to it if this is 
consistent with the principle of commensurability.  
Persistent Vegetative States 
One implication of Olson’s animalism that the hylomorphic animalist retains is 
that we continue to exist in a persistent vegetative state. On Olson’s animalism, one’s 
mental content and psychological capacities such as rationality and self-awareness are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for one to persist. Instead, the continuation of one’s vital 
(vegetative) functions such as circulation, metabolism, and respiration are necessary and 
sufficient for one to survive. Thus, an individual in a persistent vegetative state continues 
to exist even though she has apparently lost her mental content such as her beliefs, 
desires, etc. and even though she has apparently lost her capacity for rationality and self-
awareness. For, even in a persistent vegetative state, she retains her vegetative functions 
such as circulation, metabolism, and respiration. Since Olson thinks that we persist so 
long as the organism we are persists and since he takes the continued operation of 
organismic functions in an organism’s body as sufficient evidence that this organism 
persists, he thinks that we can persist in a persistent vegetative state.  
What can the hylomorphist say about whether or not human beings can survive in 
a persistent vegetative state? On my view, the composite continuity view, the human 
being survives if and only if the composite of matter and form to which he is identical 
128 
 
survives. If there is evidence that the matter-form composite can survive in a persistent 
vegetative state, then this is evidence that the human being can survive in a persistent 
vegetative state. Is there such evidence? Yes. Recall that on hylomorphism, the soul of a 
human being is responsible for the functions – the vegetative, sensitive, and rational – of 
that individual. Furthermore, the human being in virtue of her soul has the active 
potentiality for these functions essentially. So, if certain functions carry on in the 
individual’s organic body – whether those are vegetative, sensitive, or rational functions 
– this is evidence that the soul continues to inhere in the matter of the individual, and 
thus, that the individual persists.   
How does this apply to individuals in a persistent vegetative state? Suppose that 
Sally is injured and falls into a persistent vegetative state. We want to know whether 
Sally has survived this ordeal or not. If we see that, in spite of the lapse into a persistent 
vegetative state, some of the potentialities Sally possessed in virtue of her soul are still 
being actualized (namely, the potential for her organic body to carry out vegetative 
functions such as metabolism, respiration, and digestion), this is evidence that Sally has 
survived. Furthermore, if Sally has survived, since human beings are essentially living 
and rational, she has survived as a rational animal. Evidence that Sally the organism has 
survived is evidence that Sally the rational animal has survived.303 This is an implication 
of the composite continuity view. But in what sense can we say that Sally is rational? She 
does not retain the capacity in hand for rationality, since her cerebrum is damaged to the 
point that it cannot (currently) sustain consciousness. However, if she survives, she 
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retains her soul. And in virtue of retaining her soul, she retains the natural potential for 
rationality.  There is even empirical evidence that some patients in a persistent vegetative 
state retain their natural potential for rationality; namely, there are PVS patients who 
eventually regain consciousness and recover their capacity in hand for rationality as 
displayed by their ability to read, write and do simple math.304 What can we say about 
those PVS patients who have not yet recovered? As mentioned above, the fact that the 
vegetative functions continue to operate is evidence that the matter-form composite 
persists, and thus, that the person persists.  
What other responses might the hylomorphist give if she want to say that human 
beings can survive a lapse into a persistent vegetative state? First, she might reject 
Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s claim that the rational, sensitive, and vegetative forms are 
substantial. Given this, she can claim that human beings can survive the transition from a 
rational to a sensitive to a vegetative soul without ceasing to exist (that is, without 
changing in substance). Then, she can apply this to PVS cases by saying that human 
beings can survive a lapse into a persistent vegetative state even if such a lapse involves 
the loss of rational form. Note, however, that unless identity is contingent, this response 
is inconsistent with my claim that humans are identical to a composite of prime matter 
and rational form. As such, the hylomorphist will have to give an alternative account of 
human persistence that does not involve rational form. As another response, she might 
claim, contra Aristotle and Aquinas, that the possession of one’s form is not an all or 
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nothing thing, but admits of degrees.305 That is, she might claim that one can fall short of 
the full possession of one’s form by possessing mere aspects of it. Thus, in PVS cases, 
she can say that the patients do not possess their full form, yet retain aspects of it (e.g., 
the vegetative aspect, but not the rational aspect).  
If, however, the hylomorphist is not concerned with claiming that humans can 
survive a lapse into a vegetative state, she might say that such a lapse involves substantial 
change. One might say that the person, say Sally, ceases to exist and leaves behind a 
numerically-distinct organism in her place. One might even say that since the organism 
that is left behind is functioning to some degree, that it possesses (at least a) vegetative 
soul, but not necessarily a rational soul. Sally possessed a rational soul, but Sally is gone. 
The thing left in her place is not her. My response is this: the explanations which say that 
humans can survive in a persistent vegetative state are more economical. It is certainly 
possible that one soul is swapped for another. However, (i) since the vegetative functions 
continued to operate throughout the process (even though the rational functions were 
interrupted) and (ii) since there is no rival organism who might be Sally (as occurs in 
duplication cases), it seems the simplest explanation is that Sally continues to exist 
because her form – or at least aspects of it –  continues to inhere in her matter. 
Furthermore, for the person who says that Sally does not survive her lapse into a 
vegetative state, consider what she must say in cases where PVS patients regain 
consciousness. She must say that the original patient died, a mere organism took her 
place, and then a rational animal with some of the same memories as the original patient 
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took the place of the mere organism. It seems that the best explanation of these cases is 
that the original patient survived the entire ordeal.  
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CHAPTER 4: HYLOMORPHIC ANIMALISM AND TRANSFER PROBLEMS 
 Some people’s intuitions about what would happen to us in transfer scenarios – 
cases of brain and cerebrum transplant, brain-state transfer, and teletransportation – 
suggest that we are not organisms, not even contingently. And this is bad news for both 
Olson’s animalism and hylomorphic animalism, views according to which we are 
organisms, insofar as those views want to capture our common conceptions of 
personhood, conceptions which are thought to generate the intuitions in question. In this 
section, I focus on brain and cerebrum transplant cases and argue that hylomorphic 
animalism does a better job of responding to these transplant cases than Olson’s 
animalism. Specifically, I claim that the hylomorphic animalist can claim that we “go 
with our cerebra” in cerebrum-transplant scenarios. What is it to go with our cerebra? It 
means that during the procedure, we are whittled down to the size of a cerebrum and our 
rational form ceases to inform the portions of matter that helped make up the portions of 
our body that were cut away as a result of the procedure. Instead, our rational form now 
informs just the prime matter that – together with the rational form – makes up the 
cerebrum. This position, if it can be defended, retains the benefits of hylomorphic 
animalism – that we are organisms, animals, and persons essentially – while 
accommodating the transplant intuition.  
Brain-Transfer Scenarios 
 Cerebrum-transplant scenarios pose more of a problem for animalism than do 
brain-transplant scenarios. Why? Because animalists like Olson contend that it is open to 
the animalist to say that we “go with our brains” during whole-brain transplants, by 
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contending that in such scenarios the control center for the vital (i.e., vegetative) 
functions is the brain stem and that this is transplanted during the procedure. Thus, if the 
human organism continues to exist, it exists as a naked brain during the transplant rather 
than as the corpse on the operating table. Once it is placed into a new body, the organism 
begins to function fully again via the brain/brain stem. But cerebrum transplants separate 
the psychological functions of rationality and self-awareness (assuming they are realized 
in the cerebrum) from the vegetative functions of metabolism, respiration, and circulation 
(assuming they are realized in the brain stem). The cerebrum is transplanted to a new 
body while the brain stem remains in the old body and continues to carry on the 
vegetative functions. Since animalists like Olson think that psychological continuity is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the survival of human organisms, they think that the 
human organism does not “go with the cerebrum” in such scenarios, but stays behind as a 
cerebrum-less entity as a result of the operation.  
However, it is important to briefly go over brain-transplant scenarios and 
animalist responses. In Chapter 1, I discussed a brain-transplant case involving Brown 
and Johnson. In this case, Brown’s brain (which includes both of Brown’s cerebral 
hemispheres and his brain stem) is removed from his body and placed into Johnson’s 
brainless body. In such a case, it is supposed that Brown’s psychology (his mental 
content such as beliefs, desires, memories, and his capacities such as rationality and self-
awareness) goes with his brain in the transplant so that the person who results from the 
transplant—that is, the person who results from the combination of Brown’s brain and 
Johnson’s body—is psychologically continuous with Brown pre-operation. The 
transplant intuition, which many people have, is that Brown continues to exist during the 
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operation and “goes with” his brain when it is transplanted into a new body. This is 
because Brown’s psychology did not cease to exist, but was maintained in existence by 
Brown’s brain. The transplant intuition generalizes to all such whole-brain transplant 
scenarios: that the person whose brain is extracted from his body and placed into a new 
body will go along with his brain during the transplant so that the person in question will 
find himself in a new body post-operation.  
 What do the various views of personal identity say about brain-transplant 
scenarios? Consider the version of the psychological approach which says that continuity 
of our mental content such as our memories and beliefs is sufficient for our persistence 
(whether the cause of the continuity is the narrow, wide, or widest cause). It seems to 
entail that we go with our brains in brain-transplant scenarios given the plausible 
assumption that our mental content is instantiated in our brains (or nervous systems more 
generally). The same goes for the version of the psychological approach which says that 
continuity of our mental capacities such as rationality and self-awareness is sufficient for 
our persistence (whether the cause is the narrow, wide, or widest cause). Thus, 
psychological theories seem easily to accommodate the majority intuition about the kind 
of transplant scenarios described above. However, the psychological approach has the 
counterintuitive consequences that I discussed in Chapter 1: it implies that we were never 
early-term fetuses and it results in the various too-many-thinkers problems.   
 As discussed in Chapter 1, some animalists (for example, Carter in “How to 
Change Your Mind”) claim that we do not “go along with” our brains when these are 
transplanted into foreign bodies. Instead, when the brain is removed from an organism, 
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that organism can no longer function: the organism dies. What is left behind is a dead 
body devoid of a brain: a brainless corpse. What receives the brain is a lifeless body that 
is animated by the new brain, which brain begins to support the functions executed by 
this new organic body. Other animalists claim that the original human organism goes 
along with its brain in transplant scenarios and this is precisely because the brainstem 
controls “basic” organic functions like respiration and circulation.306 They say that brain-
transplant cases are cases of whole body amputations in which the organism survives as a 
naked brain until it is transplanted into a new body. The animalist who says that we do 
not go along with our brains in brain-transplant scenarios cannot accommodate the 
commonly held transplant intuition that we go with our brains in transplant scenarios.  
These animalists must say that our intuitions about these cases are mistaken or confused.  
But those animalists who think that we do go along with our brains in brain-transplant 
scenarios—supposing they can make the case that the relevant organisms also in fact do 
“go along with” their brains—can accommodate this transplant intuition.  Brain-transfer 
scenarios, then, presents a problem for only some animalists: those who do not privilege 
nervous systems (or “control systems” more generally) when making judgments about 
the persistence of organisms despite radical changes to their structure.  
Which animalist point of view is correct?  This question is hard to answer.  But 
we needn’t make progress on it here. In contrast with brain transplant cases, cerebrum-
transplant cases pose a prima facie problem for all varieties of animalism: animalists 
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have a difficult time defending the claim that an organism goes along with its cerebrum. 
They therefore have a difficult time retaining the more or less widespread intuition that a 
person might survive a cerebrum transplant case and do so by gaining a new lower brain 
and body. 
 What does the hylomorphic animalist have to say about brain-transplant 
scenarios? Whatever animalists of other sorts can say about such scenarios, the 
hylormorphic animalist can say the same. If hylomorphic animals do not go along with 
their brains in brain-transplant scenarios, then there is some tension between hylomorphic 
animalism and the most common intuition about such transplants. If hylomorphic animals 
do go along with their brains in such scenarios, then there is no incompatibility between 
hylomorphic animalism and the transplant intuition. Again, rather than settle this dispute, 
we can move to cerebrum-transplant scenarios instead, as it seems prima facie correct 
that organisms do not “go with” their cerebra. 
Cerebrum-Transfer Scenarios 
 In order to consider a revised version of the Brown and Johnson case, it will be 
helpful to discuss the functions of the various parts of the brain. The brain divides into 
the cerebrum, cerebellum, and the brain stem. The cerebrum - composed of various lobes 
and the basal ganglia - is responsible for functions traditionally associated with persons 
such as abstract thought, language, reasoning, self-awareness, and speech307 It is also 
responsible for intelligence, personality, belief, memory, imagining, sensory integration, 
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emotion, planning, concentration, voluntary movement, and behavior.308 The cerebellum 
receives sensory information, coordinates muscle movements, and maintains posture and 
balance.309 The brainstem “acts as a relay center connecting the cerebrum and cerebellum 
to the spinal cord” and is largely responsible for the vital (vegetative) functions of human 
beings such as breathing, heartbeat, blood pressure, body temperature, digestion, and 
circulation.310 
 Given these parts of the brain and their respective functions, consider a revised 
version of the Brown and Johnson case. On this version, Brown’s cerebrum (not his 
entire brain) is removed from his skull and placed in Johnson’s cerebrum-less (but not 
brainstem-and-cerebellum-less) body. Brown’s brainstem (along with the cerebellum) is 
left in Brown’s body to maintain control of Brown’s vegetative functions such as 
circulation, and respiration. In such a case, it seems that the aspects of Brown’s 
psychology that are associated with persons – his mental content such as his memories 
and beliefs, and his capacities such as rationality and self-awareness – goes with his 
cerebrum in the transplant so that the person who results from the transplant—that is, the 
person who results from the combination of Brown’s cerebrum and Johnson’s body and 
brainstem—is psychologically continuous with Brown pre-operation. That is, the 
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individual who results from the combination of Brown’s cerebrum and Johnson’s body 
(largely) has the same memories and beliefs as the pre-operation Brown and retains 
psychological capacities such as rationality and self-awareness. If the transplant intuition 
says that people “go with” the aspects of psychology mentioned above, then this intuition 
dictates that Brown goes with his cerebrum when it is transplanted.  Brown receives a 
new body and brain stem.  The cerebrum-less organism left behind is not Brown. 
 The psychological approach can easily account for the transplant intuition in 
cerebrum-transplant cases. Consider the version of the psychological approach which 
says that continuity of mental content such as memory and beliefs is sufficient for our 
persistence (whether that continuity has the narrow, wide, or widest cause). If our cerebra 
realize our mental content, then when the cerebrum is transplanted, our mental content 
“goes with” our cerebra in transplant cases. But if we go wherever our mental content 
goes, then we go with our cerebra. Now consider the version of the psychological 
approach which says that continuity of mental capacities such as rationality and self-
awareness is sufficient for our persistence (whether that continuity has the narrow, wide, 
or widest cause). If these mental capacities are realized in our cerebra, then these mental 
capacities “go with” our cerebra in transplant cases. But if we go wherever the neural 
correlates of these mental capacities go, then we go with our cerebra in transplant cases. 
Thus, these psychological approaches can easily accommodate the transplant intuition. 
However, as mentioned above, the psychological approaches mentioned above have the 
counterintuitive consequences that were discussed in Chapter 1: they cannot say that we 
were early-term fetuses and they encounter a too-many-thinkers problem.   
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 Olson’s animalism says that you do not go with your cerebrum in cerebrum-
transplant cases, but stay behind as the cerebrum-less organism. Why? On such cases, a 
living, breathing, cerebrum-less organism controlled by a brainstem which carries on 
various vegetative functions remains on the operating table after the surgery. The 
organism’s psychology (i.e., the capacities of rationality and self-awareness and mental 
content such as memories and beliefs), allegedly, goes along with the cerebrum and is 
placed into a new body. If the more common intuition about the results of these 
hypothetical transplants is correct, we “go” along with our psychologies, and we leave 
behind the living, breathing organisms we once occupied. According to Olson, the living, 
breathing, cerebrum-less entity that stays behind is an organism and the cerebrum is not 
clearly an organism;311 and so, the former entity is a better candidate for being you than 
the latter.  
But saying that we stay behind as a cerebrum-less organism comes with three 
costs. First, it conflicts with the transplant intuitions of many people who seem to 
understand how to use “person” in accord with accepted usage as well as the rest of us. 
Second, most people think that some aspect of our psychology such as rationality or 
memory has something to do with our persistence, but animalism entails that these 
aspects of our psychologies are neither necessary nor sufficient for our persistence. How 
so? In such transplant cases, we organisms come apart from our cerebra, which are the 
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bearers of our mental content and rational capacities. Given this, these aspects of our 
psychologies are not necessary for our persistence – we can survive as cerebrum-less 
organisms. And neither are these aspects of our psychologies sufficient for our 
persistence because our capacity for rationality and our memories, beliefs, etc. might be 
destroyed while we survive as organisms. Third, person essentialism, the view that we are 
essentially persons, is nearly universally held. But if we can survive without these aspects 
of our psychologies, how can the animalist maintain that we are essentially persons? On 
Tooley’s account of personhood, something is a person “only if it possesses the concept 
of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that 
it is itself such a continuing entity.”312 But in cases where we are cerebrum-less 
organisms, we lack such psychological features. Animalists like Olson reject person 
essentialism and it is partly because of cerebrum transplant scenarios.313  
 How might the hylomorphic animalist deal with cerebrum-transplant cases? There 
is a prima facie tension here between hylomorphic animalism and the transplant intuition 
since it seems natural for the hylomorhpic animalist to say that we stay behind as 
cerebrum-less organisms. Here I consider three possible positions the hylomorphic 
animalist might take in responding to cerebrum-transplant cases: (i) that as a result of the 
operation to remove the cerebrum, you cease to exist, (ii) that you stay behind as a 
cerebrum-less organism, and (iii) that you go with your cerebrum and continue to be an 
organism while a naked cerebrum. Each position has its costs and benefits. I will 
investigate each in turn and argue that option (iii) has the best benefits and the least costs. 
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In addition, I will argue that option (iii) fares better than Olson’s animalism at accounting 
for the transplant intuition.    
We Cease to Exist 
 Perhaps the hylomorphic animalist should say that in transplant scenarios we 
cease to exist. After all, the hylomorphic animalist says that we are essentially rational 
animals, so a human animal cannot lose its personhood or our nature as organisms 
without ceasing to exist. But in transplant cases, the person and the organism seem to 
come apart: the person goes with the psychology and the biological but not-even-
remotely-organism-constituting cerebrum, whereas the bulk of the organism stays behind 
devoid of mental content and the capacities in hand for rationality and self-awareness. If 
this is right, then the hylomorphic animalist has no principled basis on which to maintain 
that “we” move ahead into novel bodies, but nor does she have a principled basis on 
which to say that we stay behind as cerebrum-less organisms in our old bodies. And the 
only other option is to say we cease to exist.  
 This option seems reasonable. However, if a theorist could make the case that 
either the cerebrum-less organism left behind is actually a person or that the naked 
cerebrum is a rational animal, then she would give the hylomorphic animalist some 
reason for thinking we do not cease to exist in cases of cerebrum transplantation. In either 
case, the hylomorphic animalist who claims that we cease to exist would have to explain 
why a person ceases to exist when there remains in existence a rational animal that is 
materially continuous with the original animal that person used to be. In addition, Mark 
Spencer identifies a hylomorphic principle which further supports the claim that we do 
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not cease to exist in cerebrum-transplant cases, “that the soul is first and foremost the 
form of a body – in its natural condition it informs a body – and it will naturally tend to 
inform a body until material conditions deteriorate to the point where it simply no longer 
can do so.”314 If the case can be made that a rational animal survives the procedure, then 
unless one can argue that material conditions have deteriorated to the point where the 
soul can no longer inform the body, those of us who accept Spencer’s principle have 
reason to think that we survive cerebrum-transplant cases. But is it more reasonable to 
think that we survive as cerebrum-less organisms or as naked cerebra? It is to these 
options that I now turn.  
Cerebrum-less Organisms 
 Patrick Toner is a hylomorphic animalist who holds that in cerebrum-transplant 
cases, we stay behind as cerebrum-less organisms.315 That is, he holds to the view that we 
are essentially rational animals that are compounds of matter and form and that we can 
survive as cerebrum-less rational animals if our cerebra are removed. Toner follows 
Boethius in thinking that rational beings (persons) are “individual substances of a rational 
nature.”316 And he follows Aristotle and Aquinas in thinking that being a sensing thing is 
what is definitive of animals.317  
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 He gives two reasons for thinking that we stay behind. First, he claims that given 
that we are essentially animals and that naked cerebra are not animals (that is, they are 
not sensing things), we do not go with our cerebra.318 Second, since there is a continuity 
of vegetative functions (such as breathing, heartbeat, regulation of blood pressure and 
body temperature, and digestion) between the pre-operation organism that has its 
cerebrum removed and the cerebrum-less organism that results from the operation, it 
seems reasonable to think that the pre-operation organism and the post-operation, 
cerebrum-less organism are the same organism (i.e., you), than to think that you ceased to 
exist or survived as a cerebrum.319 Here’s another way to put this second point: given the 
continuity of vegetative functions between the pre-operation and the post-operation 
organisms, there does not seem to be a substantial change that takes place by the removal 
of the cerebrum. If there is no substantial change, then the human being still exists. If she 
still exists, then she is a rational, sensing thing since she is essentially such a thing.320 So, 
the pre-operation organism who has her cerebrum removed did not cease to exist but is 
identical to the post-operation organism who has had its cerebrum removed. 
 Toner’s account has, as a benefit, that we are essentially persons. So, unlike 
Olson’s animalism, being a person is essential to who we are, and so has something to do 
with our persistence. It also has, as a benefit, that we are essentially organisms and 
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animals (something the psychological approach denies). Before the surgery, during the 
surgery, and after the surgery, you persist and remain an organism and animal even if a 
cerebrum-less one.  
 But Toner’s view raises some potential worries. First, it cannot account for the 
most common intuition about cerebrum transplants. According to Toner, we stay behind 
as cerebrum-less entities rather than go ahead with our cerebra, but most people think we 
“go” with our cerebra (since we go with those aspects of our psychology associated with 
being a person).  Second, if we can survive as cerebrum-less organisms, then (as would 
be true according to Olson’s animalism) it seems that our beliefs, memories, rationality, 
and self-awareness have nothing to do with our persistence. But surely these things do 
have something to do with our persistence. Furthermore, if we can survive without any 
continuity in these aspects of our psychologies, how is it that we are essentially persons? 
As mentioned earlier, most proponents of animalism (including Eric Olson) reject the 
view that we are essentially persons in part because of cerebrum transplant scenarios.321 
Finally, it is not very clear that a cerebrum-less entity can sense. But Toner thinks that it 
is essential to being an animal that a thing can sense. How is it that human beings can 
stay behind as cerebrum-less entities if such entities cannot sense? 
 Regarding the first worry, Toner plainly admits that his account cannot satisfy the 
transplant intuition. However, he questions the metaphysical import of this intuition.322 
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Secondly, regarding memories, beliefs, and such aspects of our psychologies as important 
to our persistence, Toner points out that his account fares better than ordinary animalism 
in that we are rational beings by nature.323 That is, it is an essential property of human 
beings that they are rational, and so, thinking, psychological things. Admittedly, he does 
not think that anyone’s current psychology (their memory, personality, beliefs, etc.) or 
capacity in hand for rationality is necessary or sufficient for their persistence. So, this 
makes it possible for a person and these aspects of their psychology to part ways, as in 
cerebrum-transplant cases. But the question remains: how exactly is it that we remain 
persons and remain psychological beings when our psychology has been removed along 
with our cerebra? The way that Toner answers this can be used as a reply to the third 
worry for his account: How is it that human beings, who are essentially sensing things, 
can stay behind as cerebrum-less entities that cannot sense? After giving Toner’s reply to 
the first question, I will give his reply to the second.  
 So, if our psychological capacities such as rationality and self-awareness and our 
mental content such as our memories and beliefs are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
our persistence, then how is it that we are essentially persons? How is it that we remain 
persons and psychological, rational beings while we are cerebrum-less? The answer to 
this question lies in the distinction between a natural potential and a capacity in hand. If 
the human being still persists in the cerebrum-less state, then since the human is a rational 
animal by nature, he possesses the natural potential for rationality even if he lacks the 
capacity in hand for rationality (and even if he never again has the capacity in hand). That 
                                                            
 
323 Toner, “Hylemorphic Animalism,” 80. 
146 
 
is, he is still a rational being by nature even if he cannot exercise his rationality. He is a 
rational and sensing thing in that he is the sort of thing that by nature has the potential for 
rationality and sensation. And the evidence, for Toner, that he still exists is that his 
vegetative functions continue uninterrupted throughout the entire cerebrum-transfer 
procedure. So, our psychology has something to do with our persistence in that we cannot 
cease to be psychological beings yet continue to exist. But, Toner’s position is different 
from the psychological approach in that continuity of memory, personality, beliefs, etc. 
and the retention of the capacity in hand for rationality and self-awareness (or some 
combination of these) is not necessary for our survival. We can survive the sudden and 
complete loss of all of these features. But what cannot be lost is our nature. So 
psychological continuity does not constitute our identity over time, though Toner allows 
that it can serve as evidence for our identity over time.  
 The distinction between a capacity in hand and a natural potential also helps us 
give an account for how it is that the cerebrum-less entity qualifies as an animal, a 
sensing being. Even if a cerebrum-less human beings does not have the capacity in hand 
to see, hear, etc. it still has the natural potential to sense in that it is the sort of being that 
senses by nature.  
Cerebrum Organisms 
 Although Toner’s account seems reasonable, it has a problem that it cannot get 
around. Allow me to bring that problem to the forefront by laying out the final position – 
the position I favor – that the hylomorphic animalist might take in response to cerebrum-
transplant scenarios. On this view, we are essentially rational animals, we survive the 
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cerebrum-transplant procedure, and we go with our cerebra rather than stay behind as 
cerebrum-less organisms. What is it to “go with our cerebra” as a result of the procedure? 
It means that during the procedure, we are whittled down to the size of a cerebrum and 
our form ceases to inform the portions of matter that helped make up the portions of our 
body that were cut away as a result of the procedure. Instead, our form now informs just 
the prime matter that – together with the form – makes up the cerebrum. This position, if 
it can be defended, retains the benefits of Toner’s account – that we are organisms, 
animals and persons essentially – while accommodating the transplant intuition. 
 Having laid out my position, I now return to the problem for Toner’s view that I 
think he cannot get around and afterwards I will give a reason for thinking my position is 
correct. Toner thinks that he has a reason for thinking that we stay behind in cerebrum-
transplant cases rather than go ahead with our cerebra. What is that reason? That the 
continuity of vegetative functions between the pre-operation organism with the cerebrum 
(entity A) and the post-operation, cerebrum-less organism (entity B) gives us a reason for 
thinking that A is identical to B. However, this same sort of reasoning can be given in 
terms of psychological continuity in support of the claim that we go along with our 
cerebra: there is psychological continuity between the pre-operation organism with the 
cerebrum (entity A), the extracted cerebrum (C), and the post-operation organism (D) 
made up of C and a new body. That is, presumably, A, C, and D will largely share the 
same memories, beliefs, personality, etc. and will possess the capacity for rationality. 
Given that hylomorphic animalists say that we are both essentially psychological beings 
and essentially animals, why should we take the vegetative continuity between A and B 
as evidence of what happens to the human being rather than the psychological continuity 
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between A, C, and D? That is, our rational nature and our animal nature are both essential 
to our persistence, so why should we favor one over the other in determining what 
happens to us in transplant scenarios? Unless we have an additional reason for favoring 
the identity of A and B over the identity of A, C, and D, it seems arbitrary to favor the 
identity of the former over the latter.  
 Toner might respond that even if there is some sort of psychological continuity 
between A, C, and D, A cannot be identical to C and D because humans are essentially 
animals and cerebra are not since they lack the capacity for sensation. But in response to 
Toner, I would employ a distinction similar to the one he uses to defend his view that a 
cerebrum-less organism is a rational, sensing being. He says that although it seems that 
the cerebrum-less entity is not rational, it is rational in the sense of possessing a rational 
nature (and thus, possessing the natural potential for rationality). And although it seems 
that the cerebrum-less entity cannot sense, it has the capacity for sensation in that it is a 
sensing thing by nature. We can say the same thing of the cerebrum regarding the 
capacity for sensation (and rationality, if you like). If the human being goes along with 
the cerebrum, then although it seems like the cerebrum is not an animal because it has no 
sense organs, it has sensation in the sense of belonging to a kind that senses by nature 
(the kind being animal). That is, it has the natural potential for sensation even if it 
currently cannot exercise that capacity and even though it lacks sense organs. So if the 
human being has gone along with the cerebrum, then the situation we have is this: as a 
result of the extraction of the cerebrum from the body, the human being has been pared 
down to the size of a cerebrum. Even still, the human being is an entity composed of a 
rational soul and prime matter. Even if cerebra do not and cannot carry out animal 
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functions, if they are informed by a rational soul, then they possess the capacity for those 
functions in virtue of belonging to the kind human being. Since the rational soul is 
responsible for the various functions of the human being, including the vegetative and 
sensitive functions, and carries within it the capacity for these functions, when the human 
being is pared down to the size of a cerebrum, he retains the natural potential for the 
animal functions. In sum, if the extracted cerebrum is the original human being, then it is 
an animal. If it is animal, then it possesses the natural potential for the animal functions 
even if it cannot exercise them. 
 So Toner and I are at a standstill. I can employ the same sort of reasoning in 
support of my position that he can employ in support of his. The way to break the 
standstill (and find out where we go in transplant scenarios) lies in where our rational 
form goes. On my version of hylomorphic animalism, we do not persist in virtue of our 
biology or our psychology. We persist in virtue of the persistence of rational form 
inhering in a particular chunk of matter. If our form continues to inform the matter of the 
cerebrum-less entity, then we survive as a cerebrum-less entity. If our form goes along 
with the cerebra (that is, if it ceases to inform the entire body during the procedure and 
informs just the cerebrum while it is being transplanted), then we go along with our 
cerebra. The persistence of vegetative, sensitive, or psychological functions can at best 
serve as evidence of the persistence of the form.  
 Is there a way to know where the form has gone in cerebrum-transplant cases? I 
offer two pieces of evidence that the rational soul (and so, the human being) goes along 
with the cerebrum. First, Mark Spencer identifies two hylomorphic principles which 
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indicate that the soul goes with the cerebrum and does not stay behind with the cerebrum-
less entity from which the cerebrum was removed:324  
(1) The soul is first and foremost the form of a body – in its natural condition it 
informs a body – and it will naturally tend to inform a body until material 
conditions deteriorate to the point where it simply no longer can do so. Second, (2) 
the human soul is a rational soul and so will implement these powers in relation to 
matter as long as possible. 
Spencer’s first principle provides good reason to think that the human being does not go 
out of existence in cerebrum-transplant cases. Given that the rational soul will inform 
matter as long as possible, the separation of the cerebrum and the body is not sufficient to 
end the human being’s existence. Neither the cerebrum nor the cerebrum-less organism 
have deteriorated to a point that the rational soul can no longer inform them.325 (What 
degree and kind of deterioration would render a body unfit for information by a rational 
soul? This question is not easy to answer. But the cerebrum and the cerebrum-less 
organism are still relatively organized or structured and this helps support the intuition 
that they can be informed by a rational soul.) The second principle helps us determine 
that the soul goes with the cerebrum instead of staying behind with the cerebrum-less 
organism. Every soul, whether rational, sensitive, or vegetative, will seek to implement 
its “highest” powers as long as it is able. Given this, the rational soul, even though it 
carries out the vegetative and sensitive functions as well as the rational functions, will 
seek to implement the rational functions as long as it is able. Since it cannot carry out 
those functions if stays with the matter devoid of a cerebrum and it can carry out those 
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151 
 
functions if it informs the chunk of matter that helps compose the cerebrum, it will 
inform the chunk of matter that helps compose the cerebrum in case the cerebrum is 
separated from its body.  
 The second reason that the hylomorphist can cite to support the claim that we go 
with our cerebra is that those who contribute to the personal identity literature commonly 
assume that the rational capacities and mental content of the person go along with the 
cerebrum in cerebrum-transplant scenarios. If they are correct in assuming that these 
aspects of a person’s psychology goes along with her cerebrum, this is evidence that her 
rational soul has gone along with her cerebrum. Here’s another way to put it. Any 
material object that is capable of abstract thought is informed by a rational soul. So, if the 
cerebrum is capable of abstract thought, it has a rational soul. But if it has a rational soul, 
we should not suppose that its soul suddenly sprang into existence with all the same 
memories, personality, etc. as the original human being; rather, we should suppose that it 
is the original rational soul that previously informed the pre-operation organism. On my 
view of personal identity, so long as the soul persists, the human being persists and 
wherever the soul goes, the human being goes. Thus, if we have evidence that the soul 
persists, then we have evidence that the human being persists. This is not to say that 
human beings persist in virtue of their psychology. Rather, it is to say that the persistence 
of a human being’s psychology is evidence of the persistence of her soul. In order to hold 
to his account of transplant scenarios, Toner must explain away this evidence.  
 Before moving on to other transfer scenarios, we must consider whether my claim 
that we go with our cerebra is in tension with my claim that we can survive in a persistent 
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vegetative state. That is, how can I consistently say that the cerebrum-less entity that 
results from a cerebrum-transfer scenario does not possess the original rational soul, but 
that patients in a persistent vegetative state do? Spencer’s principles can assist us here:326  
(1) The soul is first and foremost the form of a body – in its natural condition it 
informs a body – and it will naturally tend to inform a body until material 
conditions deteriorate to the point where it simply no longer can do so. Second, (2) 
the human soul is a rational soul and so will implement these powers in relation to 
matter as long as possible. 
Principle (2) helps us determine that, in cerebrum-transplant scenarios, the rational soul 
goes with the cerebrum rather than stays behind with the cerebrum-less entity. That is, 
since the rational soul will implement its rational functions as long as it is able, it goes 
with the cerebrum. This means that the cerebrum-less entity left behind possesses a 
numerically distinct soul. As for PVS cases, per principle (1), the continuation of the 
vegetative functions in a PVS patient is evidence that material conditions have not 
deteriorated to the point that the soul is no longer able to inform the body. Per principle 
(2), the soul realizes the functions that it can while retaining the natural potential for the 
functions that it cannot. That is, it continues to implement the vegetative functions while 
being unable to implement the rational and sensitive functions. If a PVS patient recovers, 
the soul begins to realize the sensitive and rational functions again. Thus, we have a 
principled reason for treating cerebrum-transfer cases differently than PVS cases.      
 
 
                                                            
326 Spencer applies these principles to address this specific issue in “A Reexamination of the 
Hylomorphic Theory of Death,” 857.  
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Other Transfer Scenarios 
 What should the hylomorphic animalist say about Parfit’s My Division, 
teletransportation, and Shoemaker’s brain-state-transfer scenario? Consider My Division 
first:  
My body is fatally injured, as are the brains of my two [twin] brothers. My brain is 
divided, and each half is successfully transplanted into the body of one of my brothers. 
Each of the resulting people believes that he is me, seems to remember living my life, 
has my character, and is in every other way psychologically continuous with me. And 
he has a body that is very like mine. 
 
How can the hylomorphic animalist respond? The hylomorphic animalist who thinks that 
transferring my brain into another organism results in my death (since I do not go along 
with my brain, but die a brainless death on the operating table) has an easy response. 
They will simply say that My Division results in my death. However, if each of my 
brothers wake up thinking they are me, this seems to be evidence that I survived 
somehow. 
What about hylomorphic animalists (like me) who think that we go along with our 
brains in brain-transplant scenarios? Perhaps My Division is a case in which the 
hylomorphic organism fissions out of existence because fission involves substantial 
change. We can support this claim using the composite continuity view. On this view, 
material continuity is necessary for our persistence and material continuity requires some 
degree of material overlap. The degree of overlap that is required is the continued 
informing of enough of the matter that composes the matter-form composite to be the 
matter-form composite of a living person. Maybe the fission of the brain is a case in 
which not enough of the matter is informed for it to be the form of a living person. If so, 
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then I have died and my form no longer informs my matter. If the surgery is successful – 
that is, if my brothers each wake up thinking he is me – it must be because each half of 
my brain took on a new form once my matter-form composite ceased to exist. Then, once 
a given half of my brain was placed into one of my brothers’ skulls, the form of that half 
of my brain began to inform the formerly brainless body of that twin brother.   
How can the hylomorphic animalist respond to cases of teletransportation? The 
composite continuity view has an easy response since it implies that we are not 
transferred in such cases. How so? Recall, first, that the composite continuity view 
requires material continuity. That is, on this view, in order for us to persist, the matter-
form composite with which we are identical must persist. Further, for a matter-form 
composite to persist, the matter of the composite must be continuous. Thus, for us to 
persist through time, there can be no space or time gaps in our existence. Since 
teletransportation requires a material gap between the person who is copied (person1) and 
the duplicate of that person (person2), there cannot be material continuity between the 
person and the duplicate. Thus, on the composite continuity view, person1 and person2 are 
not numerically identical. The same goes for cases of brain-state transfer. Since brain-
state transfers require a material gap between the person whose brain state is copied 
(person1) and the person onto whom the brain state is transferred (person2), there cannot 
be material continuity between person1 and person2. Thus, on the composite continuity 
view, person1 and person2 are not numerically identical. If the transplant intuition says 
that we are transferred in teletransportation and brain-state-transfer cases, then the 
composite continuity view conflicts with the transplant intuition in such cases. But 
perhaps we can mitigate the sting of this consequence. First, perhaps fewer people have 
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the intuition that we would survive teletransportation and brain-state transfers than would 
say that we survive a brain or cerebrum transplant. Why? Because teletransportation is 
lacking the normal cause for our psychology – the brain. Second, since the composite 
continuity theorist says that teletransportation and brain-state transfers do not preserve 
our identity, he does not fall prey to teletransportation and brain-state-transfer scenarios 
in which more than one copy of a person (or brain state) is made. 
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CHAPTER 5: HYLOMORPHISM AND MULTIPLICATION OBJECTIONS 
 
We saw in Chapter 1 that certain responses to the thinking-organism argument 
lead to a so-called multiplication objection. In particular, suppose one responds to the 
thinking-organism argument by denying premise 3, that the one and only thinking being 
sitting in your chair is none other than you. This leads to the various too-many-thinkers 
problems such as the overcrowding problem, the epistemic problem, and the personhood 
problem. Animalism avoids the too-many-thinkers problem by saying that the one and 
only thinking being sitting in your chair is the organism sitting there and you are 
numerically identical to it. However, animalism suffers from multiplication problems of 
its own, as was pointed out in Chapter 1: the remnant-person problem, the corpse 
problem, the thinking-parts problem, and problems related to varieties of conjoined 
twinning. The remnant-person problem and the corpse problem involve cases in which 
there is more than one entity thinking your thoughts, for example, your organism and 
your body. Conjoined twinning cases present a problem for animalism in that the number 
of human organisms and the number of human persons that seem to exist doesn’t 
correspond to the number of human organisms and the number of human persons that 
animalism says there should be in such cases.   
Hylomorphic animalism carries the same benefit as animalism in that it identifies 
you and the organism. On hylomorphic animalism, there is one and only one thinking 
being sitting in your chair. But does hylomorphic animalism suffer from multiplication 
problems of its own, like animalism does? If so, how can the hylomorphist respond? I 
examine each of the multiplication problems brought up against animalism to see if they 
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apply to hylomorphic animalism as well. In addition, I bring up multiplication problems 
specific to hylomorphic animalism, but argue that hylomorphic animalism has the 
resources to address these problems.  
The Remnant-Person Problem 
As seen in Chapter 1, the remnant-person problem arises for animalists as a result 
of their response to cerebrum-transplant scenarios. Animalists such as Olson say that 
when a cerebrum transplant occurs, the organism does not go with its cerebrum, but stays 
behind as a cerebrum-less organism. But if the cerebrum is capable of supporting thought 
and consciousness during the transplant—when it’s connected neither to the donor nor 
the recipient—then it seems to qualify as a person. If the human organism does not go 
with its cerebrum during the operation, then the cerebrum is not numerically identical to 
the human organism who donated it since something cannot come apart from itself. But 
then, if the cerebrum is a person, where did this person come from? Either it existed in 
the same location as but not identical to the human organism prior to the operation or it 
came into existence once it was removed from that organism. Neither option is attractive. 
The former suffers from various too-many-thinkers problems—prior to the operation, 
there were two thinkers (even persons) where we thought there was one (the organism 
and its cerebrum); and how does the organism know which of these people she is? Should 
we then say that the cerebrum becomes a person when it is removed from the skull?  This 
option violates a plausible principle—“that you cannot bring a person into being merely 
by cutting away sustaining tissues.”327 That is, since we are supposing that the cerebrum 
was not a person until it was removed from the organism, we must then suppose that the 
                                                            
327 Olson, “The Remnant-Person Problem,” 6. 
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removal of the sustaining tissues surrounding that cerebrum brought a person into 
existence. And this conflicts with the intuitions articulated with the aforementioned 
principle.    
 Furthermore, once the brain is connected to the recipient’s body, what happens to 
the remnant person? It cannot exist as an organism, according to Olson, since organisms 
cannot survive as detached cerebra or start out as detached cerebra and then become 
organisms. So the remnant person and the organism are distinct. If this is the case, either 
the remnant person continues to exist or it ceases to exist once it is implanted. On the 
former option, after the transplant, the cerebrum is still a person and so is the organism. 
This gives rise to the various too-many-thinkers problems. But the latter option goes 
against a plausible principle—“that you cannot destroy a person merely by surrounding 
him with sustaining tissues.”328 In other words, if the remnant person is destroyed once 
the brain is transplanted, then it is possible to destroy a person merely by surrounding 
him with sustaining tissue.   
 So goes the remnant-person problem for animalism. Does hylomorphic animalism 
suffer from the same issue? Before I answer this, recall that hylomorphists differ in their 
response to cerebrum-transplant scenarios. Some, like Toner, say that we organisms do 
not go along with our cerebra in cerebrum-transplant scenarios but stay behind as 
cerebrum-less organisms. Others, like me, say that we do go along with our cerebra and 
leave behind a cerebrum-less organism. A remnant-person problem arises on Toner’s 
account but not mine. However, my view (as explained below) gives rise to a remnant-
                                                            
 
328 Olson, “The Remnant-Person Problem,” 6.  
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organism problem. So, whether a hylomorphist holds to Toner’s view or mine as a 
response to cerebrum-transplant scenarios, a remnant-entity problem arises. However, in 
either case, the hylomorphist can give a plausible response to the remnant-entity problem 
using the resources of hylomorphic animalism.   
Consider Toner’s response first. If a naked cerebrum is capable of conceptual 
thought, then the cerebrum can engage in conceptual thought while being transplanted 
from one organism to another. But if the cerebrum is engaged in conceptual thought 
during the transplant, then it is a person. But if Toner is right about cerebrum-transplant 
scenarios, the naked cerebrum is not the person whose cerebrum it was. That is, a normal 
person stays behind as a cerebrum-less organism once his or her cerebrum is removed. 
But if the naked cerebrum is a person that is not identical to that original organism, where 
did it come from? Either this person was co-located with but not identical to the original 
organism prior to the surgery or it popped into existence once the cerebrum was removed 
from the skull of the original organism. Further, once it is transplanted, either this person 
continues to exist in the same location as but is not identical to the new organism or it 
ceases to exist once the transplant takes place. Clearly, Toner’s account suffers from the 
remnant-person problem.  
On my response to cerebrum-transplant scenarios, the organism goes with its 
cerebrum. It does not give rise to a remnant-person problem because the cerebrum person 
is identical to the original organism. The cutting away of the body from the cerebrum 
reduces the size of the human person to that of a cerebrum. The person is taken and 
placed into a new body and continues its existence. However, while my account does not 
160 
 
give rise to a remnant-person problem, it does give rise to a remnant-organism problem. 
After all, once the body is cut away from the cerebrum and the cerebrum is taken away, 
there is a living, breathing organism left on the operating table. This organism is not 
identical to the original organism since the original organism goes with the cerebrum. 
Thus, this now cerebrum-less organism was either co-located but not identical to the 
original organism prior to the surgery or it popped into existence once the cerebrum was 
removed from the skull. Further, what about the organism into which the cerebrum is 
placed? During the surgery but before transplant, that organism lay cerebrum-less on an 
operating table. Once the cerebrum is placed into its skull, if the original organism 
survives the operation (the organism who was once a naked cerebrum), what happens to 
the cerebrum-less organism into which the cerebrum was placed? Either it is now co-
located but not identical to the original organism or it ceased to exist once the surgery 
was complete. So, although my take on cerebrum transplants does not give rise to a 
remnant-person problem, it gives rise to a remnant-organism problem. And this is equally 
problematic. Thus, hylomorphic animalism, like Olson’s animalism, gives rise to a 
multiplication objection of its own due to transplant scenarios – a remnant-person 
problem if one says that the original organism stays behind on the operating table or a 
remnant-organism problem if one says that the original organism goes along with its 
cerebrum.  
 How should the hylomorphist respond to such problems? Though the problems 
are distinct, the solution is the same: for the hylomorphist, cerebrum transplants result in 
the formation of a new substance and hylomorphists can give an account of why such 
surgeries have this result. The account involves two hylomorphic doctrines that I 
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discussed in Chapter 2. The first is that “no substance has a substance as a proper 
part.”329 Why is this the case? According to Eleonore Stump, it is because “a substantial 
form of a material thing configures prime matter; but if a substantial form were to 
configure what is already configured by a substantial form, then it would be configuring a 
matter-form composite, not prime matter.”330 Since substances are composites of prime 
matter and substantial form, any proper spatial part of a substance – like an atom in a 
molecule – will not itself be a substance since it is made up of matter that is already 
configured.331 Thus, a proper spatial part of a substance cannot itself be configured by a 
substantial form that is distinct from the substantial form of the substance itself; instead, 
it is configured by the substantial form of the substance of which it is a proper part. So, 
the proper parts of substances are not themselves substances. Now let us apply this to 
humans. On hylomorphism, human beings are substances. But human beings have proper 
parts, like atoms, cells, fingers, hearts, and cerebra. Since each of these are proper parts 
of the human being, they are not themselves substances. When an atom that is not itself a 
proper part of a substance becomes a proper part of a human being, it undergoes a 
substantial change: it ceases to be a substance in its own right, becomes a spatial region 
                                                            
329 Patrick Toner, “Emergent Substance,” 287. See also, Stump, Aquinas, 39, 195. Toner’s main 
defense of this view is that holding that substances have no substances as proper parts allows one to 
avoid what he calls the vagueness argument for unrestricted composition (where unrestricted 
composition says that “any two objects compose a third”) and the overdetermination argument for 
eliminativism (where eliminativism says that certain “(alleged) macrophysical objects—humble things like 
chairs, tables, or baseballs—do not exist”); Patrick Toner, “Emergent Substance,” 282-285.   
 
330 Stump, Aquinas, 39. As Stump reminds her readers, this isn’t to say that the substantial form 
of a matter-form composite might be replaced by a new substantial form, thus resulting in a new matter-
form composite.  
 
331 So, human beings do have parts, just not substantial parts. A spatial part, according to Toner, 
is a “geometrically defined section of the substance;” Patrick Toner, “Emergent Substance,” 288. As 
discussed earlier in the dissertation, the metaphysical parts of a substance – matter and form – are not 
themselves substances either.   
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of the human being, and the form of the human being begins to determine its organization 
and function within the human being.332 Note, though, that the proper spatial parts of 
substances retain what Toner calls a nominal presence in the substance. Consider, as an 
example, an atom that is a proper part of a human being. In being nominally present, the 
spatial region in the human being that the atom takes up will exhibit the properties of a 
substantial atom. The difference between a substantial atom and an atom that is 
nominally present in the human being is this: the properties of a substantial atom are had 
by the substantial atom itself whereas the properties exhibited by the nominally present 
atom will be had by the human being rather than the atom.  
The second doctrine is that matter cannot exist uninformed.333 This doctrine 
reflects the nature of matter itself, that is, prime matter.334 Recall that prime matter is 
                                                            
332 This view does not deny that a substance can have another substance within its boundaries. If 
a person swallows a fly and the fly remains alive for a bit in the person’s stomach, the person has a 
substance within his boundaries, but not a substance as a proper part. The fly only becomes part of the 
substance once it is digested and integrated into the person’s body. Or suppose, more radically, that one 
person, person A, has a tiny person, person B, inside her brain. If B is integrated into the body of A and is 
therefore organized and controlled by A’s form, then B is not a substance in her own right (and therefore, 
is not a person in her own right). But if B is not integrated into the body of A, then B is not part of A and 
merely exists within the boundaries of A. On this option, B would be a distinct substance and person. 
333 Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.7.1049a19-b1; Aquinas, The Principles of Nature 2.112-18: “Matter is 
never completely without form and privation, because it is sometimes under one form and sometimes 
under another. Moreover, it can never exist by itself; because, since it does not have any form in its 
definition, it cannot exist in act, since existence in act is only from the form. Rather it exists only in 
potency. Therefore whatever exists in act cannot be called prime matter”; As Brower says, “Insofar as 
prime matter is a being in pure potentiality, it has no form or actuality through itself, but only via 
inherence. But, given the close connection between actuality and existence, for Aquinas, this just entails 
that prime matter cannot exist without some form inhering in it. Indeed, for prime matter to exist, he 
says, just is for it to have actuality in this way, and hence to be a part of a larger compound” Aquinas’s 
Ontology of the Material World, 19. See also Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 44.  
 
334 The other sort of matter, secondary matter, it is not matter in the strict and proper sense. The 
strict and proper sense of matter is that which has no form in itself. Secondary matter is composed of 
matter and form and is only referred to as matter because of its potential to receive form.   
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pure potentiality, having in itself no actuality, and that it exists in actuality only when it is 
informed. On this view, any actually existing chunk of matter will not be matter in itself, 
but will be informed matter. So, for example, in cerebrum-transplant scenarios, when a 
cerebrum is removed from the skull of its organism, the matter of that cerebrum is not an 
uninformed chunk of prime matter. Instead, it possesses form and the cerebrum itself is a 
matter-form composite.335  
Given these two doctrines, I can now explain why hylomorphists think that 
cerebrum-transplant scenarios result in the formation of a new substance. Consider 
Toner’s response to transplant cases first, in which the original organism stays behind as 
a cerebrum-less entity and does not go with the cerebrum. When the cerebrum and the 
original organism part ways, the soul of the original organism continues to inform the 
matter of the original organism (with the exception of the matter of the cerebrum). Once 
the cerebrum is removed, it is no longer informed by the form of the original organism. 
But it cannot exist uninformed since it is partly composed of matter and matter cannot 
exist uninformed. Thus, when the cerebrum is removed, it takes on a new form and 
acquires new functions in virtue of this form.336 The naked cerebrum, then, with its new 
form, is a matter-form composite in its own right. That is, it is its own substance. It was 
                                                            
335 Another option is that the cerebrum is an aggregate of substances but is not a substance 
itself. But if the naked cerebrum possesses can think, as is often supposed in the personal identity 
literature, it will be a substance -  thinking is not an activity that takes place via the cooperation of various 
substances in an aggregate, but thinking takes place within a substance. If the naked cerebrum exhibits 
rational activity, it possesses a rational soul and qualifies as a substance. If other parts of the human 
organism are removed, they may not possess a single soul that informs the entire part, but may be 
aggregates of smaller substances. Consider, for example, a clipping of a finger nail. Is there a form finger 
nail clipping which makes this detached part a substance? Or is it a composite of smaller substances?  
 
336 Patrick Toner, “On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity,” 465-466.  
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not a substance prior to being removed from the original organism since, according to the 
first hylomorphic doctrine, substances do not have substances as parts. Rather, the 
cerebrum comes into existence qua substance once it is removed from the organism of 
which it was a proper part.337 In the same way, since the cerebrum of the original 
organism, prior to the surgery, is integrated into the body of that organism so that the 
organization and function of the cerebrum is controlled by the original organism’s form, 
the cerebrum is not a substance in its own right, and so, does not exist as a substance or 
person pre-operation.  
Now we are in a position to respond to the remnant-person problem. Recall that 
the respondent to the problem can either say that this remnant person was co-located with 
but not identical to the original organism prior to the surgery or that it popped into 
existence once the cerebrum was removed from the skull of the original organism. On the 
former option, there is a too-many-persons problem, and on the latter option, it is odd to 
say that a person comes to be because of the surgery. The hylomorphist can deny that the 
cerebrum was a person substance prior to the surgery because people are substances and 
the cerebrum was not a substance prior to surgery.  The hylomorphist can therein avoid 
the too-many-thinkers problem. If the cerebrum becomes a substance in its own right 
only when it is removed from the original organism, it is not a substance prior to being 
removed. And if thinkers and people are substances, the cerebrum was neither a thinker 
                                                            
337 What sort of substance is it? This depends on the sort of form that it possesses, which can be 
determined by the sort of functions of which it is capable. If the cerebrum is capable of rationality, as is 
supposed in personal identity thought experiments, then it will possess a rational soul. As an alternative, 
one could say that the cerebrum is not a substance in its own right. Since matter cannot exist uninformed, 
then presumably the cerebrum will be an aggregate of smaller substances. Toner responds in this way: 1. 
Patrick Toner, “Hylemorphism, Remnant Persons and Personhood,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, 
no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 89.  
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nor a person prior to surgery. Thus, the hylomorphist has principled grounds on which to 
argue that the cerebrum is not a thinker in addition to the organism. Rather, it is the 
human organism itself who thinks.  He or she does this using certain spatial regions of 
her body (notably, her cerebrum).  But it is the person as a whole who has the capacity 
for thought. The hylomorphist can embrace the second option – that a person comes to be 
because of the surgery – and can soften its oddness by giving a principled reason for her 
adoption of this stance. Since matter cannot exist uninformed and the form of the original 
organism does not inform the matter of the cerebrum once it is removed from the 
organism, that matter must take on a new form. But the taking on of a form by matter is 
just what it is for a new substance to come into existence. Thus, it is no mystery as to 
why a new substance comes to be because of the surgery. 
What should the hylomorphist say happens to the cerebrum once it is placed into a 
new body – that is, into a living, but cerebrum-less human organism? I propose that the 
cerebrum substance ceases to exist as a substance in its own right. This is because, once 
the cerebrum is integrated into the organism, it becomes part of the living organism that 
received it and the form of that living organism now controls the cerebrum (i.e., 
organizes its matter, determines its functions, etc.).338 On hylomorphism, it is not 
mysterious that the cerebrum (as a substance) ceases to exist once it is placed into a new 
organism. Since substances do not have substances as parts and since the form of a 
substance informs each part of the substance, once the cerebrum is placed into the new 
                                                            
338 As an alternative, one might say that the cerebrum does not cease to exist as a substance, but 
begins to inform the organism into which it is placed. I can think of no principled reason for preferring one 
of these positions over the other.  
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organism (and integrated into that organism), it becomes part of that organism and is 
informed by the form of that organism.339  
 So much for Toner’s view of what happens during cerebrum transplants. What 
about my view, where the original organism does not stay on the operating table as a 
cerebrum-less entity, but goes along with its cerebrum (rather: the human organism is 
reduced to the size of a cerebrum)? If the original organism goes along with the 
cerebrum, then the form of the original organism informs the cerebrum and does not 
inform the cerebrum-less entity that remains on the operating table. Since the entity on 
the table is composed partly of matter, it must be informed. Thus, the cerebrum-less 
entity on the operating table possesses a form, one proper to its organization and 
capacities.340 This entity did not exist prior to the surgery since substances cannot have 
substances as parts. That is, the original organism did not have this cerebrum-less 
substance as a part (though the matter that now composes the cerebrum-less substance 
was part of the original organism prior to the surgery), but the cerebrum-less substance 
“popped” into existence as a result of the surgery. Thus, the too-many-thinkers problem 
is avoided. And the oddness of an entity popping into existence as a result of the surgery 
is mitigated given the hylomorphic contention that matter cannot exist uninformed.  
                                                            
339 However, there may be a period of time during which the cerebrum retains its status as a 
substance. This would be after it is placed into the skull of the new organism, but before it becomes 
integrated into the new organism and the form of the new organism takes over the organization and 
functions of the cerebrum. Once the form of the new organism begins to inform the cerebrum, the 
cerebrum substance ceases to exist and becomes part of the new organism.  
 
340 What sort of form does the cerebrum-less organism possess? It is not crucial for my argument. 
But, it seems that it does not possess a rational soul since an entity without a cerebrum does not naturally 
possess the capacity for rationality. Thus, it either possesses a sensitive or vegetative soul, depending on 
its capacities. 
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Once the cerebrum is placed into the skull of the new, recipient organism and the 
cerebrum becomes integrated into the recipient organism, the form of the cerebrum (that 
is, the form of the original organism) takes over the organization and functions of the 
recipient organism and the recipient organism ceases to exist.341 In its place is the 
original organism. So, whether the hylomorphist holds that the original organism stays 
behind as a cerebrum-less entity or goes along with the cerebrum and is transplanted into 
a new body, he has a response to the remnant-person problem that fits well with his 
theory. 
The Corpse Problem 
The corpse problem arises for those animalists who think that organisms cease to 
be when they die (rather than continue to exist as a corpse).342 When an organism dies, it 
leaves a corpse or body behind. But where did this entity that is left behind come from? 
As in the remnant-person problem, this entity either popped into existence when the 
organism died or it existed in the same location as but distinct from the organism when 
the organism was alive. The former option is strange, since a new object comes to be 
every time an organism dies (and because of the death of an organism). The latter option 
is not attractive either, since it gives rise to the various too-many-thinkers problems. 
While the organism is still alive, there are two thinkers (even persons) where we thought 
                                                            
341 Why think that the recipient organism ceases to exist rather than the cerebrum? Well, keep in 
mind that the cerebrum is identical to the original organism. That organism has certain memories, beliefs, 
desires, etc. If the entity that results from the surgery – the combination of the recipient organism and 
the cerebrum – has the memories, beliefs, desires, etc. of the original organism, this is good evidence that 
the original organism survived the operation and the recipient organism did not.  
 
342 For those animalists who think that organisms survive beyond their deaths as corpses, there is 
no corpse problem. This is because the corpse/body of the organism and the organism are identical, so 
there is no problem of explaining where the corpse came from. It is the same entity that was once living 
and breathing and thinking only now it has ceased living and breathing and thinking.  
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there was one (the organism and the body); and how does the organism know she is the 
person who is an organism rather than the person who is a body?  
 Hylomorphism has the theoretical resources to explain what takes place when an 
organism dies. It takes death to be substantial change.343 Substantial change involves the 
ceasing to be of one substance and the coming to be of a new substance. When the 
organism dies, the matter-form composite that it was ceases to be. The form of the 
organism ceases to inform the matter of the organism. (That the body ceases to be self-
integrated and begins to decompose is evidence of this.) But the chunk of matter that 
composed the organism still exists. Since matter cannot exist uninformed, a new form 
begins to inform the matter and a new matter-form composite comes to be, namely, the 
corpse. (Alternatively, one might say that corpses do not exist as substances in their own 
right, but are aggregates of smaller substances. On this picture, many different substances 
with different forms come to be because of the death of the organism.) So, the 
hylomorphist can respond to the corpse problem by explaining on principle the respect in 
which a corpse “pops” into existence when an organism dies. This avoids the too-many-
thinkers problem since the corpse did not exist in the same location as but distinct from 
the organism when that organism was alive. And, even though it may seem odd to think 
that a corpse “pops” into existence every time an organism dies, hylomorphism 
minimizes the unintuitive nature of this result by utilizing fully general metaphysical or 
conceptual resources to explain why this happens. 
                                                            
 
343 Patrick Toner, “Hylemorphic Animalism,” 71.  
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The Thinking-Parts Problem 
The thinking-parts problem for animalism is similar to the thinking-organism 
problem. On the thinking-organism problem, you are not identical to your organism and 
your organism seems to be just as good a candidate for thought as you. On the thinking-
parts problem, the brain-inclusive proper parts of organisms are not identical to the 
organisms themselves but are just as good a candidate for thought as the organism. For 
example, if brains think, then not only can brains and organisms think, but the proper 
parts of an organism that include its brain can think as well, such as the heads and upper 
halves of organisms. But if brains and heads and upper halves of organisms can think, 
they will be psychologically indistinguishable from the organisms of which they are a 
part. If this is so, too-many-thinkers problems will arise. There will be more thinkers in 
the boundaries of organisms than we originally supposed. Each thinker will believe that it 
is the whole organism and even the person. Further, the whole organism has no more 
evidence that he is the organism or person than do any of these brain-inclusive organism 
parts. How does the organism know that he is the organism and person and not just a 
brain-inclusive proper part of it? 
 The hylomorphic animalist seems to suffer from the same problem: hylomorphic 
organisms have parts like brains and heads and upper halves and these parts seem like 
good candidates for thought. But if they are, then the various problems of too many 
thinkers arise. But the hylomorphist has a principled way of solving the problem. She can 
claim that only substances think – not properties, relations, events, or even proper parts of 
substances (that are not themselves substances). Since these various spatial regions of the 
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human organism are not themselves substances but parts of substances, they do not think. 
The subject of thought – the subject of the various mental properties manifested by the 
spatial regions of the human organism – is not any of the spatial regions themselves. 
Rather, the subject of thought is the human organism itself.344 As Toner claims: the brain 
does not think; the human organism thinks using its brain.345    
The Problem of Conjoined Twins 
Timothy Campbell and Jeff McMahan (2010) have given a multiplication 
objection based on actual and hypothetical cases of three varieties conjoined twining: 
dicephalus, cephalopagus, and craniopagus parasiticus. Animalism – at least on Stephan 
Blatti’s definition – holds that for every person there is only one organism with whom 
that person is numerically identical and for every human organism there is at most one 
person with whom that organism is identical. These varieties of conjoined twinning 
present a problem for animalism so defined.  In both craniopagus parasiticus and 
dicephalus, there appear to be two persons and one organism. In cases of cephalopagus, 
there appear to be one person and two organisms. If these cases are as Campbell and 
McMahan describe them, animalism is false.   
These varieties of conjoined twinning present a problem for hylomorphic 
animalism as well. After all, hylomorphic animalism holds that human persons are 
identical to organisms. So, how can the hylomorphic animalist respond to such cases? 
And is this best response specific to hylomorphic animalism or is it available to the 
                                                            
344 Patrick Toner, “Hylemorphic Animalism,” 72.  
 
345 Patrick Toner, “Hylemorphic Animalism,” 72. 
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animalist simpliciter to give as well?  I claim that each case of conjoined twins Campbell 
and McMahan  bring up involves two human beings (and thus, two organisms, animals 
and persons). In order to see this, consider again what hylomorphic animalism says about 
the nature of human beings. Human beings cannot exist without a rational soul.346 Since 
humans possess not only rational capacities in virtue of their soul, but also vegetative and 
sensitive capacities, humans are organismal, animal, and rational by nature. Given this, 
every human being is a person, an animal, and an organism for every moment of her 
existence. Furthermore, if any person is of human descent, this is good evidence that the 
person is a human being and a human animal; and, if any animal is of human descent, this 
is good evidence that the animal is a human being and a human person.347 
Since a soul is necessary for the existence, unity, capacities, operations, and 
actions of an organism, the presence of vegetative, sensitive, or rational capacities, 
operations and actions in an integrated body is sufficient evidence that the body is at least 
an organism with a soul.348 Since human beings are by nature rational, animal, and 
                                                            
346 This is the case on either the formal or the material continuity view.  
 
347 I say it is good evidence rather than sufficient evidence because of the theory of 
speciesization via natural selection on genetic mutation. That is, the human species may eventually give 
rise to a new species of animal via the process of natural selection acting on genetic mutations. So, there 
may eventually be some animal of human descent that is not a human being. There may even come a day 
when the fact that a person is of human descent is not good evidence that the person is a human being (a 
day, for example, when all human beings are extinct but the persons that arose from human beings still 
exist). On another note, if delayed hominization is true, then not every organism of human descent is a 
human being, let alone a person. On delayed hominization, the early fetus is an organism of human 
descent that does not possess a rational soul, and so, is not a human being or person. But see chapter 3 
where I give reasons for thinking that it is open to the hylomorphist to accept immediate hominization 
rather than delayed hominization.  
 
348 “The soul is in every part of that being, and it is the source (as formal principle) of all of that 
being’s actions, operations and capacities (root capacities [natural capacities] as well as immediately 
exercisable capacities) (Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae de Anima (QDA) a.10, Summa Theologiae (ST), I., 
q.76, Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) II, 72).” Melissa Moschella, “Deconstructing the Brain Disconnection-
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organismal, there can be no there can be no rational, sensitive, or vegetative capacities in 
an integrated body of human descent without that body being a composite of prime 
matter and rational soul.349 Thus, the existence of an integrated human body that displays 
any living operations at all (whether rational, sensitive, or vegetative) is sufficient 
evidence for the existence of at least one human being (and thus, at least one human 
person, animal, and organism).350 
                                                            
Brain Death Analogy and Clarifying the Rationale for the Neurological Criterion of Death,” Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 41, no. 3 (2016): 284. 
 
349 I added the integration requirement since a fresh corpse is a material body of human descent 
in which some organismal functions take place, I added that the activities of the body must be integrated 
rather than merely coordinated. The organismal functions taking place in a corpse are not directed by the 
corpse as a whole, but are the coordinated activities of living parts of the corpse. Second, in defining an 
integrated organic body, Maureen Condic distinguishes between coordinated activities and integrated 
activities. For example, “while cells, tissues, organs, and organ systems engage in extremely complex 
coordinated activities, in nature they are not in themselves organisms because they are integrated into, at 
the service of, and globally regulated by the organism of which they are part and by which they were 
formed. In isolation from the whole, these parts lack the autonomous capacity to sustain their own 
functions, and can remain alive only with the aid of artificial interventions, such as culture medium or, in 
the case of organs, the perfusion of oxygenated blood.” Organisms, though, are integrated wholes. 
According to Condic, “all of the activities of an organism are globally and autonomously integrated to 
promote the continued life, health, and maturation of the organism as a whole. Thus, what differentiates 
genuine organismal integration from the coordination which occurs at the cell and tissue levels is that 
organismal integration is both global and autonomous. It is global in the sense that the activities of all the 
vital parts are regulated and organized to promote the health and survival of the whole (rather than just 
the survival of the parts themselves). It is autonomous in the sense that this regulation and organization is 
carried out by the organism itself.” Maureen Condic, “Determination of Death: A Scientific Perspective on 
Biological Integration,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41, no. 3 (2016): 260.  
 
350 I do not want to claim that this is sufficient evidence for at most one human being because I 
want to leave open the possibility that human beings can overlap. I’d like to thank David Hershenov for 
giving me the strategy of inferring the presence of a rational animal by the presence of either the rational 
or animal functions. Maureen Condic and Melissa Moschella also use this strategy, but in order to 
determine if a human being is living or dead: “Determination of Death: A Scientific Perspective on 
Biological Integration,” 264; Melissa Moschella, “Deconstructing the Brain Disconnection-Brain Death 
Analogy and Clarifying the Rationale for the Neurological Criterion of Death,” 290.  
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At a certain point in development, human organisms develop a brain, which then 
serves as the central integrator of the human body.351 Since the soul is the principle of life 
in human beings, there can be no functioning human brain, which carries out organismal 
functions in an integrated body, without the presence of the soul. Given this, on 
hylomorphism, the following epistemic principle is true: the presence, in an integrated 
body of human descent, of a functioning brain (a central integrator) that regulates 
organismal function is good evidence that the body is a human being.352 Furthermore, 
since human beings are animal and rational by nature, the presence of organismal, animal 
or rational functions that are regulated by a central integrator in an integrated body of 
human descent is good evidence for the presence of a human person – a rational animal. 
So, the presence of a brain that supports rational, animal, or organismal functions in an 
integrated human body is sufficient evidence for the presence of a human person – a 
rational animal. Furthermore, if each human being has only one central integrator (at a 
time), then the existence of two brains that support separate rational functions in an 
integrated human body is sufficient evidence that the body houses two human persons 
and thus two human organisms and animals.  
Now, the brain as a whole (brain stem and cerebrum) serves as the central 
integrator, but in the absence of the cerebrum, the brain stem is able to serve as the 
central integrator, controlling vegetative functions such as circulation and respiration in a 
                                                            
351 Maureen Condic makes the metaphysical claim that a centrally integrated human body that 
carries out organismal functions is necessary and sufficient for the persistence of a human being.  
 
352 Though she thinks that the brain is the central integrator of the human body, she doesn’t 
think we begin when our brain develops. Rather, she thinks that other organs take on the role of the 
central integrator before that point. Maureen Condic, “Determination of Death: A Scientific Perspective 
on Biological Integration,” 262. 
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human being.353 So the presence of a functioning brain stem that supports vegetative 
functions in an integrated human body is sufficient evidence for the presence of a human 
organism, and thus, a human person (and animal). And, as above, if each human being 
possesses only one central integrator, the presence of two brain stems in an integrated 
human body is sufficient evidence for the presence of two human organisms, and thus, 
two persons (and animals). If it cannot be shown that each human being has only one 
central integrator, the presence of two central integrators – “two distinct capacities for 
coordinating and regulating the various life [vital] processes” – that control different 
portions of an integrated body seems to be good evidence of two human organisms (and 
thus, two persons and animals) in that body.354 
The non-hylomorphic animalist can use similar reasoning to argue that the brain 
and brain stem are the control centers and integrators of the body and are therefore 
indicative of the presence of an organism. Furthermore, given that they claim that all 
human persons are organisms, the non-hylomorphic animalist can claim that the presence 
of a person in an integrated human body is sufficient evidence of the presence of a human 
organism. However, given that organisms (on non-hylomorphic animalism) can survive 
without being persons, the non-hylomorphic animalist cannot claim that the presence of a 
human organism is sufficient evidence for the presence of a human person.   
Now that I have given the above hylomorphic principles for detecting human 
organisms, I can apply these principles to conjoined twins. Consider craniopagus 
                                                            
353 Moschella, “Deconstructing the Brain Disconnection-Brain Death Analogy and Clarifying the 
Rationale for the Neurological Criterion of Death,” 292. 
 
354 Liao, “The Organism View Defended,” 340 
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parasiticus first. Campbell and McMahan think such cases present a problem for the 
animalist because they involve the possibility of two persons in one organism. On their 
hypothetical case of craniopagus parasiticus, the parasite head is completely rational, and 
thus, qualifies as a person. So does the host twin. However, they “reside” in one 
organism. I contend that there are indeed two persons, and that the two persons are each 
organisms in their own right. First, on hylomorphism, if the parasite twin is rational, then 
it qualifies as a person and possesses a rational soul. If it possesses a rational soul, then it 
possesses the natural potential for the vegetative and sensitive functions even if it is 
unable to exercise certain of those functions or if the non-parasitic twin carries on certain 
vegetative functions for the parasite twin. Furthermore, setting aside the metaphysical 
commitments of hylomorphism, in the case of the Bengali twins mentioned early, it 
seems true that the parasite twin was an animal in its own right (though a seriously 
malformed one). Consider, again, the report of the parasitic twin’s capabilities:  
When the boy cried or smiled, the features of the upper-head were not always 
affected, their movements seem to have been reflex: a pinch in the cheek 
produced a grimace, and when it was given the breast, its lips attempted to suck. 
The natural head and body were perfectly normally developed, but a number of 
anomalies were noted on an examination of the parasitic head: the corneal 
reflexes were missing and the eyes’ reaction to light was weak. When the child 
slept, the eyes of the parasitic twin might be open and moving, but when it was 
first awakened, the eyes of the two heads moved in the same direction; the heads’ 
eye-movements were normally independent. The lower jaw was rather small, but 
capable of motion.355  
It looks as though the parasitic twin in this case had – however limited – the capacities of 
sensation and voluntary movement, which are capacities that mere organisms lack. The 
parasite’s movements were sometimes independent of the host’s control, which means 
                                                            
355 Jan Bondeson and Elizabeth Allen, “Craniopagus Parasiticus,” 428.  
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that the source of some of the parasite’s movements were internal to it. Furthermore, the 
host twin had its own brain that was “separate and distinct” from the host twin’s brain 
and “enveloped in its proper covering.”356 Thus, the parasite twin had a brain of its own 
that seemed to support the animal functions of sensation and (limited) locomotion. Given 
this, the parasite twin seems to be a distinct human animal.  
To further support the case that the parasitic head is an animal, consider two other 
cases in which it seems that an animal can exist as a head. First, in an example envisioned 
by Campbell and McMahan, a human’s head is severed from the the body and kept alive 
artificially. Campbell and McMahan suppose that it is metaphysically possible for this to 
happen and for the severed head to exercise rationality. As in the case of the parasitic 
head, this severed head would presumably be able to sense as well – it retains the cranial 
nerves that attach to the brainstem and send sensory information to the cerebrum. 
(Cranial nerves “control [smell, vision,] hearing, eye movement, facial sensations, taste, 
swallowing and movement of the face, neck, shoulder and tongue muscles.” Ten of 
twelve cranial nerves stem from the brainstem; the other two stem from the cerebrum.357) 
Furthermore, if it can move its eyes around (as in the Bengali twins case) and adjust its 
gaze, which it presumably can do because of the cranial nerves, then it seems that it can 
see (barring some deficiency in the eyes). If this is possible, then on hylomorphism, since 
the head is able to exercise rationality and sensation, it possesses a rational soul, and thus, 
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177 
 
is a human being.358 It may be unable to exercise certain vegetative functions and require 
life support, but in virtue of possessing the rational soul, it possesses the natural potential 
for the vegetative functions.  
Now consider cases of high cervical spinal cord transection (SCI), a spinal cord 
injury as a result of which a patient shows “limited or absent autonomous integration of 
bodily functions” such as respiration and circulation.359 Given this, an SCI patient needs 
life support to survive. Even still, since such patients retain their capacity for rationality 
and sensation, they possess a rational soul. Given that they possess a rational soul, they 
still possess the natural potential for vegetative functions (including the potential to 
integrate the body) even if they require life support and are unable to exercise their 
capacity for vegetative functions because of a material deficiency—“in this case, the 
severing of the connections that would enable the brain to communicate with the rest of 
the body below the site of injury.”360 Finally, and most importantly, if they possess a 
rational soul, they are human beings, though highly maimed ones. If severed heads and 
SCI patients are human beings, it seems the parasitic head is a human being in spite of the 
fact that it requires life support from its twin and does not exercise its natural potential to 
                                                            
358 If the head is severed from the body, is the severed head the original human being or not? 
This question is not important for my purposes here, since I am simply attempting to show that human 
beings can exist as a head. However, I would argue that it is the original organism. Since, as Campbell and 
McMahan would presumably say, the severed head possesses the same psychology as the original person 
(it possesses the same memories, beliefs, etc.), the best explanation is that the rational soul continued to 
inhere in the matter of the head after it was severed from the body. 
  
359 Condic, “Determination of Death: A Scientific Perspective on Biological Integration,” 264, 268-
269. 
 
360 Condic, “Determination of Death: A Scientific Perspective on Biological Integration,” 268.  
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integrate the body. If this is true, it follows that exercising the capacity to integrate the 
body is not necessary for the persistence of a human being. 
The non-hylomorphic animalist can give a similar response to craniopagus 
parasiticus, arguing that the parasitic head is a maimed organism. But if the animalist, as 
Campbell and McMahan claim, requires organisms to be self-regulating and self-
sustaining for their existence, the parasitic head is not an organism. I would recommend 
that animalists reject that requirement. In addition, I would recommend that they claim 
that the presence of a rational being in an organic body of human descent is sufficient for 
the presence of an organism. After all, the parasitic head seems to be a human person, 
and on animalism, every human person is an organism.  
Next, consider cases of dicephalus. I agree with Campbell and McMahan that the 
Hensel twins appear to be two persons:  
they are clearly separate and distinct persons. Each has her own private mental 
life and her own character, each feels sensations only on her own side of the body, 
and each has exclusive control over limbs on her side.361 
If it is true that the presence of two brains supporting separate rational functions entails 
that there are two human persons, then dicephalus involves two human persons. If there 
are two persons, then there are two animals and organisms, on hylomorphism. But there 
is another reason for thinking that such cases involve two distinct persons (rather than, 
say, a single person with a divided mind) – as I argued earlier, human beings can survive 
as detached heads. If we detached one of the heads in a case of dicephalus or even both of 
them and kept them alive, there would be two distinct centers of consciousness in two 
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clearly distinct substances (unless a single substance can exist as a scattered object). If 
each of these distinct substances is self-conscious, can make decisions, can engage in 
trigonometry, etc., then it seems they are two distinct persons of human descent. But if 
so, then this is good evidence that they are two distinct human beings, and thus, two 
distinct human animals and organisms. 
We do not need to rely on the hylomorphic inference from persons to 
animals/organisms to support the claim that there are two human organisms and animals 
present in cases of dicephalus. First, there are two organisms. Since there exists in these 
cases two central integrators – “two distinct capacities for coordinating and regulating the 
various life [vital] processes” – that control different portions of the body, it seems there 
are two distinct, but overlapping organisms that together integrate the entire body 
mass.362 Second, there are two animals. Each twin only feels on one side of the body and 
controls the movements on one side of that body. This is because they each have a 
distinct brain – an internal source for their sensations and movements – that supports the 
animal functions of sensation and locomotion only on their own side of the body. Given 
this, I suggest we take them as two distinct animals that overlap. And if there are two 
organisms, then there are two persons according to hylomorphism. So these observations 
support the existence of two persons in the cases under review. Thus, I do not think that 
dicephalus is a clear counterexample to hylomorphic animalism (or even Olson’s 
animalism).  
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 Regarding cephalopagus, the hylomorphist should say that there are two clearly 
distinct organisms, and thus, two distinct persons. The non-hylomorphic animalist is at a 
disadvantage here: she cannot make the inference from human organisms to human 
persons because not every human organism is a human person. But why think there are 
two organisms present? As Campbell and McMahan say themselves, each of the two 
brain stems “is connected to the central nervous system below it in only one half of that 
mass. Each, in short, has regulatory capacities with respect to only one of the two 
organisms.”363 That is, there are two central integrators (two brain stems), each 
integrating and regulating different portions of the body mass. This suggests that there are 
two distinct organisms in these cases. But if there are two organisms, there are two 
animals and persons according to the hylomorphist.  
That there are two persons sharing a cerebrum might strike the reader as 
obviously false. But such a phenomenon may be possible. Consider the craniopagus twins 
Tatiana and Krista Hogan.364 Although they each possess their own brain, their brains 
partly overlap (through a bridge connecting each twin’s thalamus). As a result, they share 
sensory information. When one twin sees something, the other can see it even if her eyes 
are covered. When one tastes something, the other can taste it as well. When one feels 
pain, so does the other. But they are two distinct persons. Or consider the craniopagus 
twins Lori and Reba (George) Schappell. They each share 30% of their brain with their 
                                                            
363 Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” 300. 
 
364 Susan Dominus, “Could Conjoined Twins Share a Mind?,” New York Times Magazine, May 25, 
2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/magazine/could-conjoined-twins-share-a-mind?_r=0 (accessed July 
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twin, yet they are clearly distinct persons.365 If two people can have partly overlapping 
cerebra and remain numerically distinct, perhaps they can come to have completely 
overlapping cerebra and remain numerically distinct.366 David Hershenov gives a thought 
experiment in which two people with partly overlapping cerebra come to have completely 
overlapping cerebra. He compares this to partly overlapping roads that come to overlap 
completely through an earthquake. This situation, he thinks, is best described as two 
numerically distinct roads that come to share all the same material rather than two roads 
that merge into one since merging typically involves two objects coming together to form 
one larger object. Now, suppose that two conjoined twins each have their own brains, but 
their cerebra partially overlap. Suppose further that surgeons cut away the non-
overlapping brain matter so that the twins’ cerebra completely overlap and the brain 
matter remaining is sufficient to support consciousness. In such a case, it seems that there 
are two people who remain numerically distinct even though their cerebra completely 
overlap.367 But if this is so, then why can’t the hylomorphist claim that cases of 
                                                            
365 Ronald Schulz, Environmental Literacy in Science and Society: From Knowledge to Decisions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 181.  
  
366 I got this idea from David Hershenov, “Who Doesn’t Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers?,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 2 (April 2013): 203–6.  
 
367 Alternatively, one might say that one or neither of the twins survive the merging process. And 
one might say something analogous about Hershenov’s road example: that the merging of the roads 
results in one road (which may or may not be numerically identical to one of the original road). I would 
respond to this alternative reading of the “twin merger” case as follows. Even after the merger, there are 
two separate brain stems. Thus, there are two separate central integrators, each integrating and 
regulating different portions of the body mass. On the principles I laid out above, this means there are 
two organisms (and thus, for the hylomorphist, two persons). As for Hershenov’s road example, intuitions 
differ on whether or not the merged roads are one road or two numerically distinct roads. Hershenov has 
the intuition that they are distinct roads. But others do not have this intuition. So, perhaps Hershenov’s 
road example does not shed much light on the hypothetical case of the merging twins.    
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cephalopagus like those described by Campbell and McMahan involve two persons who 
share a cerebrum? 
Even if this response is a satisfactory account of the number of human animals 
and persons involved in this case of cephalopagus, this case still seems to lead to the 
various problems of too many thinkers for the hylomorphist and the non-hylomorphic 
animalist.368 First, it results in a version of the overcrowding problem. The overcrowding 
problem occurs when there are two or more numerically distinct thinkers who are co-
located and thinking the same thoughts. Though the thinkers are not co-located in this 
case of cephalopagus, it seems that they would share all the same thoughts. Thus, for the 
hylomorphist and the non-hylomorphic animalist, there is more than one thinker thinking 
the thoughts taking place in the shared cerebrum. Further, for the animalist who denies 
that both cephalopagus twins are persons, this case leads to the epistemic problem of too 
many thinkers. The epistemic problem occurs when a view entails that there are two 
numerically distinct thinkers – one of which is a person and the other of which fails to be 
a person – who are co-located and psychologically indistinguishable. Given this, the 
person cannot know whether it is the person or the non-person. Such is the case in 
                                                            
368 David Hershenov, “Who Doesn’t Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers?” 204. The problems 
of too many thinkers do not apply to the Hogan and Schappell cases. The overcrowding problem requires 
two thinkers who share the same thoughts and the epistemic and personhood problems require that two 
thinkers are co-located and psychologically indistinguishable. However, it is (empirically) evident that 
Tatiana and Krista do not share all the same thoughts and are psychologically distinguishable. The same 
goes for Lori and Reba. Furthermore, must we suppose that cephalopagus twins share all the same 
thoughts and are psychologically indistinguishable? Indeed, in actual cases of cephalopagus, each twin has 
a separate cerebellum, brainstem, and spinal cord. Perhaps these neural differences are significant 
enough that they would result in a difference in psychology – e.g., some difference in beliefs, thoughts, 
feelings, desires, personalities, etc. if the twins actually survived long enough to possess such developed 
psychologies. However, no cephalopagus twins have survived long enough for us to tell if they are 
psychologically indistinguishable and share all the same thoughts. Thus, the psychological character of 
such twins remains an open question.  
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cephalopagus if only one twin is a person. For the animalist like me who says that both 
twins are persons, a version of the epistemic problem of too many thinkers arises: if the 
twins share all the same thoughts, they will not be able to tell if they are the person on the 
left or the person on the right. For the animalist who denies that the twins are persons, 
this case leads to the personhood problem of too many thinkers. The personhood problem 
occurs when a view entails that there are two numerically distinct thinkers who are co-
located and psychologically indiscernible, but only one qualifies as a person. Such is the 
case in cephalopagus if only one twin is a person. For the animalist like me who says that 
both twins are persons, this problem does not arise.369    
 For their final criticism based on cases of conjoined twinning, Campbell and 
McMahan argued that the animalist has faces an intractable problem when the 
implications of both dicephalus and cephalopagus are considered. This is because they 
argue that the animalist cannot claim that there are two organisms in cases of dicephalus 
and one in cephalopagus or two in cephalopagus and one in dicephalus. But on my 
response, I claim that both cases of dicephalus and cases of cephalopagus involve two 
organisms. So, their criticism does not apply. 
 
 
                                                            
369 Though it does not take away the problems of too many thinkers from the animalist, it is 
worth noting that Campbell and McMahan suffer from a similar problem. They think that we are the size 
of brains. But if two different, partially overlapping brains can come to overlap completely while 
remaining numerically distinct, then there will be two of us sharing the same thoughts. See David 
Hershenov, “Who Doesn’t Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers?”  203–6.  
 
184 
 
Multiplication Problems Unique to Hylomorphism 
 Hylomorphism has the resources to answer the various multiplication problems 
that have been raised against animalism in the philosophical literature. But there are some 
multiplication worries for hylomorphism that are not problems for Olson’s animalism: 
the problem of the thinking soul and the problem of thinking accidental unities.  
Eric Olson raises the problem of the thinking soul against compound dualism, on 
which “each of us is made up of both a simply immaterial substance and a material 
organism.”370 On this view, human beings think because their souls think (which means 
that human beings think in a derivative sense). But if souls can think and human beings 
can think (in virtue of the soul), then there are too many thinkers.371 The same problem 
arises on hylomorphism if souls can think.372 How should the hylomorphist respond? 
First, note that the problem of the thinking soul is similar to the problem of thinking 
parts, in that a proper part of an organism seems to be candidate for thought just as much 
as the human being herself. Thus, the hylomorphist can respond to this problem in the 
                                                            
370 Eric Olson, What Are We? 168.  
 
371 Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons, 48, n.9; Eric Olson, “A Compound of Two Substances,” 
in Soul, Body, and Survival, ed. Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 73–88. In 
addition to the problem of too many thinkers, it is problematic to say that the human being thinks only in 
a derivative sense. As Chisholm points out: “There is no reason whatever for supposing that I hope for rain 
only in virtue of the fact that some other thing hopes for rain . . . If there are thus two things that now 
hope for rain, the one doing it on its own and the other such that its hoping is done for it by the thing that 
now happens to constitute it, then I am the former thing and not the latter thing”; Roderick Chisholm, 
Person and Object, 104. 
 
372 David Hershenov, “Soulless Organisms?”; Eric Hagedorn, “Is Anyone Else Thinking My 
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Philosophical Association 84 (2010): 275–86; Patrick Toner, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too 
Many Thinkers,” The Modern Schoolman 89, no. 3/4 (October 2012): 209–22.  
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same way, by denying that the proper parts of human beings are substances and claiming 
that only substances can think.373 Since the rational soul is a proper part of an organism, 
it is not a substance in itself. Rather, it comes together with prime matter to form the 
substance. If only substances can think, then the soul cannot think. At best, it contributes 
to the thinking that is done by the human being herself. The compound dualist cannot 
respond in the same way since he or she thinks that human souls are substances in their 
own right. 
Second, Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s particular view of human cognition rules out 
the soul as a subject of thought. For them, thinking is a complex act that requires various 
components of the human person, including the intellect (a power of the soul) and various 
physical parts of the human body.374 Given this, the soul in itself cannot think. Neither 
can any other individual component involved in the production of thought. Rather, human 
beings themselves think.375 Thus, the soul is not a thinker in addition to the human being, 
but merely contributes to the production of thought. 376  
                                                            
373 Aquinas denied that embodied souls can think. Instead, thinking is a compound act that is 
done by the substance and involves both body and soul: Toner, St. Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too 
Many Thinkers, 216-218.  
 
374 For the details of their view, see Victor Caston, “Phantasia and Thought,” 322–34; Eric 
Hagedorn, “Is Anyone Else Thinking My Thoughts: Aquinas’s Response to the Too-Many Thinkers 
Problem,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84 (2010): 275–86; Normann 
Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 128-159; Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 267-329; 
Christopher Shields, Aristotle, Routledge Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2007), 293-305; Stump, 
Aquinas, 244-276; Patrick Toner, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too Many Thinkers.” 
 
375 Aristotle, De Anima 1.1.403b7-10; Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.75.2.2; Stump, Aquinas, 273; 
Toner, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too Many Thinkers,” 216-218.  
 
376 A special problem of the thinking soul arises for those who hold that the soul of a human 
being survives the biological death of the human being. (Some who hold to this view are survivalists, 
according to which, the human being survives in a disembodied state with her soul as her only proper 
part. Others are corruptionists, according to which the soul survives disembodiment but the human being 
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Now consider the problem of thinking accidental unities. On hylomorphism, there 
are two sorts of matter-form composites. The first is a substance – a composite of prime 
matter and substantial form. The second is an accidental unity – a composite of secondary 
matter (i.e., a substance) and accidental form. The accidental unity of a substance and an 
accidental form is co-located with that substance. For example, Socrates is a composite of 
a chunk of prime matter and the substantial form human being. When Socrates sits, an 
accidental unity seated-Socrates is formed – a unity of Socrates and the accidental form 
being seated. Given this, one might think that a problem of too many thinkers arises. If 
seated-Socrates is co-located with Socrates and is psychologically identical to Socrates, 
since Socrates can think, shouldn’t Seated-Socrates be able to think as well? But seated-
Socrates is one of many accidental unities that is located where Socrates is. If seated-
Socrates can think, then every other accidental unity that is located where Socrates is 
should be able to think as well: pale-Socrates, snub-nosed-Socrates, philosopher-
Socrates, teacher-of-Plato-Socrates, etc. If so, then there are many more thinkers where 
Socrates is than we originally thought. Further, if Socrates is a person, then all these 
accidental unities should count as persons as well. Finally, if these accidental unities are 
psychologically indiscernible from Socrates, how can Socrates tell that he’s the person 
rather than one of the accidental unities?    
This objection to hylomorphism is based on an ontological confusion. Accidental 
unities are not entities that are numerically distinct from the substances that serve as their 
                                                            
does not. For a discussion of these views, see Patrick Toner, “On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity.”) 
They believe that the soul can think in such a state. But if the soul can think when disembodied, why can’t 
it think when embodied? And if it can think when embodied (and if the human being thinks), then the 
problem of the thinking soul arises. Olson, What Are We? 174-175.   
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matter. Rather, they are modifications or properties of substances.377 The accidental form 
being seated is a property of the Socrates that he possesses when seated and lacks when 
standing. Thus, no new thinker is added to the world when Socrates sits down. Instead, 
the same thinker, Socrates, thinks while existing in a different form. Perhaps an analogy 
will help to clarify things. On Olson’s animalism, the human organism thinks and the 
human person thinks. But there is not a problem of too many thinkers because persons are 
numerically identical to organisms. Human persons just are organisms in a certain phase 
of their existence. When the organism becomes a person, there is no duplication of 
entities, just a modification of the single entity. Similarly, the substance Socrates thinks 
and the accidental unity seated-Socrates thinks. But there is not a problem of too many 
thinkers because there is no duplication of entities. Seated-Socrates is numerically 
identical to Socrates. Seated-Socrates just is Socrates in a certain form.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
377 Robert Pasnau, “Philosophy of Mind and Human Nature,” 360.  
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